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ABSTRACT 
 
This study relies on the cases of the Czech Republic and Chile to examine the 
ways in which state policies affect women‘s movements‘ emergence under both 
authoritarian and democratic political regimes.  As such, this dissertation provides some 
important clues into how citizens‘ experience with certain policies enhances or delimits 
their future political action, and how it affects their beliefs and attitudes.  Gaining a better 
understanding about the relationship between policies and civic participation is 
particularly important in the case of young democracies, which are trying to overcome 
their authoritarian past, and whose new democratic political regimes are in some 
instances yet to be fully consolidated.   
This dissertation suggests that the policy context within which social movements 
operate is an important factor in shaping what social movements can do.  The research 
presented here reveals that when grievances are present, such as accusations of gender 
inequality, women are more likely to mobilize in protest in situations when the state uses 
public policy to define women‘s role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor. In 
contrast, if public policies are enabling women to reconcile their maternal and public 
roles, women are less like to organize on the basis of their gender identity to protest the 
state.  
This occurs on both the individual and group level.  In-depth interviews with 
Czech women reveal that if the state provides policy support to women to reconcile their 
traditional and public roles, women become less conscious of the state‘s role in their 
lives.  They tend to view the state as a diffuse set of actors and ideas that do not create a 
 
 
coherent whole.  In contrast, if state policies provide little support for women‘s 
participation in the public sphere, individuals find it much easier to articulate who the 
state is and how it affects their lives.  Furthermore, public policy also affect movements 
on the group level – complex policies supporting both women‘s traditional and public 
roles are likely to create multiple camps within a formerly unified movement and lead to 
movement fragmentation and demise.  In contrast, policies emphasizing women‘s 
traditional roles only make it easy for movement leaders and actors to identify key issues 
and subsequently organize for collective action. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1980‘s, Chilean women mobilized in large numbers to provide food for 
their communities and to demand the return of their children violently abducted by the 
military regime; they also formed feminist organizations in order to advance their rights 
as women.  In the context of a repressive military dictatorship that was known to strictly 
punish any form of civil disobedience, Chilean women successfully marched in the 
streets and fearlessly engaged the government of General Augusto Pinochet.  Once the 
military regime fell, the women‘s movement in Chile disintegrated.  Even though women 
continued to face serious discrimination at home, in the workplace, and also in the social 
and political life of the country, women‘s mobilization efforts became more fragmented 
and less visible.   
Around the same time Chilean women were organizing against the military 
government, Czech women living under a totalitarian communist regime found it difficult 
to organize on the basis of their gender identity.  Instead, responding to poverty and the 
shortcomings of the inefficient centrally planned economy, Czech women relied on an 
existing system of bribes and interpersonal networks to obtain the services and goods 
needed to sustain their families.  In response to state terror and widespread violations of 
human rights by the communist government, women formed alliances with men to take 
action. And rather than organizing around feminist concepts and ideas in the face of 
gender discrimination and inequality, they ridiculed them and largely accepted what was 
defined as a woman‘s role in society.  Once under democracy, Czech women did not 
form a broad-based cohesive women‘s movement either.   
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These developments took place in a context where both Czech and Chilean 
women were experiencing important gender inequalities in employment, politics and in 
the home.  They all had much to lose in the democratic transformation processes 
(Moghadam 1993).  In the Czech Republic, for example, unemployment for women 
escalated beyond the rates for men soon after the political turnover; social protections 
established under communist regimes weakened; quotas for holding political office were 
abolished; and women‘s reproductive rights were threatened (see Jaquette and Wolchik 
1998).   
Therefore, women in the two countries faced gender discrimination and inequality 
under both authoritarianism and democracy, but the glaring difference being that in Chile, 
the state attempted to clearly define women in unequal terms to men, while in the Czech 
Republic, the communist state attempted to elevate their role in society by forcing the 
appearance of equality in the labor markets and creating seemingly progressive 
protections for women as both mothers and laborers.   
Although Chile and the Czech Republic are two different countries located in very 
different parts of the world, their patterns of women‘s mobilization have been fairly 
representative of the developments in their respective regions.
1
  While in the 1980‘s, the 
military regimes in Latin America typically experienced women‘s organized efforts to 
advance various political, social and economic grievances and promote gender equality, 
women in communist Central and Eastern Europe showed reluctance to organize as 
women.  Furthermore, the previously intensive women‘s mobilization in the Latin 
American region disintegrated soon after the democratic turnover; in Eastern Europe, 
women never organized into a cohesive movement to protect or advance their rights 
                                                 
1
More information about the regions will be provided in the research design section of this dissertation.  
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under the newly democratic regimes of the 1990‘s (see Alvarez 1990; Baldez 2002; 2003; 
Basu 1995; Dandavati 1996; Einhorn 2003; Jaquette 1989; 1994; 2001; Jaquette and 
Wolchik 1998; Kaplan 2004; Lee and Clark 2000; Ray 1999; Tripp 2003; Wieringa 
1997).
 2
  Surely, women continued to form a variety of women‘s organizations and many 
still engaged the state from within to advance their agenda, but they did not mobilize into 
a sustained, broad based movement such as the one seen in dictatorial Chile of the 
1980‘s.  
In this dissertation, I use the cases of the Czech Republic and Chile to examine 
these differences in women‘s mobilization across the two regions and two distinct 
historical periods.  I focus on the processes through which state policies affect women‘s 
ability and willingness to organize for collective action, and I study the relationship 
between policy and women‘s movements under both authoritarianism and democracy.
 
  
According to social movement theorists, women‘s and social movements more 
generally emerge as a result of some combination of the following three broad factors: (1) 
availability of resources; (2) perceived opening of political opportunities
3
; and (3) 
existence of perceived grievances associated with issue framing and members‘ collective 
identities
4
 (see Gamson and Meyer 1996; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; 
McCarthy and Zald 1977; 1996; McAdam et al. 1996; Meyer 1990; Snow and Benford 
1988; Staggenborg 2011; Swidler 1995; Tarrow 1998).  In both Chile and the Czech 
                                                 
2
 For the purposes of this paper, I use terms such as ‗women‘s mobilization‘, ‗women‘s activism‘ and 
‗women‘s movement‘ interchangeably.  In general terms, I employ Sidney Tarrow‘s (1998) definition of 
social movements: ―collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained 
interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities‖ (4)  Based on this definition, I understand women‘s 
movements as social movements where women act collectively as women. Baldez (2002) suggests that all 
women‘s movements invoke their identity as women in order to emphasize their uniqueness in relation to 
men and their interest in having greater access to decision making. Such norms comprise a set of 
understandings that reflect women‘s widespread exclusion from political power.   
3
 This has become known as the ‗political process approach‘  in social movement theory. 
4
 Also known as the ‗cultural approach‘ in social movement theory. 
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Republic, I demonstrate, women could draw on a variety of resources and mobilizing 
structures. As the Chilean case documents, even when a political opportunity was not 
present, women innovatively created one for themselves.  Therefore, the sole presence of 
resources and broadly defined political opportunities do not seem able to explain the 
regional and historical difference in women‘s organizing across the two regions.  Instead, 
I rely and elaborate on a combination of two of the approaches described above.  They 
are the political process approach which examines the role that politics plays in social 
movement emergence, and the cultural approach which pays attention to how issues are 
framed by movement leaders.  Rather than focusing solely on the presence or absence of 
political opportunities, as much of the existing research devoted to social movement 
emergence has done, I concentrate on the ways in which policy-making affects women‘s 
organizing.   
In other words, my research suggests that the policy context within which social 
movements operate is an important factor in shaping what social movements can do. 
While Chilean women living under a military dictatorship were successful in framing 
their grievances and coming together to protest against the widespread violation of 
human rights, gender inequality and economic injustice, Czech women were not able to 
find a common voice either under the communist or the subsequent democratic regime. 
Similarly, women leaders in the newly democratic Chile lost their ability to frame their 
issues in ways that would resonate with the public as well. An important part of the 
explanation for these outcomes lies in the policies developed, presented and implemented 
by these states.    
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Despite the extensive body of literature devoted to social mobilization, little has 
been done to date to systematically explore the relationship between policies and social 
movements.  As David Meyer noted in 2005, ―public policy (has been) treated as a 
relatively minor part of the structure of political opportunities that might spur social 
movements‖ (Meyer et al. 2005, 6).   This research deficit is evident in the case of old 
democracies of North America and Western Europe (for discussion of this, see Pierson 
1993 or Mettler and Soss 2004), but especially in the case of countries in regions such as 
Latin America and Eastern Europe that have just two decades ago undergone radical and 
wide-ranging political transformations.   
The general lack of research in this area is puzzling given the possible 
implications of these ‗policy feedback‘ effects for the development and maintenance of 
democratic citizenship in these nations.
5
  In order to understand the complexities of 
democratic political processes, we need know how ―policies transform and expand the 
identities, political goals, and capabilities of various social groups that subsequently 
struggle or ally in politics‖ (Skocpol 1992, 58).  In other words, we ought to be able to 
explain why some policies ultimately promote political action from the mass public while 
others impede it.   
This question is of a particular importance in young democracies which are trying 
to overcome their authoritarian past and whose new democratic political regimes are in 
some instances yet to be fully consolidated.  It is important to find answers to questions 
about how citizens‘ experience with certain policies enhances or delimits their future 
political action, how it affects their beliefs and attitudes.  Inspired by existing descriptive 
                                                 
5
 Theda Skocpol (1992) defines ‗policy feedback‘ as the ways in which ―policies, once enacted, restructure 
subsequent political processes‖ (cited in Mettler and Soss 2004, 8). 
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studies about women and their social position in new democracies, and by the literature 
on policy feedback in the political science literature, this study concentrates on processes 
and cases that have been understudied the most.   Specifically, I focus on: 
(a) policy feedback effects in countries that have recently undergone wide-
ranging political transformations;  
(b) the  mass public rather than political elites;  
(c) the formation of spontaneous social movements rather than formal political  
processes.    
Furthermore, this dissertation contributes to the literature on women‘s (and other 
social) movements and politics and history literature in additional ways.  First, studies on 
women‘s activism in democratizing regions have in the past typically consisted of single 
case studies that have been normally compared to and discussed in opposition to 
women‘s movements in the West.  The resulting generalizations and arguments are less 
convincing when viewed against the developments in other non-Western regions.  This 
dissertation avoids this problem by comparing two non-Western cases - Chile and the 
Czech Republic.   Second, this study bridges literature on social movements, 
democratization and policy feedback in order to explain the empirical puzzle.  Finally, it 
is one of the first studies to explore policy feedback effects in the context of young 
democracies. 
 
Research design  
This project examines the effects of public policies on social movements through 
a detailed study of women‘s movements in two new democracies: Chile and the Czech 
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Republic.   I use the cases of Chile and the Czech Republic because despite some 
differences, the two countries are similar in terms of population, size, economy and the 
timing of their transitions to democracy (see figure 1.1).  Furthermore, each of the two 
country cases allows me to study the emergence (and non-emergence) of women‘s 
movements under two distinctive policy regimes – first authoritarian and later democratic 
(each with its distinctive gender ideology).  
 
Figure 1.1  An overview of basic characteristics of Chile and Czechoslovakia. 
 Chile Czechoslovakia 
Previous regime Military dictatorship  
(1973 – 1988) 
Totalitarian/Communist 
(1948 – 1989) 
Current regime Liberal democracy 
(1989 – current) 
Liberal democracy 
(1990 – current) 
Authoritarian state policies 
toward women 
Traditionalist (emphasis 
on motherhood) 
Mixed: Emancipatory  (full 
employment, education, 
gender quota) + 
Traditionalist (pro-natalist) 
Income category (World 
Bank) 
Lower-middle until 1992; 
Upper middle since 1993 
Lower-middle until 1993 
(Czechoslovakia); Upper-
middle since 1994 (Czech 
Republic) 
Population 15 million 15 million (10 million in the 
Czech Republic since 1993) 
First free elections 1989 1990  
Suffrage for women 1949 1918 
Prior experience with 
democracy 
Yes (limited democracy, 
late 19th C -1973) 
Yes (1918 – 1939; 1945-
1948 ) 
Religion Catholic (high 
participation) 
Catholic (low participation) 
 
Furthermore, while Chile and the Czech Republic differ in regard to the prior 
regime type and their state policies, they are, in regard to these characteristics, relatively 
representative of the other countries in their respective regions.  Certainly, some 
important intra-regional differences existed (Batt 2007; Bunce 1999; Ekiert 1996; Rupnik 
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1999; Htun 2003), but they were ―relatively minor when seen from a larger comparative 
perspective‖ (Howard 1999, 5).
6
   
First, the political and social developments in Czechoslovakia and the transitional 
Czech Republic were fairly typical of the developments in the Eastern European region.  
By the 1950‘s, according to Jowitt (1992), all the communist countries were 
characterized by the same institutional and ideological mechanisms.  An important line of 
thought in comparative politics represented by, for example, Valerie Bunce and Marc 
Howard argues that state socialism and post-state socialism were unique compared to 
other regimes.  These scholars suggest that these countries have shared a distinctive 
combination of political, economic and social characteristics arising from their historical 
experience (Bunce 1995).  These countries also share the low levels of women‘s 
independent organizing experienced under both communism and democracy.  The only 
two countries in the Eastern Bloc that experienced a short period of what resembled a 
fairly unified women‘s movement were those of East Germany and Russia.  However, 
East Germany represents an outlier case due to its political proximity to former West 
Germany and its movement toward German unification.  The Russian case is addressed in 
more detail in the concluding chapter.   Nowhere in communist or post-communist 
Europe did women organize into a unified movement on the basis of their gender 
identity. 
                                                 
6
 In his study of post-communist civil society, Howard (1999) suggests that the discussion of differences 
among post-communist countries is primarily relevant for the level of institutions or elites, while one is 
more likely to find significant similarities on the mass/societal level. The political and economic 
transformations have brought important changes in existing institutional structure (possible to change 
quickly), but societal attitudes and behavior change gradually.  He builds on some existing survey research 
that points to some of these similarities on the mass level. 
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Second, the developments in Chile were relatively representative of the 
developments in the Latin American region as a whole.  Chile, similar to the majority of 
other Latin American countries experienced military dictatorship in the second part of the 
20
th
 century.   In fact, by 1980 democratically elected civilian governments in Latin 
America could only be found in Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Mexico.  
Furthermore, while Eastern and Central European women were not organizing to advance 
their rights, women in Chile and in other Latin American countries did both during the 
1970‘s and also the 1980‘s.  In addition to Chile, Latin American women also formed a 
unified movement in countries as diverse as Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Haiti, 
Mexico, Peru or Uruguay (for overview, see Jacquette 1989, 2001; Stephen 1997).  
The two cases also present an interesting puzzle.  Under both the former 
authoritarian and current democratic rule, women in both Chile and the Czech Republic 
faced many inequalities in employment, political representation and division of labor in 
the home.  And yet, women in Chile and Latin America more generally organized in a 
unified movement to defend and advance their rights during the oppressive authoritarian 
regime, while women in the Czech Republic and post-communist Europe did not.     
The hesitance of Czech women to organize as women during the political window 
of opportunity in the early 1990‘s is especially interesting given that Czech women were 
exceptionally active in advancing their rights before the communist coup of the late 
1940‘s.  Because of the previously high level of activism, one would expect Czech 
women, more than women in any other country of the post-communist region, to take up 
the strong tradition of women‘s organizing once democratic transition occurred, but that 
did not happen.  The low levels of women‘s activism during and after the democratic 
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transition in in the Czech Republic and post-communist Europe more generally may also 
seem unusual in the face of other types of activism that were on the rise during this time.  
For example, environmental movements have been emerging since the early 1980‘s, and 
have strongly contributed to the democratic transformations in the region (see Jancar-
Webster 1993; Pickvance 1998; Sarre and Jehlicka 2007).  Czech women had a strong 
presence within these alternative movements, but they never came together on the basis 
of their gender identity. 
While being similar in a number of ways, Chile and the Czech Republic are 
undeniably two different countries, each identified by a particular history, culture and 
geography.  Notably, they differ in their prior regime type (authoritarian vs. totalitarian) 
and consequently also in regards to the specific type of public policies (policy regimes).  
This variation in authoritarian/totalitarian state policy also became reflected in the public 
policies subsequently developed and implemented under the new democratic regimes.  
One might argue that these two cases represent what Theda Skocpol and Margaret 
Somers (1980) once called ―contrast of contexts‖.  As such, they ―bring out the unique 
features of each particular case included in their discussions, and show how these unique 
features affect the working-out of putatively general social processes‖ (178).   
 
Methodology 
The evidence presented in this dissertation has been collected primarily by using 
secondary data in the form of historical studies and newspaper articles.  To ensure the 
accuracy of the information and to entertain alternative points of view and interpretations 
of different events, I supplemented this material with information from archival 
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documents, with available survey and other statistical data, and also with personal 
interviews I have conducted with activists, policy-makers and researchers in the two 
countries.  These additional sources of data allowed me to question the information 
offered in the secondary evidence sources, and they also provided additional information 
and thus contributed to the development of new lines of argumentation presented in this 
study. 
During my research in Czech and Chilean archives and libraries, I focused on 
studies, newspaper articles, surveys and other documents that provided information about 
policy-making under both authoritarianism and democracy. I also collected historical and 
current information about women‘s groups and about the formation of women‘s 
movements in both countries. To get a better understanding of the general social, 
political, economic and cultural context under which policies provided opportunities and 
obstacles for women‘s mobilization in Chile and the Czech Republic, I also paid attention 
to studies providing reliable information in regard to these topics, especially those that 
took gender differences into consideration. 
While I have obtained some of the survey and other statistical data from 
publications available in U.S. libraries, I have collected the majority of the material in 
research centers and local libraries I visited during my field trips to Chile and the Czech 
Republic. In the Czech Republic, these included the National Library of the Czech 
Republic, Central Library of Charles University in Prague, the library of the Communist 
Party of the Czech Republic, and the Gender Studies library in Prague.  In Chile, I 
conducted my research in the library of the National Library in Santiago, in the library of 
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Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO-Chile) in Santiago, in the library of 
the National Service for Women (SERNAM) and in the National Archives of Chile.  
  Because I was particularly concerned with the reliability of the survey and other 
data collected under the communist and authoritarian regimes, I have consulted local 
social scientists and researchers to verify the accuracy of the information accessed in 
specific survey studies and other reports.  I have done this during personal interviews I 
conducted in both Chile and the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2008. 
In terms of archival documents, I relied on primary documents compiled mainly 
by women‘s organizations.  These included meeting minutes, public statements, project 
proposals, letters and other relevant documents.  Namely, in the Czech Republic, I have 
been able to access a large numbers of materials produced under the communist regime 
by the state run women‘s organization Union of Women.  I have accessed this 
information through the Czech National Archive in Prague and through the Gender 
Studies Center library. 
I supplemented this evidence with information gained through interviews with 
activists, experts and policy-makers in the two countries.  I have conducted a total of 43 
interviews.  I completed a total of 34 interviews between 2005 and 2006 in the Czech 
Republic, and a total of 9 interviews in Chile in 2009.   The reason for conducting a 
significantly higher number of interviews in the Czech Republic lies in the fact that 
unlike in Chile, very little literature exists on the emergence (or lack of thereof) of Czech 
women‘s movements.  Therefore, I was forced to look for alternative sources of 
information.  Admittedly, the number of Chilean interviews is also lower because it 
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proved to be much more difficult for me, as a foreigner, to gain access to Chilean 
respondents.  
During these interviews, I used purposive rather than probability sampling to 
select respondents (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1996).  Both in the Czech Republic 
and in Chile, I started my selection with a list of names I compiled based on available 
secondary literature.  The main goal of this selection was to find individuals who were 
either particularly active around women‘s issues or who were viewed as ones 
knowledgeable about the position of women in the society and about public policy 
making as it pertained to women.  I continued to update this list through a snowball 
method as the interviews progressed and respondents recommended others to be 
contacted.  I purposely asked respondents to recommend not only others who share their 
views and beliefs, but also those who were likely to disagree and hold different views.   
Influenced by the feminist methodology of Shulamit Reinharz and Lynn 
Davidman (1992) I conducted open-ended, in-depth interviews.  The open-ended 
approach to interviewing allowed the respondents to emphasize, in their own words, the 
aspects of their life choices and strategies that they assigned greatest importance 
(Spradley 1979).  These interviews allowed greater flexibility in terms of follow up 
questions and therefore fuller understanding of various motives within the lives of the 
individual respondents who were interviewed (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 
1996).   
I compiled a different set of questions for the different types of respondents; 
activists, policy-makers and academics.  In each category, the same set of basic questions 
was followed during each interview (see Appendix A).  These served as a basic guideline 
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that intended to motivate the respondents to freely talk about their experiences, 
recollections and opinions.  Additional questions were asked depending on the individual 
respondent and his or her narrative. Respondents were asked not only about their own 
lives, but also about their views regarding certain general trends and patterns.  All 
interviews were transcribed in their entirety.  First I considered the interviews in their full 
length and later extracted quotations from the larger texts.  I then sorted these quotes 
according to different themes into clusters. In sorting the quotes, I paid attention to any 
trends that would stand out. 
  
Outline of the Argument 
Both in Chile and the Czech Republic, levels of women‘s mobilization have been 
intimately linked with the changing nature of the two states and their policies.  The 
relationship between policies and women‘s action found in Chile and the Czech Republic 
is similar to that illustrated in the policy feedback scholarship in American politics.  My 
research confirms that citizens‘ level of political participation is influenced by their 
experience with public policy (see Mettler and Soss 2004).  Namely, my research 
suggests that whether women will be requesting a public role will depend on a particular 
policy context.  If public policies provide support for the reconciliation of women‘s 
maternal and public roles, women will be less likely to mobilize into a cohesive women‘s 
movement. 
  This relationship between policy and social movement development becomes 
clearer when one explores the nature of state policies toward women in the four cases 
presented here: Chile under the military regime, Chile during democratic transition, 
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communist Czech Republic/Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic during the democratic 
transition.
 7
   
Under the totalitarian regime, the Czechoslovak communist state introduced many 
policies which Western women typically view as progressive.   For example, the 
Czechoslovak state made an effort to include women in the job market, raise female 
educational levels and incorporate women into formal politics.
8
   At the same time, 
through its pro-natalist policies, the state reinforced women‘s roles as those of mothers 
and housekeepers.  These policies have enabled women to reconcile their maternal and 
public roles.  At the same time, the mixed messages  regarding women‘s position, women 
could not identify a clear ideological stance they could use to advance their grievances.  
Furthermore, because of the state rhetoric regarding women‘s emancipation, Czech 
women have over time come to associate emancipation and women‘s rights with the 
totalitarian political regime (Heitlinger 1996; Wolchik & Jaquette 1998).  This combined 
with a lack of legitimacy enjoyed by the regime resulted in a situation where women 
were willing to join men and organize around non-women‘s or non-feminist issues, but 
not on the basis of their gender identity.
9
 
                                                 
7
 Note that Czechoslovakia as a sovereign country came to its end in January 1993 when the independent 
states of Slovakia and the Czech Republic were formed.  In this work, I focus on the Czech Republic region 
of the formerly federal republic of Czechoslovakia when I discuss the developments that took place under 
the communist regime.  I use this simplification because as a result of the capital city of Prague‘s political 
and geographical position, much of the relevant policy-making and women‘s activism under the communist 
regime took place in the Czech lands.   
8
 For the purposes of this paper, the terms formal and mainstream politics encompass office holding on 
federal or national level, and more specifically leading posts in the main legislative and executive decision-
making bodies. 
9
 By the 1980‘s, public opinion polls documented that citizens blamed the regime for worsening living 
standards, worsening environmental pollution, problems in healthcare, long-term existence of failing 
economy and other (Forst et al. 1989).  In a 1988 opinion poll conducted by UVVM, over 90% of 
Czechoslovak citizens suggested a need for further democratization of the Czechoslovak society (Misovic a 
kol 1988).   
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Later, after communism fell in 1989, the Czech Republic experienced an 
overwhelming public enthusiasm for a capitalist economy and right-wing parties – the 
traditional targets of criticism from women‘s movements in countries that did not 
undergo the long period of state socialism.  The new state emphasis on individualism and 
free market participation continued to encourage women to participate in the labor market 
and the public sphere more generally.  At the same time, the remaining protectionist 
policies of the communist state have continued to provide support for women‘s 
traditional roles in the home.  As a result of these policies, Czech women still find it 
difficult to identify a common language that would allow them to organize on the basis of 
their gender identity.  While women are active in the newly formed civil society, by using 
the rhetoric of Marxism and equality, the communist state alienated women from using 
this common ‗frame‘ for articulation of gender inequalities.  The concepts of equality and 
women‘s rights could not resonate with women or the mass public in post-communist 
countries because these were terms and notions earlier used (and abused) by the 
communist states.   This situation has been further exacerbated by a lack of available 
information about the feminist achievements in other countries, and by an intense 
misinterpretation of women‘s movements and demands in the media.  
 Unlike the Czech totalitarian regime, the Chilean military dictatorship was very 
clear on where the role of women was.  Here, the combination of the traditionalist gender 
ideology and the neoliberal economic reforms played out differently than they did in the 
Czech case. In Chile, the state made it clear that women were not welcomed in the public 
sphere.  The traditionalist gender policies aimed to exclude women from political life, 
and through these policies, the state removed some of the earlier accomplishments of the 
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Chilean women‘s movement.  In a very paradoxical way, these were the very same 
measures that also created political space for women to return to the public arena.  
Framing their issues in terms of their roles as good mothers and wives, women responded 
to the economic and human rights crises by engaging the state through its own rhetoric 
and policies (Baldez 2002; Waylen 1994).  Similar frames remained unavailable to 
Chilean men.   
 Avoiding ‗Western feminism‘, Chilean women subsequently framed their issues 
in Marxist terms.  Again, through its repressive measures against labor unions and other 
traditionally leftist groups, the Chilean military dictatorship left this particular frame 
available for women to utilize.  Furthermore, as a result of these processes and women‘s 
demands, the commitment to equality helped differentiate the new democracy from the 
old authoritarian political model.  Not only in Chile, but in Latin America generally, 
women‘s issues then became ―congruent with and symbolic of a larger political 
transformation‖ (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998, 8).  
 Upon return to democracy, the message of the Chilean state toward women and 
their position in the society changed. The first democratically elected Chilean 
government (at least formally) supported women and their demands.  It established the 
National Service for Women (SERNAM) and ratified a number of national and 
international treaties and documents including the United Nation‘s Convention on 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.  This has led to a greater 
professionalization of the Chilean women‘s movement as a number of women leaders 
were co-opted by the state.  Even though the SERNAM‘s relationship with women‘s 
groups has remained problematic and the traditionalist ideology of Pinochet‘s regime 
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continues to creep into democratic politics through the Constitution of 1980 as well as 
through other policies and bureaucratic rules, women feel the state is providing them with 
more support to reconcile their maternal and public roles.  These developments have 
caused division within the Chilean women‘s movement until it disintegrated. 
In brief, women in both Chile and the Czech Republic have experienced 
important gender inequalities in the private as well as the public sphere.  Despite the state 
repression of civil society under the authoritarian regimes, women in both countries had 
the opportunity to draw on an extensive set of family, friendship and organizational 
networks.  Chilean women mobilized on the basis of their gender identity, but Czech 
women did not.  In the late 1980‘s, a political opportunity to organize presented itself as a 
result of the political transformations in both nations.  And yet, Czech women did not use 
this opportunity to advance their rights. Instead, they became active participants in the 
newly developing civil society as they proceeded to advance other issues. With a similar 
outcome, the Chilean movement disintegrated soon after the transformation took place.  
Why? 
What the developments in these two countries (and regions more generally) seem 
to suggest is that when grievances are present, such as accusations of gender inequality, 
women are more likely to mobilize in protest in situations when the state uses public 
policy to define women‘s role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor. In 
contrast, if public policies are enabling women to reconcile their maternal and public 
roles, women are less like to organize on the basis of their gender identity to protest the 
state.  
 
19 
 
This occurs on both the individual and group level.  In-depth interviews with 
Czech women reveal that if the state provides policy support to women to reconcile their 
traditional and public roles, women become less conscious of the state‘s role in their 
lives.  They tend to view the state as a diffuse set of actors and ideas that do not create a 
coherent whole.  In contrast, if state policies provide little support for women‘s 
participation in the public sphere, individuals find it much easier to articulate who the 
state is and how it affects their lives.  Furthermore, public policy also affect movements 
on the group level – complex policies supporting both women‘s traditional and public 
roles are likely to create multiple camps within a formerly unified movement and lead to 
movement fragmentation and demise.  In contrast, policies emphasizing women‘s 
traditional roles only make it easy for movement leaders and actors to identify key issues 
and subsequently organize for collective action. 
 
Organization of chapters 
The chapters that follow are organized in the following way. The second chapter 
situates this project in the existing scholarly literature.  Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to 
the case of the Czech Republic.  Specifically, chapter 3 outlines relevant state policies 
introduced under Czechoslovak state socialism during two distinct time periods. It also 
describes the impact these policies have had on women‘s lives in general and on 
women‘s activism in particular.  Chapter 4 discusses the policy changes brought about by 
the overturn of the political regime in Czechoslovakia, and the way these affected the 
lives of Czech women.  Chapters 5 and 6 examine the Chilean case, and the organization 
of these chapters follows a similar structure to the Czech cases.  Chapter 5 provides an 
 
20 
 
overview of the state policies toward women in authoritarian Chile, and it analyzes their 
effects on the Chilean women‘s movement of that period.  Chapter 6 discusses the 
situation as it developed in post-authoritarian Chile of the 1990‘s.  Finally, the 
dissertation ends with a conclusion which summarizes main findings, outlines possible 
limitations and contributions of the study and suggests some possible directions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS RESPONSE TO STATE POLICY 
 
Drawing on three dominant trends in the existing social movement literature – 
resource mobilization, political process and framing – I propose that contemporary policy 
theory and particularly the literature on policy feedback (Pierson 1993) can serve as a 
useful tool in explaining why women protest in some instances but not others.  In other 
words, this study works with the assumption that women‘s movement emergence cannot 
be adequately explained without paying attention to pre-existing state policies.   
Social movement theory explains the emergence of women‘s movements and 
social movements more generally as a result of some combination of three broad factors: 
(1) availability of resources and mobilizing structures; (2) perceived opening of political 
opportunities and/or an emergence of a threat; and (3) existence of perceived grievances 
associated with issue framing and members‘ collective identities.  These factors then 
constitute three distinct approaches to the study of social movement emergence known as 
the resource mobilization model, political process approach and collective identity 
approach (sometimes also referred to as ‗new social movements theory‘). 
 
1. Resource Mobilization Model in Social Movement Theory 
Supporters of the resource mobilization model argue that the study of resources 
and organizational bases is crucial to understanding why and when social movements 
occur.  In this view, resources are key to social movement emergence because they 
provide constituents with the capacity to act.  According to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 
(1996) such mobilizing structures represent ―those collective vehicles, informal as well as 
formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action‖ (3).  Although 
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this approach is often criticized for its lack of conceptual clarity regarding the definition 
of resources, these are typically thought to include financial resources, meeting places 
and labor, communication networks, leaders and members (McAdam 1982; McCarthy 
and Zald 1977).  In particular, the resource mobilization approach stresses the importance 
of pre-existing social and organizational networks for the formation of social movements 
because those already participating in established networks and groups are more likely to 
turn their attention to other issues and re-organize around them. (McAdam 1982; 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996).  While the early resource mobilization models are 
thought to exaggerate the role of deliberate strategic decisions in social movements 
formation and continuance, today scholars still view resources as important (but not 
sufficient) factors in explaining the formation of social movements.   
What does this mean for the mobilization of women on the basis of their gender 
identity?  According to the resource mobilization model, for a women‘s movement to 
emerge, women need to be able to draw on pre-existing resources.  These can take on any 
number of forms – from informal friendship ties to networks of well established formal 
organizations.  While existing studies of women‘s movements rarely rely on the presence 
or absence of resources alone to explain women‘s mobilization, a number of key studies 
do take the availability of resources seriously.  For example, in their 1999 analysis of the 
emergence and outcomes of women's collective action in the United States between 1956 
and 1979, Sarah A. Soule, Doug McAdam , John McCarthy and Yang Su found that 
resources – both monetary and organizational – were crucial for collective action to take 
place.  More specifically, the authors found that collective action by women increased 
with higher numbers of organizational structures and also with greater levels of female 
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labor force participation.  In their study, Soule, McAdams, McCarthy and Su offered 
evidence to suggest that resources were more important for social movement emergence 
than were political openings.  
Similarly, studying the women‘s movement in 1970‘s and 80‘s Brazil, Sonia 
Alvarez (1990) found that the opposition Left provided women with the necessary 
organizational basis for the development of their feminist movement.    Lee Ann 
Banaszak (1996) and Lisa Baldez (2002; 2003) also noted that organizational networks 
were necessary (but not sufficient) for the formation of vibrant women‘s movements 
around the world.  Finally, resources also played an important role in Anne Costain‘s 
1992 study of the women‘s movement in the United States.  Here, Costain (1992) found 
that women‘s higher educational achievements and workforce participation provided 
important resources to those looking to mobilize.  
While they have represented an important aspect of women‘s mobilization (or a 
lack thereof) in Chile and the Czech Republic, the presence of resources and mobilizing 
structures alone cannot explain the variation in women‘s organizing across the two 
regions and across the two historical periods.   In both countries, first under 
authoritarianism and later under democracy, a variety of mobilizing structures were 
available to women.  Women in the two countries already participated in informal or 
formal networks they could use to organize a movement.  In authoritarian Chile and Latin 
America more generally, the Catholic Church provided meeting spaces and social ties 
that women were able to use to further their demands.  This was especially the case prior 
to the political overturn but also later during the democratic transition.  Responding to the 
economic crises that took place under the military regime, poor women united in 
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neighborhood associations which later enabled them to utilize their newly gained 
organizational skills in order to politicize their demands and mobilize on the basis of their 
gender identity.  Furthermore, especially after the military regime ended, Chilean women 
were also able to draw on their participation in political parties.   
In the Czech Republic and Eastern Europe more generally, women could rely on 
the existing networks of state-run women‘s organizations.  My interviews with women 
active in these organizations reveal that even though the organizations were formally 
under the patronage of the Communist Party, the individual branches of the Czech Union 
of Women were fairly autonomous and focused primarily on non-political activities such 
as organization of cultural events, delivery of goods to elderly citizens and planning of 
children‘s activities.  Furthermore, because of the omnipresent state repression, citizens 
and women in particular relied on tight and carefully built networks of trusted friends and 
relatives.  These friendship networks and even many of the local groups organized under 
the patronage of the state run Women‘s Union survived the political transformation and 
continued to provide potential bases for social mobilization for years to come.   Because 
important resources were available to women in both authoritarian and later democratic 
Chile and the Czech Republic, they alone cannot explain the variation over time and 
across the two cases. 
 
2. Political Process Approach 
Complementary to the resource mobilization model, the political process 
approach within social movement theory emphasizes the interaction between social 
movements and the state.  According to scholars in this area, movements develop in 
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response to an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups and the larger 
sociopolitical environment they seek to change (McAdam 1982).  In other words, 
whether supporters are mobilized or not, and whether a movement advances or not, 
depends on the relevant political context.  If potential movement participants view 
political conditions as favorable, they are more likely to organize.   
Here, the concept of ―political opportunity structure‖ has been found particularly 
useful in describing the properties of the external environment as they relate to social 
movement emergence (see Meyer 2004).  More specifically, movements are thought to 
emerge in response to political openings resulting from changes in the institutional 
structure or informal power relations of a given political system (Jenkins and Perrow 
1977; McAdam 1982; Meyer 1990; Tarrow 1998).  Specifically, the stability of political 
coalitions, tolerance of opposition from governing elites, conflicts among political elites, 
and openness of the formal political access seem to matter the most (see Piven and 
Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1983).   Recent scholarship has further broadened this political 
process model in that it has somewhat downplayed the significance of objectively 
existing political opportunities for movement emergence, and instead emphasized the role 
of participants‘ perceptions of these opportunities and of potential threats (Banaszak 
1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996).   
That political context matters in the process of forming social movements has 
been confirmed by a number of case studies, perhaps most notably represented by Doug 
McAdam‘s (1982) well-known analysis of the American civil rights movement.  In 
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930 – 1970, McAdam 
explains the rise and decline of the black protest movement in the United States.  
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Focusing on black churches, black colleges and Southern chapters of the NAACP, 
McAdam concludes that ―movements develop in response to an ongoing process of 
interaction between movement groups and the larger sociopolitical environment they seek 
to change‖ (40).  Specifically, he suggests, political opportunities together with a 
heightened sense of political efficacy and the development of these three institutions 
played a key role in shaping the American civil rights movement.   
That the political process model transcends borders has been documented in a 
number of comparative studies.  For example, Gay Seidman (1994) applied the model to 
militant labor movements in South Africa and Brazil.  As both countries were undergoing 
an ‗economic miracle‘ resulting from the governmental intervention in the 1960‘s, South 
African and Brazilian workers continued to experience a lack of basic social services and 
a decrease in real wages.  Seidman documented how these worsening living conditions of 
workers, combined with the weakening of the state-capitalist alliance due to subsequent 
economic problems, created a political opportunity for workers to organize in trade 
unions, giving rise to new social movements.  
The political process approach has also been applied in studies of women‘s 
mobilization.  For example, Sonia Alvarez (1990) relied on the combination of the 
political process and resource mobilization approaches to examine the development of 
arguably one of the largest and most successful women‘s movements in Latin America – 
which occurred in the 1970‘s and 80‘s in Brazil.  In her study, Alvarez analyzed how 
women‘s interests were shaped in the political system.  Furthermore, she examined the 
importance of state building and regime change for women‘s mobilization in Brazil.  She 
found that the context of gradual political liberalization opened up space for Brazilian 
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women‘s mobilization.  As such, the regime allowed women to organize while still 
actively repressing other sectors of civil society.  
Generally speaking, it is the premise of this political process model that women 
are likely to organize when a window of political opportunity opens up.  In contrast, 
women are expected to be reluctant to organize or it may be impossible for them to do so 
when such a window is closed.  This seemingly simple theory is, however, laden with 
serious conceptual and measurement issues.  The political opportunity concept has over 
the years been criticized for conceptual stretching as ―virtually anything that, in 
retrospect, can be seen as having helped a movement mobilize or attain its goals becomes 
labeled a political opportunity" (Goodwin and Jasper 1999, 36).   And similarly, Gamson 
and Meyer (1996) warned that ―The concept of political opportunity structure is … in 
danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement 
environment‖ (275).   Nevertheless, the concept of political opportunity can increase our 
understanding of the conditions under which women‘s movements are likely to emerge in 
countries such as the Czech Republic and Chile.  
If the concept of political opportunity is used in a very generic sense – as a major 
elite realignment within the given political system – and is correct, then women‘s 
movements in Latin America and Eastern Europe should have been springing up during 
the early stages of the political transition.  However, that was not the case.  Ironically, 
Chilean women formed a powerful movement at a time when the repressive military 
regime put strong limits on many forms of civic participation.  Then once the country 
transitioned to open democracy, the movement disintegrated.  Czech women have not 
taken advantage of the political opening associated with the transition either.  Therefore, 
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using the concept of political opportunity in its broader sense does not prove effective in 
understanding the emergence or decline of women‘s activism in the two countries.  This 
is why in this project, I seek to look beyond the general explanations of partisan 
realignment and other broad changes in the relevant political system when considering 
the interaction between the state and social movements formation. 
I find that the type of political regime a country has is important for explaining 
the variance of women‘s mobilization across the cases I study.  First, history has shown 
that movements often arise or disappear when political regimes change.  For example, a 
number of powerful women‘s movements arose in the context of repressive authoritarian 
regimes in Latin America, but they disappeared once these countries transitioned to a 
democratic political regime.  Second, and more importantly, the importance of political 
regimes as causal factors for women‘s mobilization is supported by the existence of 
regional differences.  For instance, the Eastern European and Latin American regions 
demonstrated very different patterns of women‘s mobilization under the non-democratic 
regimes of the 1970‘ and 80‘s.  
Identifying the special characteristics of political regimes that might be conducive 
to women‘s mobilization can be a tedious process.  However, it is possible to rule out a 
number of possible factors.  First, one may assume that women‘s status improved as a 
result of the larger political transformation, and therefore women no longer had a reason 
to organize around their gender identity.  That is unlikely in light of available research 
suggesting that during and after the process of the democratic transition, both Chilean and 
Czech women continued to face important inequalities in both the private and public 
spheres.  This included inequalities in the workplace, in political life and also at home.  
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Second, it is possible to rule out broader cultural or geographical differences as main 
causal factors because they cannot account for the variation in women‘s mobilization in 
one country, such as Chile, over time.   
Therefore, one needs to look at other regime characteristics to examine why 
women organized in some countries but not in others and why they mobilized in the 
context of one political regime but not others.  Specifically, my research points to a 
combination of factors that have so far been neglected in the social movement literature.  
Namely, I suggest that the particular combination and implementation of policies as they 
pertained to women is of utmost importance for explaining women‘s movement 
emergence.  I refer to these as ‗gender regimes‘. 
 
3. Collective Identity Approach 
While the political process model in the form of gender related policies and their 
implementation tells an important part of the story behind women‘s mobilization in the 
two regions under study, it does not provide information about the particular processes 
through which policies impacted women.  This is where the concepts of ‗framing‘ and 
‗identity‘ come into play because shared meanings and definitions that people bring to 
their situation mediate between opportunities, organization and action (McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald 1996).   
By the 1980‘s, social movement theorists recognized that both the dominant 
resource mobilization and political process models had major weaknesses.  Namely, the 
resource mobilization model could not account for the development of social movements 
over time, and it was difficult for the political process model to address new ―identity 
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movements‖ whose goal was not to change state structures.  As a result, a new 
‗culturalist‘ strand of research and literature developed within the social movement 
scholarship with the objective of explaining why movements arise and fall (see McAdam 
1994; Johnston 1994; Swidler 1995).  It is this body of literature that provides an 
important piece of the puzzle for uncovering the reasons behind the differences in 
Chilean and Czech women‘s mobilization patterns.  
In this relatively new perspective, the formation of social movements is viewed as 
an effort to shift the direction of social change by controlling societal symbols.  What this 
suggests is that (a) grievances alone are not sufficient for social movement mobilization; 
and (b) that the perception of grievances by potential recruits is as important as their 
objective existence.  The proponents of this model recognize that social problems are 
subject to change and that the ways in which organizers frame these problems, and 
whether the issues resonate with potential recruits and the public, is crucial for 
determining whether social groups will mobilize or not (see McAdam, McCarthy et al. 
1996; Swidler 1995; Snow and Benford 1988).
10
  This cultural approach thus emphasizes 
the importance of emotions, symbols, solidarity and perceived grievances in the 
formation of social movements.  In other words, according to these authors, whether a 
movement forms or not depends on how activists define the issues they are concerned 
with and how they convey them to the public.   
Over time, it has become increasingly common for scholars to recognize that the 
understanding of social movement emergence does not rest in any one of the three broad 
approaches (resources, political opportunities or collective identity) already described 
                                                 
10
 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) define framing as ―the conscious, strategic efforts by groups of 
people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate 
collective action." (6) 
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above, but in their confluence (Banaszak 1996; McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 1997; Baldez 
2002).  In fact, many recognize the effects of the three types of approaches as mutually 
reinforcing (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 1997; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996).  For 
example, relying on a synthesis of resource mobilization, political process and collective 
identity approaches, Lisa Baldez (2002; 2003) studied the conditions under which, in the 
process of democratic transition, women mobilized on the basis of their gender identity.  
Examining primarily two historical examples of the Chilean women‘s movement but in 
her later work also adding the cases of Brazil, Poland and East Germany, Baldez argued 
that women would protest if multiple conditions were in place.  She referred to these as 
tipping, timing and framing.  Specifically, she suggested that women in all four countries 
relied on a variety of organizational networks to build a movement.  She emphasized the 
notion of ‗framing‘ proposing that contact and alliances with activists in other countries 
were also of importance.  Finally, she argued that for women to mobilize, they needed to 
be excluded from the political negotiations through which democratic opposition formed 
new alliances with one another.   
Similarly, in her book Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity, Culture, 
and Struggle for Woman Suffrage Lee Ann Banaszak also utilized a combination of the 
resource mobilization, political process and cultural approaches when she asked why 
women‘s suffrage in Switzerland was more than fifty years behind the United States.   
Her book expands our understanding of the role that political opportunities play in the 
formation of social movements, and of how the opening of these opportunities interacts 
with the beliefs and values of movement participants.  Namely, Banaszak proposed that 
―While (women‘s) tactical choices were affected by available resources and the political 
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opportunity structure in both countries, collective beliefs and values played an even 
larger role in those decisions‖ (36).  Furthermore, she discovered that ―Culture and 
beliefs allowed for the explanation of activists‘ perceptions, internal decision making and 
strategies‖ (41).  In other words, even when resources were available and a political 
opportunity opened up, the values and beliefs of Swiss activists prevented their 
utilization.  Specifically, the Swiss suffrage movement‘s belief in consensus politics and 
local autonomy limited their tactical choices while the American suffrage movement, 
influenced by the abolition and progressive movements, utilized a wider set of 
confrontational tactics.   
The framing of social issues and the formation of collective identity is important 
for explaining the formation of women‘s movements in some regions and their absence in 
others.  Furthermore, framing is also a useful tool for explaining variation over time as 
well.  Specifically, a number of students of Latin American politics have in the past 
described the ways in which women of the region framed their issues so that they would 
resonate with the public.  To demand political, economic and social changes, women 
utilized their gender roles as they were defined by the state.  They framed their demands 
and issues from the position of concerned mothers and wives.  Additionally, as Lisa 
Baldez (2003) reminds us, Latin American women were able to use such framing 
successfully as they draw a link between feminism and greater democracy.  However, it 
is less apparent why women in this region were not able to come together and continue to 
press the governments for women‘s issues once democracy took place.  In other words, 
the question remains; why did the formerly utilized frames not produce similar results 
upon the demise of the military regime? 
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In communist and later post-communist Europe, women were not able to use a 
shared identity to form a movement and demand their rights either under totalitarianism 
or democracy.  To explain this, some point out to the role that the rhetoric of the 
communist government played in these processes.  In this region, the Marxist frame 
successfully utilized by women in Latin America has already been appropriated by the 
communist governments.  Terms such as ‗emancipation‘ took on a different meaning 
under the patronage of the totalitarian regime (see Baldez 2003).  However, it remains 
unclear why citizens in the Soviet Bloc did not use this same state rhetoric to their 
advantage.  With many rights formally incorporated into the law, why didn‘t Czech and 
other Eastern European women deliberately utilize the state approach to women‘s issues 
and demand that women‘s and other democratic rights be respected not only in writing 
but in reality as well?  In other words, while the framing/culturalist approach seems to 
explain why feminist and other women‘s movements emerged in some regions but not 
others, it is far too vague a concept to capture the particular mechanisms in play.  The 
question that remains is: Why were women able to utilize particular frames in some 
countries and in some historical moments but not others?  And is there one particular 
mechanism that explains the success or failure of these framing strategies in all cases?  
 
Gender and Transition Literature 
While social movement theory and research speaks to the issue of women‘s 
movement emergence in general terms, the more specific question of regional differences 
in civic participation has been addressed by feminist and other scholars studying 
democratic transitions.  While this literature says little about the nature of civic 
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participation and social movement formation prior to political turnovers,  it provides 
important insights into the conditions under which citizens participate in civic 
associations and mobilize for social change in new democracies. 
One strand in the transitions literature compares the strength of civil society in 
post-authoritarian Latin America to that of post-communist Europe.  It argues that civil 
society in post-communist Europe is distinctively weak compared to other regions.  Marc 
Howard‘s 2003 study is of particular importance in this respect.  Here Howard identifies 
three causal factors and proceeds to explain how mistrust in communist organizations, the 
persistence of friendship networks, and post-communist disappointment have had 
mutually reinforcing negative effect on civic participation in post-communist countries 
(26).  If Howard is correct, one would assume that women‘s movements were less likely 
to emerge in democratic Eastern Europe (and more likely in democratic countries of 
Latin America) because of historical differences in the regions‘ developments.  
However, Marc Howard‘s study does not provide any insight into the variation in 
civic participation over time.  In fact, the independent variables Howard uses are specific 
to post-totalitarianism and post-authoritarianism.  Therefore, Howard‘s findings are not 
able to address the surprising demise of the Chilean and other Latin American women‘s 
movements in the context of new democratic regimes.  Furthermore, the author measures 
the strength of civil society through citizens‘ membership in formal organizations only.  
This does not directly translate into participation in informal social movements.   
Howard‘s work was not alone in neglecting alternative forms of civil society.  
Initially, much of the literature on democratic transitions paid surprisingly little attention 
to women‘s forms of participation that fell outside of the formal politics realm (Waylen 
 
35 
 
1994).  More recently, however, feminist and other scholars have since generated an 
extensive body of work offering a variety of possible explanations for women‘s 
movement emergence or absence in a variety of settings (see, for example, Baldez 2003; 
Banaszak 1996; Einhorn 2003; Jaquette 2001; Jaquette and Wolchik eds. 1998; Siklova 
1997; Rios-Tobar 2003).  The literature on women‘s activism in Latin America is 
particularly well developed, whereas much of the research devoted to the developments 
in post-communist countries has been collected in edited volumes, and with few 
exceptions remains empirically thin.
11
  Most of these studies explicitly or implicitly 
extend social movement theory to the examined country cases by putting forward a wide 
range of additional context-specific variables.  In other words, rather than attempting to 
identify individual or a combination of mechanisms that could explain the formation or 
absence of mobilization around gender issues in a variety of settings, these scholars 
typically identify a variety of variables specific to the cases they study.  As a result, much 
of the literature in this area cannot be generalized across different regions and cases.    
In Central and Eastern Europe, scholars have typically referred to some 
combination of three factors that were thought to prevent women‘s mobilization during 
the early stages of democratic transitions.  These included  
a) association of gender issues with the discredited Communist regimes 
and not with women‘s understanding of their own interests 
b) women‘s  lack of experience with organizing and civic participation 
c) the rejection of international feminism as a result of pressures from  
Western feminists to have women in the region conform to their views  
                                                 
11
 For an exception, see Valerie Sperling‘s (1999) account of women's organizing in post-communist 
Russia.  
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(Jaquette and Wolchik eds. 1998; see also Einhorn 1993; Siklova 1997; 
Sperling 1999). 
In particular, feminist scholars conducting research in post-communist Europe 
have emphasized the effects of the so called ‗forced emancipatory policies‘ on women in 
the region.  These authors have provided some anecdotal evidence documenting that 
when faced with the state‘s appropriation of women‘s equality, Eastern European women 
reacted by rejecting the goal of gender equality itself (Wolchik 1998a).  These works 
have, however, done little to adequately support their arguments with empirical evidence 
and link their findings to general social movement theory.  In addition, the concept of 
‗communist legacies‘ has in the works of transitologists and other scholars changed time 
into a residual category used to collect variance which could not be explained through 
other factors. 
While the Central and Eastern European literature focuses on the absence of 
autonomous women‘s activism during the early stages of the democratization process, in 
Latin America, existing research explores the occurrence of women‘s movements as they 
formed under the formerly authoritarian regimes.  In examining the origins of these often 
powerful movements, scholars have emphasized the effects of state economic policy and 
ensuing economic crisis, the state repression of human rights, and also the ways in which 
international feminism affected women‘s identities in the region (see Baldez 2002; 
Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Jaquette 1989).  
Although all of these studies and essays speak to the question of women‘s 
movement emergence in transitioning countries, they have not been successful in 
providing a general theoretical argument applicable to a variety of cases across different 
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regions.   An important exception to this rule represents the above noted Lisa Baldez‘ 
(2002) theoretically and empirically rich account of two Chilean movements taking place 
under two different political systems.  Baldez argues that aside from resources, two 
conditions need to be in place in order for a women‘s movement to emerge.  In her own 
words these include; ―partisan realignment, understood as the formation of new coalitions 
among political parties, and women‘s decision to frame realignment in terms of widely 
held cultural norms about gender difference‖ (5).  She further clarifies that women will 
respond to partisan realignment in gender terms if they and their interests are excluded 
from the discussions during such process of partisan realignment (11).   
While persuasive in light of the two Chilean cases she analyzes, and to some 
extend even in light of the additional Eastern European cases she brings in in her 
concluding chapter, Baldez‘ argument does not hold in other instances.  Namely, her 
theoretical framework would incorrectly predict the mass mobilization of women in 
transitioning Czechoslovakia.  Here, women were able to draw on informal networks, a 
political realignment did take place and women and their interests were excluded from 
the political agenda.  And yet, women‘s groups and organizations were not able to frame 
their concerns in ways that would resonate with the public.   
One can also identify a second weakness in Baldez‘ otherwise convincing 
argument.  Much of the literature on Latin American women‘s movements during the 
third wave of democracy actually assigns women‘s movements great importance in 
aiding the democratizing process (and hence indirectly or directly contributing to the 
occurrence of the partisan realignment).  The causal relationship between Baldez‘ 
dependent and independent variables is therefore difficult to decode. 
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Policy Feedback Approach  
This dissertation builds on the research conducted by both transition and social 
movement scholars.  While the existing regional studies have in broad terms recognized 
the importance of state ideology and public policies for women‘s subsequent organizing 
for collective action, to date there exists little empirical evidence to uncover the particular 
processes through which state policies in combination with a particular state ideology 
affect various social groups and women in particular.  Furthermore, this dynamic has 
been almost exclusively addressed in relation to the developments in post-communist 
Europe, and less is known about the policy effects in the case of Latin American 
countries.  The effects of state policies on social movements also remain relatively 
unexplored in the literature generated by the political process theorists.  This has been 
recently reiterated in a volume devoted to this topic by David Meyer: ―public policy (has 
been) treated as a relatively minor part of the structure of political opportunities that 
might spur social movements‖ (Meyer et al. 2005, 6). 
Drawing on all three dominant trends in the social movement literature – resource 
mobilization, political process and framing – I propose that contemporary policy theory 
and particularly the literature on policy feedback (Pierson 1993) can serve as a useful tool 
in explaining why women protest in some instances but not others.  In other words, this 
study works with the assumption that women‘s movement emergence cannot be 
adequately explained without paying attention to pre-existing state policies.   
That political processes are influenced by political institutions as they develop 
over time is an idea incident to the ‗historical institutionalist‘ approach in American 
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political science (see Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 1984; Pierson 2004; Thelen 
1999; March 1984).
12
  Scholars employing this method of inquiry have for over three 
decades been exploring the ways in which both formal and informal types of institutions 
matter for political and economic behavior of citizens and for societal change.
13
   While 
the overwhelming majority of studies of politics concentrates on political processes at a 
given point in time (whether past or present), historical institutionalists argue that our 
understanding of these processes is likely to be incomplete and distorted when they are 
taken out of their temporal context.   Instead, they suggest, ―historical investigation 
focusing on unfolding processes can greatly illuminate our understanding of the present‖ 
(Pierson 2005, 49).   
The idea that policies restructure subsequent political process has been around for 
a very long time (see Schattschneider 1935).  However, until the early 1990‘s, it was 
largely ignored by students of political science.  Since then, this concept of ‗policy 
feedback‘ has drawn renewed attention.  In 1992 Theda Skocpol identified two basic 
types of such policy feedback dynamic.  First, she argued, new policies may transform 
state capacities by creating, building upon, or undercutting administrative arrangements. 
And second, she suggested, they may affect the identities, political goals, and capabilities 
of social groups.   Elaborating on Skocpol‘s classification, Paul Pierson (1993) outlined 
the numerous ways in which identities, political goals and capabilities of social groups 
could be affected by preexisting policies.  Most notably, Pierson (1993) suggested that 
                                                 
12
 For the purposes of this study, I adopt Peter Hall‘s (1986) definition of institution: "the formal rules, 
compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals 
in various units of the polity and economy" (19). 
13
 It was not until the late 1960‘s and 1970‘s when the state was ‗brought back‘ into the study of politics, 
and came to be viewed as an agent capable of influencing political processes (see Nettl 1968; Evans, 
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985).   
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policy feedback may affect government elites, interest groups and mass public through 
two basic types of mechanisms.  First, particular policies provide individuals with 
specific resources and incentives (such as education).   Second, policies may also affect 
individual  citizens by conveying certain meanings about their status within the system.
14
  
As stated above, public policies affect politics through a variety of actors.  
Furthermore, political scientists seem to agree that policy feedback effects differ for 
policy-makers, interest groups and the public (see Pierson 1993; Soss and Schram 2007). 
And while scholars from various streams of the new institutionalism have addressed how 
pre-existing public policies affect the political goals and actions of political elites and 
organized interests (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Hacker 2002; Heclo 1974; Lowi 1964; 
Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Skocpol 1992), little is known about their consequences 
for the political attitudes and behavior of the mass public.  Only recently has a handful of 
empirical studies addressed these dynamics as well (see, for example, Campbell 2003; 
Mettler 2005).  These works have placed special emphasis on the ways in which policy 
design type conveys various messages to citizens and affects their civic engagement as a 
result (see Schneider and Ingraham 1993; Soss 1999).  In short, policies have been shown 
to be powerful determinants of citizens‘ participation in political life.  
Policies set political agendas and shape identities and interests.  They can 
influence beliefs about what is possible, desirable and normal.  They can 
alter conceptions of citizenship and status.  They can channel or constrain 
agency, define incentives, and redistribute resources.  They can convey 
cues that define, arouse, or pacify constituencies. (Soss and Schram 2007, 
113) 
 
Unfortunately, the studies tracking policy feedback effects on mass public remain 
sparse.  This led Mettler and Soss (2004) to argue that the effects of public policies on 
                                                 
14
 see also McDonagh (2009) and Schneider and Ingram (1993)  
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mass opinion and behavior remain remarkably under-theorized.  This research deficit is 
evident in the case of old democracies of North America and Western Europe (Pierson 
1993; Mettler and Soss 2004), but especially in the case of countries in regions such as 
Latin America and Eastern Europe that have recently undergone radical and wide-ranging 
political transformations.
15
  
Furthermore, because they focus almost exclusively on the developments in the 
West, students of policy feedback have been studying the effects of public policies in 
political environments which are democratic and that have been relatively stable over 
time.
16
   Such conditions, however, are not the norm when one looks beyond the borders 
of Western Europe and North America.  If preexisting policies have, indeed, the potential 
to produce long-term effects on citizens‘ participation in public life, one cannot but 
wonder about the ways in which policies matter for political processes in authoritarian 
countries or how preexisting authoritarian policies continue to shape the political 
processes in countries that are newly democratic.
17
     
While little is known about the implications of public policies for the political 
participation and behavior of the mass public, even less has been done to systematically 
explore the relationship between policies and social movements (Meyer, Jenness, Ingram 
et al. 2005).  To be sure, the topic is not entirely new.  In the early 1970‘s, Piven and 
                                                 
15
 Lauren Morris MacLean‘s work on the effects of state policy on informal networks in Ghana and Cote 
d‘Ivoire represents an important exception in this trend. 
16
 For an exception, see Valiente 1996 
17
 The idea that the authoritarian past may matter for subsequent political and other developments in new 
democracies has appeared in the literature devoted to the ‗third wave‘ (see Huntington 1991) of democratic 
transitions.  While one stream of the transitions literature devoted to post-communist Europe and Latin 
America emphasizes the changes and opportunities brought about by the political and economic 
transformations, a second one highlights the role of historical legacies for the contemporary development of 
these societies.
 
 These two approaches were outlined and hotly debated in Slavic Review by Valerie Bunce 
(1995) and Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (1994; 1995).  See also Bunce 1999, Offe 1991; 
Howard 2003; and Ekiert and Hanson eds. 2003. 
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Cloward (1971) considered the ways in which government uses its social policy to 
prevent the poor from organizing against the state. To date, however, much of the 
existing research focuses on the ways in which social movements affect the formation of 
public policies rather than vice-versa (see Piven and Cloward 1977; Gamson 1975).  
The general lack of research in this area is surprising given the possible 
implications of these ‗policy feedback‘ effects for the development and maintenance of 
democratic citizenship in these nations.   In order to understand the complexities of 
democratic political processes, we need know how ―policies transform and expand the 
identities, political goals, and capabilities of various social groups that subsequently 
struggle or ally in politics‖ (Skocpol 1992, 58).  In other words, we ought to be able to 
explain why some policies ultimately promote political action from the mass public while 
others impede it.  This question is of a particular importance in new democracies which 
are trying to overcome their authoritarian past and whose political regimes are in some 
instances yet to be fully consolidated.   
To sum up, by comparing two countries during two distinct historical periods, I 
am able to rule out a number of grievance related, cultural and geographical differences 
as main predictors for movement emergence or decline.  Furthermore, as I document, 
both Chilean and Czech women had a variety of resources and mobilizing structures 
available to them under both the non-democratic and democratic regimes. Therefore, in 
this study, I build on the political process, collective identity and policy feedback models 
to uncover the specific characteristics of political regimes and framing processes that 
have mattered the most for the formation of women‘s movements in these two regions.   
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Defining terms 
Social and Women’s Movements 
Terms such as ‗public policy‘, ‗political regime‘ or ‗women‘s movements‘, many 
of which I have used in the preceding part of this chapter, call for further specification.  
We as social scientists far too often avoid clear definitions and operationalization of the 
basic terms we employ.  This creates much confusion over the exact nature and 
boundaries of the phenomena we are looking at, and as such, it makes further 
comparisons very difficult.   
In this project, I rely on Sidney Tarrow‘s definition of social movements (SMs). 
According to Tarrow (1998), social movements are ―collective challenges, based on 
common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, 
and authorities‖ (4)   I understand women’s movements as a particular type of social 
movements.  As in the case of other social movements, women‘s movements come in a 
variety of forms and sizes, and they differ in regard to the grievances they address as well 
as to the goals they aim to achieve.  As Saskia Wieringa (1997) noted, ―Women‘s 
movements have never spoken with a single voice‖ (7).  They represent a variety of 
interests, issues and identities (Basu 1995). 
This presents a difficulty for those seeking to develop a single definition of 
women‘s movements that could be applied and remain relevant in a variety of historical 
and spatial settings.  Scholars of comparative politics have typically addressed this issue 
by developing definitions of women‘s movements in relation to the individual 
movements in particular countries they study.  For the purposes of this dissertation,  
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I understand women‘s movements as social movements where women act collectively as 
women.  Baldez (2002) suggests that in all women‘s movements, women invoke their 
identity as women in order to emphasize their uniqueness in relation to men and their 
interest in having greater access to decision making. Therefore, women‘s movements can 
be those organized around feminist issues but also those where women come together as 
women to, for example, demand the state‘s greater adherence to international human 
rights norms.  
Karen Beckwith‘s (2001) distinction between ‗women‘s movements‘, ‗feminist 
movements‘ and ‗women in political movements‘ is particularly useful in this respect.   
In Beckwith‘s view, ‗women‘s movements‘ are those where women‘s action is based on 
their identity as women.  A narrower term, the ‗feminist movement‘ refers to those 
instances of social movements whose primary concern is women‘s challenge of 
patriarchy (Beckwith 2000).  Finally, ‗women in political movements‘ is an expression 
typically associated with any social movement where women participate (Beckwith 2000; 
Molyneux 1985).  At the same time, it is important to recognize that the divisions among 
these three types of movements are not clearly drawn because there typically exist strong 
links among them all that make it difficult to separate them analytically (Waylen 1994).  
This dissertation focuses on the effects of public policies on women‘s movements.  
Because feminist movements are a specific type of women‘s movements, they are also 
addressed here.   
A second type of confusion one may encounter in the women‘s movement 
literature relates to the difference between women‘s organizations and women‘s 
movements.  While not all analyses of women‘s movements are transparent about the 
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meaning of these terms, and there exists no consensus regarding this issue, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, I understand women‘s organizations as formalized groups 
where women invoke their identity as women as they associate around particular issues.  
These issues may be very diverse, and they can include both feminist topics and issues 
related to women‘s traditional roles as caregivers.  What distinguishes women‘s 
organizations from other types of organizations is the gender nature of the membership 
and also the emphasis on gender specific identity.  In some instances, women‘s 
organizations form women‘s movements, in others, they remain independent.  In cases 
where women‘s organizations do form a movement, one can expect to see a broad-based 
collaboration around particular issues sustained over a significant period of time (a month 
or more).  
Those new to the literature on comparative women‘s movements may also be 
puzzled by the variety of terms scholars use to describe similar phenomena.  These 
typically follow the adjective ―women‘s‖, and they include expressions such as women’s 
movement, mobilization, activism, organizing, and/or civic participation.  Other authors 
work with ―women‘s collective action‖ or an ―emergence of women‘s groups‖ (see 
Odoul and Kabira 1995).  In the social movement literature generally, ―mobilization‖ 
typically refers to the ―unplanned or planned gatherings of people… organized by 
organizations or not… (in order to) further … short-to-long term social change.‖
18
  It is 
therefore a somewhat narrower term in comparison to ―social movement‖.  However, 
while this particular distinction is also used – to some extent – in the women‘s movement 
literature, the differences among all of these terms seem to be much blurrier, and they are 
                                                 
18
 This quote comes from an email exchange between the author and a social movement scholar John 
Burdick (11/13/2005). 
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often used synonymously to refer to ―women‘s movements‖ and their emergence.  In this 
dissertation, I choose to use terms such as ‗women‘s mobilization‘, ‗rise of women‘s 
activism‘ and ‗emergence of women‘s movement‘ interchangeably.  
 
Public and Women’s Policy  
Two other terms I employ frequently are those of ‗public policy‘ and ‗state 
policy‘.  I understand public policy as ―the sum of government activities, whether acting 
directly or through agents, as it has an influence on the life of citizens" (Peters 1999).  
While public policies are typically embedded in laws, regulations and recommendations 
issued by democratic governments, in the case of non-democratic regimes, these rules 
and regulations may also be unwritten, but nevertheless known to the citizens.  I include 
these unwritten rules into my understanding of ‗public policies‘.  In this dissertation, I use 
the terms ‗state policy‘ and ‗public policy‘ interchangeably.  However, I prefer to use the 
term ‗state policy‘ in respect to non-democratic political regimes because here, the 
‗public‘ value of these policies is often questionable. 
The concept of ‗women‘s policy‘ plays a particularly important role in my 
research.  My understanding is similar to that of Hoskyns (1996) who defines women's 
policy as "The area of political action and activity which particularly concerns (or targets) 
women or groups of women, or where issues are forced onto the agenda by women" (6).  
Women‘s issues are then those that "disproportionately become the responsibility of 
women as a result of the sexual division of labor" and "where policy consequences are 
likely to have a more immediate and direct impact on significantly larger numbers of 
women than of men" (Carroll 1994, 15). 
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Finally, although intuitively evident, the term policy legacy deserves some 
specification as it is crucial for the story presented here.  I understand policy legacies as 
(1) policies introduced in the past which continue to influence citizens today and (2) the 
material, institutional and cultural factors deriving from state policies introduced in the 
past but no longer in existence. 
 
State and Regime 
I follow Theda Skocpol‘s (1992) understanding of state which draws on the 
definitions of Max Weber and Otto Hinze.  Skocpol defines the state as ―any set of 
relatively differentiated organizations that claims sovereignty and coercive control over a 
territory and its population, defending and perhaps extending that claim in competition 
with other states‖ (43).  These organizations consist of administrative, judicial and 
policing organizations whose functions are: (1) the process of administration, (2) 
institutionalization of sovereignty, (3) sectoral autonomy, (4) law enforcement, and (5) 
social goal attainment and representation (Nettl 1968).   
States and political regimes are, in my understanding, not synonymous 
concepts.
19
  I understand regimes to be ―the formal and informal organizations, 
relationships, and rules that determine who can employ state power for what ends, as well 
as how those who are in power deal with those who are not‖ (Goodwin 2002, 12).  In his 
famous typology, Juan Linz (2000) distinguished among three basic regime types:  
authoritarian, post-totalitarian and democratic.   
                                                 
19
 Although as I note below, one of the primary characteristics of the communist totalitarian regime are the 
blurry boundaries between state and regime as the dominant political party penetrates key state 
organizations.  Similarly, in the case of military authoritarian regime, the boundaries may be crossed when 
the military takes over the executive power (for more on this, see for example Goodwin 2002, 12-15). 
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Democracy 
To date, there seems to be little agreement among students of democracy and 
transitions as to what exactly the definition of democracy ought to be.
20
   Perhaps the 
most often employed definition is the so called ―minimalist‖ one as presented in the 
work of Joseph Schumpeter (1947).  There democracy is defined as ―an institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by 
making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to 
assemble in order to carry out its will‖ (250).  A minimalist and procedural definition 
was also adopted in the works of Robert Dahl whose theoretical work on democracy is 
probably the most influential in political science. In Polyarchy (1971), Dahl suggested 
that there are two dimensions to democracy: public contestation and political 
participation. Suggesting that democracy in its ideal form does not exist, he adopted the 
term polyarchy which he defines as a regime that ―ha(s) been substantially popularized 
and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation‖ (8)  
However, I too follow those who argue that these institutional definitions are too 
narrow, simplistic and consequently insufficient as they fail to account for certain 
aspects (such as the presence of civil rights and liberties) usually associated with 
democracy and which are important to marginalized groups such as women.  For this 
reason, in this project I consider a regime to be democratic when it fulfills all conditions 
outlined by Larry Diamond in his definition of ‗liberal democracy‘.  Here, Larry 
Diamond‘s (1999) three characteristics of a liberal democratic political regime are 
helpful:  
                                                 
20
 For a debate of what democracy is... and is not, see Schmitter and Karl (1991) 
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i.      a democratic political system: It enables citizens to choose their rulers in free and 
fair elections and to participate and express themselves in other political processes;   
ii.     a liberal political system: It limits the power of the state to encroach on the basic 
rights of its citizens, thus affirming civil liberties and minority rights; and,  
iii.    a republican political system: It provides the rule of law and good government 
through institutions of horizontal accountability that check and balance the executive 
(and other forms of) power, while holding all actors, public and private, equal before 
the law.‖ (xx).    
 
Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism 
 There seems to be more agreement among scholars as to when a regime is 
authoritarian. Juan Linz‘s classification has become a classic in the field.  Linz (1964) 
defines authoritarian regimes as  
political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism without 
elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive 
nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, 
and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within 
formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones (255). 
 
Furthermore, Linz argues that there exist two basic types of non-democratic regimes.  
The first one is the authoritarian type defined above, while the second is a type of regime 
he calls totalitarian.  According to Linz, three characteristics are dominant in totalitarian 
regimes: 
 1. There is a monistic but not monolithic center of power, and whatever 
pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy from that 
center… 
    2. There is an exclusive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually 
elaborate ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party 
serving the leaders, identify and which they use as a basis for policies or 
manipulate to legitimize them. … The ideology goes beyond a particular 
program or definition of the boundaries of legitimate political action to 
provide, presumably, some ultimate meaning, sense of historical purpose, and 
interpretation of social reality. 
 3. Citizen participation in and active mobilization for political and 
collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled 
through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups. Passive 
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obedience and apathy … characteristic of many authoritarian regimes, are 
considered undesirable by the rulers. (70) 
 
Therefore, what distinguishes the totalitarian from authoritarian regimes is the presence 
of a totalist ideology in totalitarian regimes, dominance of a single party, importance of 
the secret police and the existence of monopolistic governmental control over civic 
organization, economy and mass communications (Linz 2000). 
 So far, I have discussed three basic types of political regimes: democratic, 
totalitarian and authoritarian.  However, not all regimes within these three groups share 
the same characteristics, and for this reason, it is also important to think in terms of 
regime subtypes.  Most importantly for the purposes of this project, it is necessary to 
specify the communist totalitarian regimes that I (and others) also sometimes refer to as 
state socialism.  Here, Valerie Bunce‘s definition is helpful.  According to Bunce (1999), 
state socialism as a type of political regime that existed in Central and Eastern Europe 
(but also in other parts of the world) and which was distinguished by four principal 
characteristics: (1) ideological mission of the ruling elite which emphasized anti-capitalist 
economy, equality and a transformation of the society; (2) communist party monopoly 
over the economy and political regime resulting in a fusion of the political and the 
economic; (3) the fusion of the party and the state apparatus; and (4) the strong 
institutional penetration of the party-state resulting, among other things, in the destruction 
of an independent civil society.  As Bunce explains; ―mass publics were rendered 
dependent on the party-state for jobs, income, consumer goods, education, housing, 
health care, and social and geographical mobility. … party-state held sole responsibility 
for the allocation of power, money and status‖ (24).  
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Region 
Finally, there has been some debate in the democratization literature over whether 
a region is a meaningful category in the study of democratic transitions (see, for example, 
Batt 2007).  Aware of the dangers associated with understanding a region as a causal 
variable on its own terms, I employ Valerie Bunce‘s definition (2000) that describes 
region as a ―summary term for spatially distinctive but generalizable historical 
experiences that shape economic structures and development and the character and 
continuity of political, social and cultural institutions‖ (Bunce 2000, 722).  When 
referring to Eastern Europe, I typically mean countries of East Central Europe 
(geographically) which fulfilled the condition of liberal democracy definition after 1991, 
and which remained democratic since.  These include the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Poland, but also Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  Although the experiences of 
other former Soviet Union countries are often also relevant, unless referred to 
specifically, I choose to exclude them from the analysis because their complicated 
political trajectories make them problematic for the study of social movements.  
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Chapter 3 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC 1948 – 1989 
Mothers and Workers: State Appropriation of Women’s Activism 
 
That Czech women did not organize around their grievances during the period of 
the communist regime is surprising in light of previous historical developments.  Namely, 
it is puzzling because Czechoslovakia had a strong tradition of women‘s mobilization 
dating back to the pre-World War II period.  Czech and Slovak women were also active 
in the dissident movement of the 1970‘s.  Furthermore, despite a variety of gender 
oriented state policies introduced by the communist state, Czech women continued to 
face important inequalities in the home, in the workplace and also in formal politics.  
Czech women‘s activism can be traced back to the end of the 19
th
 Century.  
Namely, the Czech women‘s movement became particularly visible during the final 
stages of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire as women struggled to gain the right to vote.
21
  
In the context of passionate intellectual and political disputes between those in support of 
the quickly spreading German language and those aiming to save traditional Czech 
culture, women began to establish female educational clubs.  From the beginning, ―it was 
clear the motive behind the club activity was women‘s desire to get away from the 
confined environment of family life, and to participate in public life‖ (Horska 1999, 72).  
These clubs enabled women take part in religious and charity related activities, and as 
such, they served as substitutes for general political clubs that were closed to women.  
Around the same time, a number of Czech women became also visible as writers.  
                                                 
21
 The Austrio-Hungarian Empire was a union between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire. 
During this time, Hungary and Austria maintained separate parliaments, each with its own prime-minister. 
The empire lasted for 51 years, dissolving on October 1918.  
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Through writing and organizing educational meetings, Czech women were for the first 
time able to get involved in public life.   
At the same time as Czech feminists were fighting for the right to suffrage, they 
also became publicly active as patriots struggling alongside men to maintain Czech 
national heritage in the context of the Austrio-Hungarian Empire.  As Wilma Iggers 
(1995) pointed out, ―The history of the emancipation of Czech women is closely linked 
with the history of their national awakening and of their philanthropic activity.‖(Iggers 
1995, 8)   Therefore, the struggle for Czech national identity under Austrian government 
served as an opportunity for women to become publicly active while working alongside 
men.   
Middle class women first focused on helping the poor through their participation 
in education clubs.  Later, their attention shifted to women of their own class.  And 
similarly as in the United States, several distinguished men lent their helping hand as 
well.  Among others, Vojtech Naprstek (1826-1894) who returned back to Prague after a 
ten years long exile in the United States, came to symbolize the male contribution to the 
women‘s emancipation of this time.  The club he organized soon became known as the 
American Ladies Club because ―Naprstek had become convinced that American women 
were much freer than Czech women to pursue their own interests, that they were more 
respected and that in America there was more educational equality between the 
sexes.‖(Iggers 1995, 18) 
As a result, the growing numbers of education and other philanthropic clubs 
organized by women in the late 19
th
 Century had important consequences for Czech 
women‘s position on the labor market.  While poor women always worked, this concept 
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was fairly new to middle class women.  By 1880, about 30% of women in the Western 
part of the Austrio-Hungarian Empire were receiving their own wages working primarily 
as laborers, servants or daily workers.  A few also became teachers and clerks (Horska 
1999, 75).   
But the main goal of the early Czech women‘s movement was to improve 
women‘s qualification and education.  Wilma Iggers (1995) reminds us that what the vast 
majority of Czech women had in common at this time was their low socio-economic 
position and their lack of formal education.  Furthermore, the large numbers of women 
left widowed and without an income after the 1866 war against Prussia provided an 
additional incentive for the development of various educational and training opportunities 
(Kotlandova-Koenig 1999).  As a result of these efforts, Czech women were the first in 
the Austrio-Hungarian Empire to establish a ―gymnasium‖, an equivalent of an American 
senior high school for girls in 1890.  By 1900, women were also attending Czech 
universities.  Clearly, cultural norms were changing and higher numbers of women were 
able to receive further education.   
The increasing access of women to higher education had further implications for 
women‘s involvement in public life.  This is because the Election Act of 1861 derived the 
right to vote in the parliamentary elections from the amount of personal tax paid and a 
type of one‘s occupation.  Therefore, because large numbers of women were now 
working, they could no longer be prevented from voting when the time of the 1908 
election came about.
22
   
                                                 
22
 At the same time, women were still barred from voting on different levels such as the Imperial Council, 
for example. 
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Given these developments, the public began to understand that the women‘s 
movement needed ―to be taken seriously as an important part of the overall social 
progress taking place at this time.‖ (Horska 1999, 80-81)  Both the vehement 
demonstrations of the suffragists and the increasing amount of information about growing 
access of women to Western universities contributed to public understanding of the need 
for a women‘s movement.  Even Tomas Garrique Masaryk (T.G.M.), the future first 
President of independent Czechoslovakia, influenced by his American wife Charlotte, 
expressed his support for women‘s emancipation in his speech given the night before the 
World War I started (Kotlandova-Koenig 1999).  
 Czech women today can also build on a strong tradition of women‘s political 
participation and mobilization for greater political rights.  The Czech women‘s movement 
was notably active between 1905 and 1907, and it gained a clearly political character as 
the struggle for women‘s suffrage intensified (Vosahlikova 1996).  Until the end of the 
19
th
 Century, women were prohibited from taking part in existing political clubs.  But 
despite the prohibition, the Social Democratic party has always been accepting women as 
members.  Then in 1905, the Council for Women‘s Suffrage, an informal club under the 
leadership of Frantiska Plaminkova, was established in Prague. 
Surprisingly, in the Czech lands, female candidates to the Parliament preceded 
women‘s suffrage.  In the 1908 parliamentary elections, women‘s votes suddenly became 
important.  As Horska (1999) points out, ―several Czech political parties attempted to 
take advantage of the situation by introducing female candidates‖(72).   The first woman 
to be elected into the parliament was Bozena Vikova-Kuneticka who replaced a deceased 
parliamentary member in 1912.   She campaigned on patriotic ideals rather than a 
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feminist agenda.   By 1918, the year when Czechoslovakia became officially independent 
from the Austrian Hungarian Empire, female representatives on different administrative 
levels were no longer an exception.   After two decades of intensive lobbying, Czech 
women finally gained a full right to vote in 1919 setting a strong precedent for future 
women‘s activism.  
  
Women and the Communist State: 1948 – 1989 
By World War II., women‘s activism was well established in the Czech lands and 
nothing seemed to stand in way of women‘s rights advancement.  After the Second 
World War, in the context of a short period of democratic rule, a number of Czech and 
Slovak women‘s activists gathered to revitalize the active women‘s movement that was in 
existence during the pre-war period.  Women were once again active in labor unions, and 
political parties established branches just for women (Uhrova 1990).  Each political party 
even published a magazine for women.  By 1947, the non-partisan Women’s Council 
united about forty women‘s organizations.  They worked together to achieve equality for 
women and improve women‘s participation in public life in post-war Czechoslovakia.  
The Women’s Council also followed the pre-war tradition of collaborating with women‘s 
organizations abroad.   
But these efforts were interrupted by the Communist coup in February 1948.   To 
establish the new totalitarian system, the new Czechoslovak government began to 
systematically outlaw all independent political or civic activity and brutally repress any 
potential opponents.  Czechoslovak citizens disagreeing with the new system and its 
policies were jailed and even executed after they were sentenced in the many ‗show 
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trials‘ prepared and run by the government.  The leaders of the earlier women‘s 
movement were not spared as documented on the case of Milada Horakova, the leader of 
the Women’s National Council who became a victim of a conspiracy prepared by the 
newly established communist regime, and was executed in 1950 .
23
   
Soon, the Communisty Party united all permitted social and political activities 
under the National Front, an umbrella organization comprising a variety of political 
organizations, trade unions, and so-called voluntary social organizations.  ―The 
centralized system of state power thus autocratically permeated areas of private interests 
or citizens needs and did not permit alternative forms of association to develop 
independent of the National Front‖ (Fric 1999, 4).   But did this mean that the window of 
opportunity for women‘s organizing closed? 
The state repression of independent organizations and movements had 
undoubtedly important consequences for women‘s activism.  In 1950, the regime 
replaced the independent Women’s National Council with a centrally coordinated 
Czechoslovak Women’s Union (CWU) that was closely connected with the Communist 
Party.
24
  After February 26, 1948, this was the only women‘s organization operating in 
the Czech lands.  Its motto was ―By building the nation, you will strengthen peace‖.   In 
its resolution in November 1949, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party defined the mission of the CWU: 
It is its mission to lead activities for women, especially the fight for peace and to 
perform those tasks that are not peculiar to labor unions or other mass 
organizations. (Archival UKZ6_37-40). 
                                                 
23
 The Women’s National Council was an umbrella organization for a number of women‘s liberal clubs 
during the time of the ―1
st
 Republic‖ (1918-1938). This organization was a successor of the earlier 
established Women’s Czech Club which since 1901 represented a center of emancipation efforts and by 
which was the Council for Women’s Suffrage established in 1905 (see Buresova 2001, 41-42). 
24
 For a detailed overview of the events leading to and surrounding this transformation, see Skalova 2004. 
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In 1952, the state once again reorganized the state-controlled women‘s 
organization when the Communist Party temporarily dissolved the Czechoslovak 
Women’s Union (CWU).  It was reasoned that based on the premises of Marxist 
scholarship, the ‗woman‘s question‘ did not exist, and therefore there was no need for 
women to organize.  To replace CWU‘s activities, local city governments also known as 
the National Councils began to establish local Women’s Councils.  Their goal was to 
actively engage women in ‗building the socialist society‘, ‗building peace‘, ‗improving 
productivity in factories‘ and many others (Uhrova 1990).  It took 15 years before the 
Czechoslovak Women’s Union was re-established and the significance of gender 
recognized by the state again. 
It would seem that by eliminating all independent forms of organization, the state 
removed important mobilizing networks and resources from Czech and Slovak women.  
However, my interviews with women active in these organizations reveal that the 
individual branches of the Czech Union of Women were fairly autonomous and focused 
primarily on non-political activities such as organization of cultural events, delivery of 
goods to elderly citizens and planning of children‘s activities.  As one of the interviewed 
women noted; ―The Union of Women was not very political on the local level.  There 
were people who showed up when there was no one to clean windows or organize a 
Children‘s Day.  It was very hands on.‖ (personal interview).  Therefore, unconsciously, 
the state created alternative mobilizing structures for women.  Czech women, however, 
did not take an advantage of these.   
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State Ideology toward Women: Conflicting Messages 
In the context of the post World War II. period, both women and men had high 
hopes for the future.  During this time, the state introduced a number of new policies that 
women expected to have a positive impact on their lives. In other words, it is possible 
that early on, women did not organize because they felt their grievances would be 
addressed. 
After the Communist overthrow of 1948, Czechoslovak women as a social 
category became gradually central to the development of communist ideology.    This did 
not mean, however, that emancipation and advancement of women‘s rights was an issue 
of interest for the state that based its ideology on a simplified interpretation of Marxism-
Leninism.  In her 1976 (pro-regime) publication, Bauerova explains the foundations of 
the state‘s attitude towards women‘s liberation: ―… the classics of Marxism conditioned 
the liberation of women by the following three factors:  
a) existence of socialist economy,  
b) participation of women in economic activity,  
c) formation of an extensive net of services and commerce, and abolishment of 
small-scale production.‖ (Bauerova 1976, 29)  
The state policy towards women was derived from the government‘s interest in 
developing a socialist society, and explicit concerns about inequality were typically 
reduced solely to issues of social class.  
Therefore, rather than focusing on women‘s issues per se, the communist regime 
used its policies to systematically address the three conditions summarized by Bauerova.  
Point number one regarding the necessity of a socialist economy was addressed soon 
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after the 1948 coup when the regime headed by the Communist Party began to 
nationalize all enterprises, collectivize land and when it established a system of a 
centrally planned economy.  Given the situation in the rapidly developing national 
economy after the war, the country soon began to lack in qualified labor force.  In 
response, the regime began to systematically draw women into the labor force.   Finally, 
the communist government also quickly realized the need to address the necessity for 
services and goods that would ease women‘s transition into the labor force, and began to 
respond it by introducing a variety of social services targeting women and mothers in 
particular.  While early on the public shared the post-War excitement surrounding the 
idea of building a new socialist society, the enthusiasm diminished in light of further 
developments. 
 
The ‘Women To Work’ State Campaign 
First, the relationship between the Czechoslovak state and women was throughout 
the 1950‘s and early 1960‘s defined by a powerful state campaign aiming to increase the 
participation of women in the communist labor market.   The idea that there was plenty of 
work (and jobs) for everyone as a result of a rapid growth of the heavy industry and of 
the displacement of ethnic Germans was very prominent at this time.  
In this context, the state came to view and define women primarily in terms of 
their working capacity.  In a personal interview, a former employee of the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs explained: ―A non-working woman did not have much value for 
the government and state officials.  The idea of that time was a woman who was willing 
to do anything – even if it was at the expense of her family.‖  The state encouraged 
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women to participate in the labor market in order ―to build socialism and peace‖.  It 
primarily targeted middle class women who had been staying at home until this time, and 
it used a variety of means to bring women into the factories.  The authorities worked to 
reach women through the media, advertisements in the public transportation system, 
through the movie industry, and through the newly established network of branches of the 
Central Women‘s Committee of the Communist Party.   Later, it also used the state-
controlled Czechoslovak Women‘s Union.   
The documents of the Central Women‘s Committee of the Communist Party 
collected in the Czech Central Archive detail how the Communist Party placed little 
emphasis on actual ‗women‘s issues‘.  Arguably, the Czechoslovak family law 
introduced in 1950 did guarantee gender equality within the family, but what the 
Communist Party emphasized in reality was the importance of women‘s contribution to 
‗building the socialist state‘ (Archival 20/2-3).  The state was drawing women to jobs in 
construction, heavy industry and distribution of goods.   It established quota for women 
in these areas.  In his 1954 address, President Antonin Zapotocky also turned attention to 
women‘s role in the socialist economy when he pointed out that ―During the Five-year 
plan, the number of those employed in industry and construction/building has increased 
by 36%.  Women represent a large portion of these growing numbers‖ (Rude Pravo, 
2/37).  
 In 1951, the Central Women‘s Committee conducted a survey examining the 
‗Experiences in Recruiting Women to Employment‘.  The study describes in detail the 
ways in which women were recruited into the workforce: 
... the Czechoslovak Women‘s Union... establishes information centers called 
Service for Women. To date, we have 117 of them. ... The centers have lists of 
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open jobs and daycare facilities available to women. ... Otherwise, the recruiting 
takes place directly. Most often, after a campaign and promotion in the 
newspapers, radio, posters and through meetings, a couple of working women go 
and visit women at home. Mailmen provide a good service because they have a 
good idea about which women are not involved in the working process, and they 
can point to any remaining workforce reserve. (Archival 1261/1/17 KSČ Ústřední 
komise žen, Unit 134). 
 
As a result of these state efforts, the numbers of working women were growing. And they 
continued to grow even faster as a result of decreasing living standard.  In June 1953, the 
Czechoslovak Currency Reform did away with the devalued currency, food and product 
stamp system, and the black market.  Consequently, prices increased and the standard of 
living declined.  According to Jiri Vecernik, a Czech sociologist, the currency reform 
―made people dependent on the state. That was the point.‖ (personal interview) 
 The declining standard of living together with the state‘s campaign to bring 
women to paid employment led to a significant increase of the female workforce.   A 
leading demographer explains that by the 1950‘s, ―it was socially unacceptable for 
women not to work‖ (Kucera, personal interview).   As documented in Table 3.1, by 
1970 over 80% of women were economically active (Kucera 1994, 77).  By 1976, 
women represented 47.8% of all employed persons in Czechoslovakia (Bauerova 1976, 
111).   
 
Table 3.1. Trends in economic activity of Czechoslovak women 1950-1970 
Year Economic activity of women  
1950 54.1% 
1960 70.7% 
1970 85.3% 
 Source: Hamernik 1976 
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However, despite the overall growing trend in women‘s employment, the numbers looked 
very different in various industries (see Table 3.2).  Throughout the communist period, 
there remained a fairly strong gender segregation within the existing ‗labor market‘.   
 
Table 3.2 Proportion of women among Czechoslovak workers in selected branches of the 
national economy 
 1954 1973 
Industry 34.2% 44.6% 
Building/construction 9.2% 16.6% 
Agriculture 54% 48.1% 
Commerce 62.4% 75% 
Transportation (non-
production units) 
18.4% 22.6% 
Science and research 21.8% 35.5% 
Healthcare and social work 72.4% 80% 
Education and culture 55.8% 67.4% 
Judiciary and public 
administration 
36.4% 53.2% 
Source: Foret & Illner 1976 
 
Most noticeably, the percentage of women working in industry, 
building/construction and business/food industry grew over time, while the proportion of 
women employed in agriculture was decreasing.  The formerly feminized agricultural 
sector came to be dominated by male workers.  Construction and transportation were the 
least feminized industries.  In contrast, healthcare, trade, education and culture 
represented the most feminized spheres.  
Striking were the high numbers of employed women who had children.  As Marie 
Cermakova, the director of the Czech Sociological Institute and a leading expert in the 
area of women and labor force suggests ―What was really new was that women with 
small children started working in large numbers‖ (Cermakova, personal interview).  
However, the intensity of women‘s economic activity decreased with the number of 
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children.  Of married women with one child, 78.5% were employed in 1980.  76.7% of 
women with two children worked and the number is 62.4% for women with three or more 
children (Bauerova and Jancovicova 1983). 
To assess whether women were dissatisfied with their situation or not, and 
whether they had a reason to organize and protest, it is helpful to look at some historical 
data.  Bauerova and Bartova (1987) examined the reasons why individual women entered 
the labor force.  According to the surveys of the 1980‘s, only 3.3% of women preferred to 
stay at home under any conditions (Vitek et al. 1983).  Sixty percent of women between 
the ages of 21 and 35 wanted to stay at home temporarily – one to three years while they 
care for small children.  Thirty-six percent of women did not want to stay at home at all 
(Bauerova and Bartova 1987, 198).   Bauerova and Bartova (1987) noted that those 
supporting women‘s traditional role were typically older persons and men in particular, 
people with lower education and those living in rural areas.  
Women proposed three primary motives for entering the workforce: economic, 
social and work related.  Financial reasons dominated the answers in the 1960‘s survey.  
A 1965 survey conducted by the Czechoslovak Commission of People’s Control and 
Statistics revealed that over two thirds of newly employed women entered the workforce 
for financial reasons (Srb 1966).
25
  However, by the 1970‘s and 80‘s, women emphasized 
social and career oriented motives.  Here, women suggested that work provided them 
with important social contacts, support and encountering interesting people and problems.  
Less frequently, women suggested that the work they did was interesting, useful or that 
they liked using their qualifications (Bauerova and Bartova 1987).   
                                                 
25
 Vera Kucharova, a Czech sociologist has to say the following about the reliability of the data collected 
under the totalitarian regime: ―The Statistical Office was controlled by the Communist Party. The data they 
produced are reliable, but something else was presented to the public‖ (Kucharova, personal interview) 
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To ease women‘s transition to the labor force, the communist government 
recognized the necessity of introducing a variety of services and programs (see Table 3.4 
below).  First, the government worked to expand women‘s qualifications and skills 
through education.  Educational levels of women rose steadily during the communist 
period; ―While in 1955 every third girl who left school directly joined the labor force, by 
1961 only every tenth girl left school without pursuing some further education‖. 
(Heitlinger 1979, 150).  By the end of the 1980‘s, the percentage of women with a high 
school diploma was higher than that of men.
26
   And while in 1948/49, women 
represented only 23.2% of university students, by 1989/1990, the number rose to 45% 
(Cermakova 1992, 54).  
 
Table 3.4 Proportion of female students in % 
 1955 1960 1970 1980 
Specialized secondary school 49.7% 50.3% 58.7% 61.8% 
College 25.3% 37.1% 40.2% 43% 
Source: Bauerova and Jancovicova 1983 
 
To enable women to carry full time jobs, the totalitarian communist state also 
began to introduce a seemingly generous network of social services available to women, 
namely a range of daycare facilities for children.  The Czechoslovak Women’s Council 
pledged to construct additional day nurseries, kindergartens and other programs and 
facilities for children.   As a result, the number of day nurseries for infants and children 
under 2 years of age grew from 511 in 1950 to 1,155 in 1970 (Kucera, personal 
                                                 
26
 In 1991, 24% of women as compared to 21% of men had high school diploma. However, only 5% of all 
women compared to 9% of men received education at the University level (Stasova 2000, 9). 
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interview).  The numbers of state and company kindergartens for children between the 
ages 3 and 5 also grew as documented in Table 3.4
27
  
 
Table 3.4 Total Number of State-operated Kindergardens 
Year No. of institutions No. of spaces % of children 3-5 
yrs of age 
1950 4,359 188, 000 36% 
1960 4,732 202,000 43% 
1970 5,582 259, 00 62% 
Source: Kucera 1994, 77 
 
―The trend of the 1950‘s was to get children into day nurseries, no one worried 
about its possible implications for these children‖ (Kucera, personal interview).  At this 
time, ―Daycare facilities were a necessity not an achievement or a luxury‖ (Krejcova, 
personal interview).  
The official paid maternity leave continued to enable women to stay out of work 
during the last four weeks of pregnancy and then the subsequent fourteen weeks after 
giving birth.   A survey conducted by the State Population Committee in 1962 revealed 
that once the official maternity leave was over, only one third of women opted to return 
to work.
28
   Another third asked the employer for an unpaid leave and the remaining third 
left paid employment altogether (Prokopec 1963).    
During the first post-war years, the Czechoslovak Women’s Council under the 
patronage of the Communist Party also promised women that their housework would be 
made easier in order to enable them to enter the labor market.  The state worked to supply 
families with various kitchen and other appliances in order to decrease the burden of 
housework and childcare.  Specifically, the government began to establish Free 
                                                 
27
 These numbers somewhat differ from author to author. According to Bartosova (1979), for example, 
there were 1,120 daycare facilities for children between the ages of 3-6 in Czechoslovakia in 1945, and this 
number grew to 6,633 in 1960 (30).   
28
 The respondents were 6,176 randomly selected women. 
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Household Cooperatives that offered a variety of services such as dry-cleaning, laundry 
and ironing (Uhrova 1990).  
Over time, the artificial full employment, centralized income scales affecting all 
employees, as well as extremely strong redistributive social policies, led to relatively low 
income inequality. 
29
  This is well documented by the extremely low levels of GINI 
coefficients in communist countries.  For example, the GINI coefficient for persons was 
0.158 in 1988 Czechoslovakia (Nelson, Tilly and Walker 1998, 355).    
But despite the state policies resulting in low income inequality and small gender 
differences in educational levels, women did not gain an equal position with men in the 
official working sphere.  In other words, important grievances remained.  Most notably, 
the fact that the regime supported women‘s entrance to the labor market did not become 
reflected in women‘s status and salaries.  A prominent Czech demographer of that time 
explains:  
Talking about the gender wage gap… this information was secret, little research 
was done.  Even the number of citizens was kept secret.  Equality was established 
by the law, but the gender wage gap was huge in some industries. (Kucera, 
personal interview).  
 
Bauerova and Bartova (1987) also confirmed that the average salaries of women were 
lower than those of men, and they attributed these differences to the disproportionate 
numbers of men in heavy industry but also in leadership positions.  According to 
Krizkova and Vohlidalova (2009), in the 1960‘s the average female salary in the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was around two thirds of the average male salary (44).   
                                                 
29
 Although this has been to a great extent the case in all communist countries, the equitability of income 
was especially profound in former Czechoslovakia (Atkinson & Micklewright 1992; Milanovic 1997; 
Potucek 2001). 
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Furthermore, while the public accepted many of the employment and social 
provisions favorably in the context of the post-war enthusiasm and pro-socialist mood in 
the society, it was often dissatisfied with their implementation on the ground.  Despite its 
ambitious goals in the first phase of its state-building, the Czechoslovak state had limited 
resources to fund these various programs.   Consequently, the state soon transferred some 
of the responsibility for building childcare facilities and providing other services to 
factories and companies.  Typically, local labor unions took over and began to organize a 
variety of services for families with children.  A survey conducted by the State 
Population Committee in 1962 found that the number one reason for women not to return 
to work after giving birth was the acute lack of childcare facilities or other options 
available to them (Prokopec 1963).    
A prominent Czech sociologist Marie Cermakova refers to a ‗myth about 
socialism‘.  She refers to the disconnection between the state propaganda regarding the 
availability of childcare facilities and what actually was available to parents.   According 
to Cermakova; ―not everyone had access to daycare facilities, you often had to rely on 
nepotism to get a spot‖ (Cermakova, personal interview).  This situation was further 
exacerbated by the 48 hour working week which was an official state policy that lasted 
until 1960, and by the omnipresent shortages of basic goods.  Eva Uhrova, a former 
editor of the Vlasta magazine comments: ―I remember a cover page of Vlasta – there was 
a picture of pregnant women standing in a line for goods.  Women considered standing in 
a line the norm‖.  (Uhrova, personal interview) 
Therefore, despite the formal provisions and promises made by the state, women 
with small children continued to struggle to combine childcare with paid employment.  
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And yet, these topics quickly retreated from the public agenda.  ―The (Czechoslovak 
Women‘s) Union really tried to deal with some of the initial problems facing women in 
the 1950‘s, but they had very little power‖ (Uhrova, personal interview).  In fact, in a 
personal interview, the former chief editor of Vlasta, a key women‘s magazine during 
communism, stated that during communism, the heads of factories and other businesses 
avoided the active leaders of the Czechoslovak Women’s Union because they did not 
want to respond to their demands! 
This situation was further exacerbated by the lack of governmental institutions 
addressing gender inequality.   As the supporters of state socialism believed that social 
problems would disappear, they even eliminated the Ministry for Social Affairs in the 
early years of the Communist Regime.  The Ministry was not reinstated until 1968.   
Meanwhile, social problems did not disappear with the arrival of communism.  In fact, a 
number of new problems arose.  It becomes clear that while the Czechoslovak state 
pushed women into the labor market, it sent women conflicting messages when it did 
little to ensure gender equality in regard to pay and access to leadership positions.  
Furthermore, women continued to struggle to combine motherhood with paid 
employment.   While the state propaganda declared the ‗women‘s question‘ solved, 
women in Czechoslovakia continued to experience long working hours, lack of available 
childcare facilities and also all-pervading shortages in basic goods including groceries 
and hygienic products (Moghadam 1993).   
 
Renessaince of Motherhood: Pro-Natalist Policies of the 1960’s 
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The message about their desirable societal role as it was communicated to women 
by the Czechoslovak state changed profoundly with the introduction of pro-natalist 
policies in the 1960‘s.  Until then, the state emphasized women‘s role in building 
socialism through women‘s participation in the economy as the heavy industry grew 
rapidly in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s.   During this time women were viewed primarily as 
workers and the ‗woman‘s question‘ was considered irrelevant in light of Marxist 
teaching.  But this view began to change in the late 1950‘s and early 1960‘s as a result of 
declining fertility rates.   Suddenly, through state policies, women were asked to devote 
themselves to traditional, childrearing roles again. 
While in 1947 there were 23.6 children born per 1,000 persons in Czech lands, 
this number declined to 14.1 by 1964 (Bartosova 1979, 19).   By 1969, Czechoslovakia 
had the lowest birth rate among all European nations.  In response, the socialist 
propaganda began to call for women to become "good mothers" in addition to being 
"good workers‖ in order to continue building a "free and prosperous socialist society" 
(Castle-Kanerova 1992), and the communist government started to expand the already 
existing set of policy provisions aiming at supporting young families and mothers in 
particular.  
A number of developments contributed to this decrease in the fertility rate and to 
the subsequent reconsideration of state social policy toward women and families.  First, 
the census of the late 1960‘s revealed that employed mothers had fewer children.  The 
data were not conclusive, but they led officials to ask questions about this relationship.  It 
became clear that while the state persisted in drawing women into the labor force, the 
development of childcare facilities and housework related services for families promised 
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by the state continued to stagnate.  Despite the growing number of state and company 
established day nurseries and daycare facilities, the supply never caught up with the 
demand.   Furthermore, women continued to be disproportionately burdened by 
housework.   According to Milada Bartosova, a former employee of the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs and of the Czechoslovak Women’s Union, ―by the 1960‘s, we 
began to collect data documenting that women‘s position is really not as good at it should 
be‖ (Bartosova, personal interview).   As families continued to be dependent on two 
incomes, women found it increasingly difficult to combine motherhood with paid 
employment.  As a result, the average number of children per each woman began to 
decline.  
Second, the 1957 abortion law made it legal for women to interrupt their 
pregnancy for social reasons.
30
  While in Western countries women had to fight for the 
right to abortion, in Czechoslovakia it came from ‗above‘.  Dana Musilova, a Czech 
historian, suggests that ―the reason for this new policy was not related to women‘s rights 
but rather it was perceived as a health issue‖ (Musilova, personal interview).   David 
Delia (1992) concurs when he says that the new abortion law was put in place in response 
to problems with illegal abortion. Ideology was less of a factor in the development of 
these policies (80).
31
  This led to an additional decrease in fertility rates because abortion 
was used as birth control which was slow to arrive in the socialist countries (Bartosova 
1979; Delia 1992). 
                                                 
30
 Abortion was legalized in Czechoslovakia in 1920.  In 1936, it was legally restricted to cases where 
mother‘s health was threatened (Delia 1992, 82). 
31
 By 1960, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and China allowed abortion 
on request, or on the basis of social need (Delia 1992, 82). 
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In response to the declining birth rates, the 1962 Convention of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party gave an impetus for the creation of state population policy.  Milan 
Kucera, a demographer and a policy advisor during this era describes the situation: 
During 1962 and 1963, an interdepartmental commission was created to design a 
program of social assistance for families with children.  This commission 
conducted an analysis of population growth, and it also studied living conditions 
of Czech and Slovak families.  However, the proposals were deemed too 
expensive, and were put aside for several years. … When the 1968 Prague Spring 
came, the political leaders needed to calm the nation down and redirect people‘s 
attention from politics to their families and private lives.  The family policy 
program had been already prepared, so they started to implement it (Kucera, 
personal interview). 
  
In response, the state established the State Population Commission in 1962.
32
  The 
Commission assisted in gradually expanding the number of social provisions protecting 
women during the childbearing stages of their lives.  These programs and policies 
consisted mainly of relatively generous schemes of maternity allowances and maternity 
leave in which women were guaranteed their jobs.   
A new Labor Code was introduced at the beginning of the 1960‘s in order to unite 
a variety of policies aiming to protect women during the maternity period.   In 1964, the 
official maternity leave was prolonged to 22 weeks of paid leave.  At this time, women 
could also request unpaid leave from their employers until the child reached one year of 
age.  Official maternity leave was further prolonged in 1968.  After 1970, women were 
able to take advantage of additional non-paid leave.  By the late 1980‘s, women were 
entitled to a standard three year long paid maternity leave during which the employers 
were obliged to hold their jobs open.   
                                                 
32
 It is interesting that only two out of the sixty members of the Lehr‘s Commission had three or more 
children (Kucera, personal interview). 
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Another important measure introduced at this time was the differentiation of the 
retirement age according to the gender of the worker, and for women also according to 
the number of children born by them.  As a result, while the legislation would allow men 
to retire at the age of 60, it could have been as early as at the age of 53 for women (see 
Kucera 1968).  Demographer Milan Kucera describes the ad-hoc origins of this policy: 
The idea of the differentiated gendered retirement was invented in 1965.  Women 
would retire earlier. This was considered a pro-natalist policy.  It was not 
something that went through some public debate, it was simply an idea developed 
by the women who worked at the Central Committee of the Communist Party and 
Central Women‘s Union.  They came up with it because they wanted to retire 
early. (Kucera, personal interview). 
 
Milada Hrda, an employee of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs during 
communism, confirms that ―Policy-making was much easier during communism, you 
only had to satisfy one party‖ (Hrda, personal interview). 
During this time, the Labor Code also defined acceptable working conditions for 
pregnant and breastfeeding women.  These included regulations regarding safety 
conditions at work, over-time work, night work and breaks.  Regular breaks were 
introduced for breastfeeding women.  Furthermore, following the recommendations of 
the International Labor Organization, Czechoslovakia included provisions protecting 
female workers in mines, established weight limits that could be safely carried by 
women, and as the only communist country, it also laid out the conditions under which 
women could work at night.    
Other pro-population measures included a massive increase in new apartments 
built and made available to young couples, lump sums of money given to parents of a 
newborn child (birth grants) and paid leaves for the parents of sick children.    In 1973, 
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the state began to offer zero interest and other beneficial loans to young couples.  These 
programs included significant financial contributions for each child born to eligible 
couples under the age of 30.   At the same time, the state also increased child allowances. 
The politically more relaxed atmosphere of the late 1960‘s enabled Josef 
Langmeier and Zdenek Matejcek (1968) to conduct a study of day nurseries for the newly 
established State Population Committee.  It was discovered that these institutions tended 
to have a negative impact on children‘s development.  It was the first time an authority 
had openly suggested that institutional care may not be ideal for child‘s development.   In 
other words, while in the 1950‘s everyone was trying to get their infants into day 
nurseries, during the 1960‘s, the role of mothers as caregivers was rediscovered.  Dana 
Musilova, a Czech historian concludes in this context: ―The renaissance of motherhood 
was peaking (in the 1970‘s)‖ (Musilova, personal interview).   The importance of 
mothers was further underscored through the introduction of the SOS Village project 
which advocated for the replacement of institutional care for children with foster family 
placement.
33
 
These political developments and policy discussions on the issue of population 
developments were interrupted in 1968 after a reformist Alexander Dubcek came to 
power in January that year.   He worked to partially decentralize the economy and 
democratize politics as well.  To provide context for the development of public policy 
and social movements during this time, it is important to note that under his watch, the 
Czechoslovak government loosened restrictions on the freedom of speech and freedom of 
travel.  He also established a federation of Czech and Slovak Republics.  
                                                 
33
 In 1968, the Circle of Friends of SOS children's villages was founded in Czechoslovakia in response to 
the visit of the founder of the first SOS village in the world, Hermann Gmeiner.  
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In August 1968, the invasion by the Soviet military and forces of the Warsaw Pact 
put an end to these democratizing processes.  What followed was a period of 
‗normalization‘ -  a return to previous ways of doing things.   The government maintained 
control by imprisoning and intimidating opponents of the regime, by conducting house 
searches, denying appropriate employment to thousands of people, denying educational 
opportunities to children of political opponents, and not allowing citizens to travel 
abroad.   The government led by Gustav Husak also worked to redirect citizens‘ attention 
from public affairs to private life.  A set of new state policies targeting women and 
families with children was introduced in the 1970‘s with the objective of pacifying the 
public by providing additional benefits to families and by improving the state of the 
economy. 
 As a result of these changes, people retreated into the safety of their homes, since 
the private sphere was least affected by the strict political control exercised by the 
communist state.  Milan Kucera, a prominent Czech demographer of this period explains:  
After the summer of 1968, in the Czech lands alone, 327,000 people were 
expelled from the Communist Party, and some 400,000 lost the opportunity to 
fully participate in employment and public life.  Many turned to their families and 
friends. … This is where the phenomenon of the weekend homes started.  During 
weekends, people retreated to their weekend homes where they could spend time 
with their family and friends and there they could exercise freedom of speech. 
(Kucera, personal interview).   
 
Fertility increased dramatically as a result of these developments as young people were 
being driven away from public life into the private sphere, and the state introduced new 
family policies supporting young families with children.  
At first, women welcomed the pro-natalist policies introduced by the communist 
government, but soon it became clear that the laws and state rhetoric did not always align 
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with reality.  In a personal interview, Eva Uhrova, an editor of Vlasta, the most popular 
women‘s magazine under communism explains:  
We were seeing completely different working conditions than what the 
communists were promising to people.  Take for example the work of pregnant 
women.   They were supposed to be protected but they had to climb up the 
weaving loom to tie the thread all the time.  
 
There was a clear disconnect between what the state was communicating to women and 
the actual working conditions women encountered in their jobs. 
This shift in government policies and rhetoric towards women‘s role as mothers 
(as opposed to the earlier emphasis on their role as workers) reinforced traditional 
division of labor in the family (Heitlinger 1979; Scott 1974; Wolchik 1979).  ―The 
pronatalist policies… reinforced the idea that childrearing and domestic work are ‗by 
nature‘ women‘s work‖ (Heitlinger 1996, 83).  That none of the experts or government 
officials involved in preparing the population policy questioned women‘s exclusive 
responsibility for caregiving and housework within the family is well reflected in the 
exchange within the State Population Commission and in academic articles and 
discussions of this time (see, for example, Srb 1960).   The experts of this time were 
concerned with the development of policies that would enable women to ―successfully 
fulfill all functions expected of her by the family and by the society‖ (Ulrych & 
Wynnyczuk 1961, 19).   
Overall, the pro-natalist policies had a profound effect on women‘s lives.  Delia 
(1992) explains: 
The unparalleled power of the state in countries ruled by a single party, its great 
organizational ability, and the general acceptance that individuals‘ interests 
should be subordinated to national ones, meant interventionist population policies 
had a tremendous impact on the lives of ordinary citizens, and especially women. 
Policy makers did sometimes pay lip service to women‘s welfare in justifying 
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policy.  But arguments couched in these terms, that abortion or contraception 
were bad for women‘s health, or that repeated child-bearing exhausted women 
and was a barrier to sex equality, tended to change conveniently to match the 
prevailing wind (80). 
 
Despite the legislative changes and formal promises made by the Czechoslovak 
government, the implementation of some of these policies continued to lag behind.  In 
reality, many families continued to face a lack of daycare facilities and housework related 
services (Bartosova 1979).   In 1976, a public opinion poll suggested that about one-third 
of families with small children were not able to find an opening in daycare facilities 
(Cakiova 1979).   The situation regarding the delivery of housework related services was 
also improving only slowly.  Additionally, no one started questioning the traditional 
stereotypes and the role of women as primary caregivers and of those responsible for vast 
majority of household tasks.  In fact, a closer look at Vlasta, the government-sponsored 
women‘s magazine of this time, reveals that the communist government continued to 
deliver the message that outside of paid employment, women ought to carry on their 
traditional roles.  Without contest, Czech women took on what Arlie Hochschild later 
called The Second Shift (1990).   Research conducted in the 1970‘s estimated that 
Czechoslovak women were on average devoting 3-5 hours a day (and 6 hours during 
weekends) to housework (Bauerova and Bartova 1987).  
Furthermore, it would be misleading to believe that women gained an equal 
position with men in the official working sphere.   Public opinion polls from the 1970‘s 
and 80‘s document a significant gender gap in the salaries received by women and men, 
discrimination in employment of women with small children as well as an inadequate use 
of women‘s qualification and education (Bauerova and Bartova 1987).  In 1972, while 
salaries were computed according to official governmental scales, women working in 
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industrial enterprises continued to receive 64% of the salaries received by men (Mineni 
zen 1972).   
While as early as the 1960‘s the state declared the ‗women‘s question‘ solved, 
women‘s understanding of their position in the society was far less optimistic.  In a 
survey conducted by UVVM of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in 1972, only 
22% of female respondents reported that the equality of genders had been reached in 
Czechoslovakia at that time.  In contrast, 55% believed that equality had not been reached 
(Mineni zen 1972).  When asked about their reasons for their responses, women 
emphasized inequalities in the home, lower economic status and inequalities in wages, 
and also lower status of women in political life and in general.   
In short, the message regarding women‘s desirable role in society as it was 
communicated by the communist state shifted conveniently along with state ideology and 
economic strategies.  While early on the state emphasized women‘s role in ‗building 
socialism‘ through women‘s participation in the economy, by the 1960‘s, the state 
focused on women‘s maternal roles.  At the same time, Czech and Slovak women were 
left frustrated with their unequal position at home, in work and in public life.  
Surprisingly, unlike women in Chile and other Latin American countries, Czech women 
did not use the resources available to them to organize to protest these conditions. 
 
Absence of Women’s Mobilization  
In communist Czechoslovakia, women never organized around the numerous 
gender inequalities they continued to face, and they never organized on the basis of their 
gender identity around other issues either.  This is puzzling considering women had a 
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strong presence alongside men in the political opposition movements both in 
Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc (Jancar 1985, 168).
34
  In fact, under 
communism, women played a prominent role in all key civic initiatives and groups 
including the Czechoslovak Charter 77, the Committee for Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS), 
Czechoslovak Helsinki Federation and the Society of Friends of the U.S.A.   For 
example, women represented about 20% of those who signed the Charter 77 Manifesto, a 
document calling for the Czechoslovak government to live up to its commitments in 
terms of international agreements.  Women also represented 30% of the Charter‘s 
spokepersons.  About 30% of the Committee‘s for Unjustly Prosecuted members were 
women.
35
   Furthermore, about one quarter of those imprisoned by 1981 for their 
activities within VONS were women (Einhorn 2003, 158).  
A set of personal interviews conducted with both female and male dissidents 
reveals that women played an even more important role within the opposition movement 
than the existing data suggest.  As Kveta Jechova, a historian and author of a study about 
Charter 77 pointed out; ―The share of the actual work conducted by women within the 
Charter 77 activities is much larger than the share of women who signed the manifesto.‖ 
(personal correspondence with Jirina Siklova 2002).  The relatively low number of 
female signatories of Charter 77 can be partially explained by the particular gender 
division of labor within the movement which allowed women to remain less visible.  
                                                 
34
 The Czech Sociological Dictionary (1996) describes the main characteristics of political opposition or 
dissent as the following: ―… persistent public defense of civil and human rights, criticism of the totalitarian 
regime and of its societal impacts, active citizenship involving common responsibility for the societal 
situation, defense of the principle of indivisibility of freedom, and solidarity with everyone who was 
limited in his or her civil and human rights.‖ (Velky sociologicky slovnik 1996, 212). 
35
 VONS, the Committee for Unjustly Prosecuted was established in 1978 by a group of Charter 77 
signatories. The Committee‘s mission was to collect and publicize information about cases of police and 
court persecutions committed for political reasons.   
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First, women‘s roles as mothers sometimes implied different treatment from the 
secret police and other authorities.  Such ―special‖ treatment could take on different and 
often contrasting roles, but it always led to women‘s greater invisibility within the 
movement.  In some cases, the authorities used children and family members to 
blackmail women.  This by no means stopped women in their opposition activities, but as 
Siklova (2001) suggests, it made women more secretive and ultimately less visible.  
Other times, women‘s maternal role prevented the authorities from instituting further 
persecutions and especially long-term imprisonment, and thus rendered women less 
visible: ―… members of the StB made a decision not to imprison me, because I was 
known as a poet and a woman with two small children― (Jirousova, personal interview). 
 Second, though dissidents disagree about the specific nature of the gender 
division of labor in the opposition movement, they agree that women were more likely to 
do certain activities over others.  For instance, Siklova (2001) suggests that women 
copied political essays, translated documents, wrote open letters, wrote books that were 
later published in ―samizdat‖, organized secret meetings, circulated petitions, coordinated 
money delivery for those who needed them and provided support for those in jails and 
courts.
36
  Many of the secret meetings, seminars, religious services and lectures could 
only take place in dissidents‘ apartments and they would not have been possible without 
the support and work of women.  All of these activities were illegal under the totalitarian 
regime and therefore required strict operational security.  In contrast, men dissidents were 
more likely to design Charter 77 statements and other documents – an open activity that 
                                                 
36
 Because of a strong state censorship of both old and new literature, those active in the opposition 
movement manually copied (through typing) books that were forbidden, and started new journals and 
magazines. After all these materials were typed in several copies, they were further circulated among the 
dissidents themselves and among public. This became known as the ‗samizdat literature‘. 
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did not necessarily lead to immediate imprisonment.  This division of labor partially 
explains why many of the most active and later persecuted dissidents never became 
Charter 77 signatories.  This is also why women were somewhat less visible within the 
opposition movement, and their roles were interpreted by some outsiders as secondary. 
 Third, signatories of Charter 77 faced a number of risks that included 
―questioning by secret police (75%), interrogation (61%), forced change of employment 
and occupation (44%), house searches (36%), worsened health (30%), impossibility of 
further study either by themselves or by their children, … different limitation of personal 
freedom, physical attacks, forced emigration…‖ (Klimova quoted in Cisarovska 1997, 
83).  Therefore, women and men often described an unwritten agreement between 
husbands and wives in which they would put only one name under the Charter 77 
manifesto.  One of the female dissidents described in a personal email: ―After our mutual 
arrangement, we had decided that only one of us should sign Charter 77 in order for the 
other one to remain relatively impregnable (because of a child).‖  This was a deliberate 
strategy that provided at least partial protection for dissidents‘ children and which 
ensured that at least one member of the family stayed employed and continued to secure 
basic family income. Due to their more traditional roles, women were usually the ones to 
take on this role.  
 These were all factors that contributed to women‘s relative invisibility within the 
Czechoslovak dissident movement.  To prevent themselves from being caught, women 
also applied a number of innovative tactics and methods that were based on their 
traditional female roles.   They held meetings in laundermats, and they carried illegal 
documents, books and photographs in their children‘s baby carriages.  They designed 
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clothes with hidden pockets where they would hide money and documents. Siklova 
(2001) remembers:  
… books to be sent to Brno were kept under piles of clothes waiting to be ironed, 
or… in broken washing machines, and … secret messages were passed through 
garbage bags hanging on a balcony… And again, they were women who came up 
with the idea that it was possible to hide vitamins in bags with M&Ms and this 
way they could be smuggled into the prison. (2) 
 
These activities carried on by women were invaluable to the functioning of the 
movement. Indeed, women‘s presence in the opposition movement was crucial to its 
survival and its achievement. As Dagmar Battekova, a wife of a dissident and an 
economist who has been tracking the role of women in opposition for years, puts it: ―It is 
my view that dissent could not have existed if it was not for women‖ (personal 
interview).   
 To summarize, it is surprising that Czech women did not organize on the basis of 
their gender identity when it is clear that women played an important role in the 
Czechoslovak opposition (though it was less visible than that of men).  Making a case for 
why something did not happen is tricky.  It is, however, possible to eliminate alternative 
explanations.   Czech women were not satisfied with their position as revealed in the 
public opinion polls from that time.  Between the local branches of the state run 
Women‘s Union, tight friendship networks and even the Catholic Church, women had 
numerous mobilizing resources available to them.   The dissident movement built on 
international networks, and so could the potential women‘s movement.  Furthermore, the 
existence of the strong political opposition movement suggests that despite widespread 
state repression, the political space was not fully closed for mobilization and just like in 
Chile, women could carve political space for themselves.   
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What makes the Czech (and Eastern European) situation different from the one in 
Chile (and Latin America in general) are the particular state policies and rhetoric 
associated with women‘s issues.  Women’s Memory
37
, a Czech oral history project which 
has collected close to 200 interviews with ordinary women living under state socialism in 
Czechoslovakia reveals an acute absence of women‘s reference to the Czechoslovak state 
and government.  Describing their daily lives and experiences, these women focus on 
their jobs, families and relationships, but do not mention the state and they rarely bring 
up specific policies.  This is in stark contrast to the interviews I have conducted in Chile 
where women articulated their lives in relation to Pinochet‘s regime and the Chilean 
states as well as its policies (see Chapter 6).  While further research is needed, this 
possibly suggests that the contradictory messages and policies of the communist state left 
Czech women disoriented and unable to easily identify the source of existing inequalities 
they could organize against.  
  
Conclusion 
While Czech women played an important role in the political opposition 
movement, neither female dissidents nor any other women organized into a cohesive 
women‘s movement under the totalitarian regime.  This was not because women were 
satisfied with their position in the society.  It is true that formally the Constitution of 
1948 and Family Law guaranteed women and men equal rights.  While the official 
rhetoric continued to suggest that the women‘s question had been solved, only a small 
minority of Czech and Slovak women felt that gender equality had really been reached.   
                                                 
37
 For more information about the project, its history and its methodology, see the project‘s website 
http://www.womensmemory.net/english/ .  
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In a 1972 survey, only 21% of female respondents thought that gender equality was in 
place.  Close to one quarter of respondents suggested that existing gender inequality was 
a result of women‘s disproportionate responsibility for housework and childcare, one fifth 
of respondents connected inequality with women‘s lower salaries and lower position in 
paid employment (Mineni zen 1972). 
 The low levels of women‘s mobilization in the Czech lands cannot be attributed 
to women‘s lack of experience with organizing as described in the resource mobilization 
theory or to the repressive nature of the political regime as proposed by the political 
process model in social movement theory.  After all, Czech women could have built on 
the strong pre-war tradition of women‘s activism.  While some of the earlier movement 
leaders did not live long enough to renew the mobilization efforts, many remained.  
Furthermore, while the state repressed civic participation that did not take place under the 
umbrella of the National Front, it is a fact that women continued to come together and 
discuss their issues.   Marie Cermakova, a prominent Czech sociologist, explains: 
―Women in rural areas were normally socializing, it did not matter under what name or 
umbrella.  It started with crocheting but then it developed… ― (Cermakova, personal 
interview).  Furthermore, the fact that women were active in the political opposition 
suggests that they had mobilizing resources available to them – but they decided not to 
make a use of them to organize on the basis of their gender identity. 
The evidence presented in this chapter points to the importance of policy feedback 
effects for explaining women‘s mobilization. These effects were not straightforward, 
however.  While state policy enabled women in Czechoslovakia to reconcile their 
maternal and public roles, gender equality was never a priority for the Czechoslovak 
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communist regime.  The inherent assumption behind the state socialist ideology was that 
with the change of societal context, the woman‘s and social question would no longer be 
relevant.  As Jaroslava Bauerova (1976), a proponent of the regime, described in her 
book:  
In the socialist societies, women have the same opportunities as men in regards to 
work, working and living conditions, education, habitation, utilization of culture, 
political activity.  However, in consequence of former traditions as well as of 
some hitherto unsolved socioeconomic circumstances, they have so far asserted 
themselves less than men. (116)  
 
According to Petr Visek, a former employee of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Social 
Affairs, ―Women never represented a target population for the state.  Instead, families 
did‖ (Visek, personal interview).  
Furthermore, women‘s interests were not directly represented in the communist 
government.  It is true that the Czechoslovak state included women in the legislative 
branch of the government - the numbers of women in the communist parliament rose 
from 12% in 1948 (national assembly) to 25% in 1971 and 29% in 1981… (Bartova 
1976; Bauerova & Jancovicova 1983).  But this was merely a formality, and as Castle-
Kanerova (1992) notes, ―Women were involved in the political apparatus in purely 
formal terms, and their inclusion was based on crude quotas‖ (115).  While women 
represented nearly 30% of all parliamentary deputies, the numbers of female members of 
the Communist Party and of the Central Committee apparatus were much lower than 
those of men.  Simply put, policies in communist Czechoslovakia were decided by men. 
Despite these shortcomings of relevant policies and of the policy-making process, 
Czechoslovak women felt that the existing policies provided them with enough resources 
to combine their traditional and public roles.  For this reason, they were less likely to 
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organize on the basis of their gender identity to protest the state.  Early on the state 
emphasized women‘s roles as that of workers and state-builders.  But the state used 
government sponsored media and later its pro-natalist social policies to reinforce 
women‘s traditional roles as well.  And while the poor implementation of social services 
left many women juggling housework, childcare and paid work outside of home, Czech 
women were proud that they could manage it all.  While the strength of the Czech 
dissident movement and the high numbers of female participation within it document that 
citizens had the organizational and other resources to organize against the state, I suggest 
that the particular nature of communist public policy prevented women from addressing 
the prevailing gender inequalities and forming a cohesive women‘s movement. 
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Chapter 4 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC 1990 – present 
Democracy Arrives: Women Struggle to Find a Common Language 
 
The early 1990‘s brought along many important changes for Czechoslovakia, and 
these changes had major consequences for women‘s lives, rights and activism.  After 
1989, the totalitarian way of governing was abandoned, and the country embarked on its 
way to democracy, a change that has occurred almost overnight.  The state also embarked 
on an ambitious journey to transform its inefficient communist centrally planned 
economy.
38
  ―When Central and Eastern European countries emerged out of the red in 
1989, they fell into a world dominated by liberal and, in economics, neoliberal discourse 
(Orenstein 2001, 1).  After decades of socialist governance in Czechoslovakia, there was 
an evident rise of public support for liberal and non-interventionist policies of the state.  
As a result, Czechs gradually replaced their command economy with a free market.   
In this environment, the highly centralized system of social security soon became 
seen as highly inefficient, static and costly.  As Andrew Roberts (2003) noted, ―…within 
a year of the transition, housing, healthcare, and pension systems changed almost beyond 
recognition‖(7).  The artificial full employment practiced under communism was no 
longer an option as the country struggled to make its economy more efficient.  Newly, the 
right-wing government of economist Vaclav Klaus began to emphasize individualism as 
a positive trait in navigating the new economy.  
It soon became clear that these political, economic and social changes would 
affect women and men differently.  Women clearly became the ―losers‖ in the transition 
                                                 
38
 Central and Eastern European countries did not use one path to arrive at capitalism and democracy.  For a 
description of the different strategies used by post-communist Poland and  Czech Republic, see Orenstein 
2001.  
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process (Beckwith 2005; Moghadam 1993).  Soon after the political turnover, 
unemployment for women escalated beyond the rates for men
39
; the gender pay gap 
increased, social protections under communist regimes weakened; quotas for holding 
political office were abolished
40
; and women‘s reproductive rights were threatened (see, 
for example, Bosnicova et al. 2009).  As gender quotas in decision-making bodies were 
removed, women effectively disappeared from the country‘s political life as well.  The 
remaining social policy provisions protecting women during the time of pregnancy, 
childbirth and child rearing turned, in the environment of free market economics, into an 
excuse for the discrimination against women based on stereotypes.  Furthermore, despite 
the continuing high rates of females in the workforce, Czech women continued to be 
almost exclusively responsible for childcare, elderly care and housework.  As Zdena 
Krejcova, an activist and a former member of Parliament, recalls ―women‘s work at 
home was considered a given‖ (personal interview).  
Given the continual gender inequalities, it is surprising that Czech women have 
not taken advantage of this political, economic and societal opening associated with the 
post-communist transformation to organize for action.    While under the communist 
regime, Czech women actively participated in the public protests against the regime and 
in other pro-democratic activities, female dissidents never organized on the basis of their 
gender identity and/or around gender issues either before or after the revolution of 1989.   
Furthermore, the few women‘s groups that emerged during the transition process of the 
1990‘s found it difficult to frame their concerns in ways that would resonate with the 
Czech public.   
                                                 
39
 see for example Watson 1993 
40
 Across the region as a whole, the decline in women‘s political representation was from an average of 33 
percent to 10 percent (Waylen 1994). 
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State Ideology toward Women: Conflicting Messages 
 After the collapse of communism, the Czech state‘s position regarding women‘s 
role in society followed three distinct paths.  First, the economic and political 
transformation overshadowed the societal one, and especially in the early years of the 
transition, there was little public discussion on issues pertaining to women.  The 
government pointed to legal provisions guaranteeing gender equality and emphasized the 
importance of the general transformation over minority issues.  Second, in contrast to the 
previously described absence of state‘s interest in women‘s issues, it was clear from the 
rhetoric of the government of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus that women were expected to 
return to their traditional sphere of home and private life.  Third, during the later stages of 
the democratic transition and economic transformation, women‘s issues gained in 
importance as a result of the European Union‘s (EU) encouragement during the EU 
accession process.  
First, in the context of the 1990‘s democratization, liberalization and 
privatization, a number of newly formed women‘s groups began to express concerns 
about a variety of issues regarding women.  However, their efforts were disregarded on 
the grounds that there were enough provisions in the Czech legislation to protect equality 
between women and men.  Without a doubt, gender equality was of a minimal 
importance to political leaders during the 1990‘s.  Vera Kucharova, a researcher working 
at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs remembers: ―I saw a letter from Minister 
Vodicka who said that this (gender inequality) is not our problem‖ (personal interview). 
Similarly, Marta Hubova recalls: ―The state understood women to be equal to men.  They 
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felt there was no need to fight for equal status for women within the law… I was in the 
parliament at that time and there, this was in opposition, these ideas were not welcomed 
there…‖ (personal interview)   And Zdena Krejcova, a former member of parliament 
similarly remembers; ―I felt no need to fight for women‘s rights. It wasn‘t something 
female members of parliament talked about… there  (in the parliament) was a lot of 
political fighting going on at that time, no space for women‘s issues.‖ (personal 
interview). 
While gender equality was, at least to a great extent, present in the law, it was by 
no means practiced in reality.  Referring to mid-1990‘s, Vera Kucharova, a researcher 
from The Czech Research Institute for Labor and Social Affairs recalls;  
At the time of the Peking conference, all states were invited to follow a set of 
questions and topics to write a report about the status of women.  My colleague 
and I were responsible for this.  So I can tell you that as I saw the questions, I kept 
going down the list saying ‗this is not a problem, this is not a problem… and as I 
was working on the report, I came to realize that women had equal rights legally 
but it did not work in reality. … but then I realized that even the legislation was 
not straightforward (personal interview).   
 
What Kucharova suggests is that despite a number of legal provisions, Czech women 
continued to face important inequalities in the workplace, in the education system and at 
home. 
  Second, during the time of the political transition and economic transformation, 
the state policies of the 1990‘s and beyond continued to affect women and men 
differently.   In reality, women‘s traditional role within the family and their assumed 
responsibilities in the private sphere meant that economic and social policies had varying 
impacts on the two genders.   On the one hand, women found it increasingly difficult to 
combine formal employment with their traditional roles as wives and mothers.  The 
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arrival of capitalism meant that women were no longer able to rely on the unspoken 
‗gender contract‘ (Cermakova 1997) with the state that enabled them to have jobs and 
families while men had ‗careers‘.  Instead, growing unemployment and price 
liberalization resulted in a situation where women had to compete on the labor market 
just as men did.   These developments took place in an environment where the state was 
reducing many social programs and as well as, for example, the number of state run 
childcare facilities making these facilities inaccessible to many women (Potucek 1999).  
At the same time, the state continued to take women‘s traditional role in the 
family for granted, and even reinforced a traditional gender division of labor through its 
policies.  The state has done this by implementing more conservative ‗re-familization 
policies‘ which supported women in their roles as mothers and made it more difficult for 
women to remain in the labor market (Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006)
41
.  As Hana 
Marikova, a researcher in the Department of Gender and Sociology of the Czech 
Sociological Institute recalls, ―It was (prime minister‘s) Klaus‘ explicit rhetoric that 
women should return into the household‖ (personal interview).    Similarly, other 
politicians including former Prime Minister Marian Calfa called on women to become 
housewives – something seen as a sign of progress in light of the communist era when 
women were de facto obliged to work (Sokacova 2009). 
Therefore, for the first ten to fifteen years after the fall of communism, the Czech 
government did not seriously question this ‗re-familization‘ policy (Saxonberg and 
Sirovatka 2006).  Partly because of financial necessity and partly because Czech women 
did enjoy the independence associated with their own income, the rates of female 
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 For an overview of the family and social policy transformation in the early 1990‘s, see Hrusakova 1993 
and Potucek 2001 
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employment continue to remain high in Central and Easter Europe.  Rather than exiting 
the labor market, demographic data tells us, women have decided to have fewer children 
in order to be able to combine work and family life.   
Third, in the past ten years or so, the significant decline in the birth rate combined 
with Czech Republic‘s integration into the European Union (EU) has led the government 
to start reconsidering its family and general gender policy.  The first institutional changes 
took place in response to international commitments (e.g. United Nation‘s Convention for 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) and European Union‘s 
requests to coordinate legislation in the area of gender equality and ensure their 
implementation.
42
  Hana Haskova and Alena Krizkova (2006) quote a number of Czech 
women‘s groups leaders and other experts to say that it is unlikely that the issue of gender 
equality would have received as much attention if it were not for the Czech Republic‘s 
integration into the European Union.  In other words, it was the EU‘s commitment to 
advancing women‘s rights in the region that brought gender equality to the forefront of 
Czech governmental attention.  
As a result, in 1998, the Czech Minister of Labor and Social Affairs established a 
Department for Gender Equality within the European Integration Bureau at the Ministry 
of Labor of Social Affairs.  The Department‘s primary goal was legislative coordination 
with the EU directives concerning gender equality.  The Department remained small 
(three workers) and largely played a formal rather than a real role in forming and 
implementing its mission.  Other, primarily formal, institutional mechanisms established 
during this period included the Inter-resort Coordination Committees (1998) and later the 
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 For a chronological overview of the institutional structure development, see Pavlik 2004 
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more active Government Council for Human Rights, one of which goals was to monitor 
the fulfillment of international commitments in the area of human rights.  
 In 2001, the state showed further formal commitment to women‘s issues by 
establishing the Government Council for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men
43
.  
The council‘s task was to advise the government in the area of equal opportunities for 
women and men.  It works through the so called ‗gender focal points‘ which were 
instituted in January 2002 at each ministry as part-time positions.  The persons in these 
posts were responsible for the implementation of equal opportunities in each resort.  Two 
years later, the part-time positions were turned to full-time ones.  After January 2008, the 
Department for Equality of Women and Men was moved from the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs, and it now falls under the responsibility of the Minister for Human Rights 
and the Office of the Government.   
While many welcomed these changes, women‘s advocacy groups and others 
interested in gender equality issues continue to question the government‘s real 
commitment to gender issues given the minimal number of workers assigned to these 
institutional bodies (Kralikova 2009).  Therefore, despite the initial excitement on the 
part of Czech women‘s groups, these institutional changes have so far been primarily 
formal, and they have done little to eliminate gender discrimination and improve the 
position of women in Czech society (Pavlik 2004; True 2003).  
 To summarize, while the surviving communist social policies combined with the 
new EU related anti-discriminatory policies continue to enable women to reconcile their 
maternal and public roles, the Czech state has not been clear on where the expected and 
desirable role of women in the society is.  During the early years of the democratic 
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 The Council was established through  government decree N. 1003. 
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transition, the state used social policy and programs to support women‘s traditional roles 
in the home.  At the same time, government officials emphasized legal achievements in 
the area of gender parity, dismissing any public attempts to rectify existing gender 
inequality.  Later on, to formally comply with the requirements of the European Union, 
the state introduced a number of administrative offices and regulations dealing with 
gender issues.  However, these recent steps have been accompanied by a lack of real 
commitment from the state to improve the status of women. 
 
Women’s Rights: Prevailing Inequalities  
It has become clear that the democratic transition did not automatically translate 
into equal rights for Czech women.  It is true that women, as all Czech citizens, benefited 
from the general advancement of basic human rights in the Czech Republic.  At the same 
time, however, throughout the 1990‘s, Czech women continued to struggle with gender 
discrimination in employment and politics and they were also uniquely negatively 
affected by the social reform.  Furthermore, Czech women continue to balance their 
private and public responsibilities as existing cultural norms make them almost 
exclusively responsible for childcare, elderly care and housework.  In other words, as the 
following section suggests, there are numerous important grievances Czech women could 
be expected to organize around. 
 
Gender Inequality in the Workplace 
The economic transition of the 1990‘s affected women and men differently.  
Namely, women have been disproportionately affected by rising unemployment rates, 
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and they also continue to face important gender inequalities and discrimination in the 
workplace.  Unemployment, virtually unknown under state socialism, was just one of the 
phenomena that Czechs had to start to cope with.  Prior to the transition, full employment 
represented an integral part of the communist state policies.  Job opportunities were 
created artificially, and the right to work was turned into an obligation.  Wages were set 
centrally and together with social benefits were allocated through the workplace.  With 
the emergence of free market economy, however, guaranteed employment was 
abandoned. Employment became gradually marketized and contingent upon labor 
contracts.  This consequently reduced the security of obtaining employment, security of 
durability of employment, and also security of the real income level (Offe 1993) in the 
context where Czech families were financially fully dependent on two incomes.
44
   
While the unemployment rate was only 0.7% in 1990, it rose to 4.1% in the 
following year, and by 1999, it reached almost 10% (Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
cited in Potucek 2001).
 45
   Between 1989 and 1995, 21% of those economically active 
experienced losing their jobs, and 5% of these had done so more than once (Potucek 2001, 
14).  Although the female labor force participation rates did not decline significantly in 
the early 1990‘s, the growing unemployment was beginning to affect women more than 
men.  For example, by 1999, the unemployment rate was 10.5% for Czech women as 
compared to 7.3% for Czech men (Zeny a muzi v cislech 2000, 129).
46
  The situation was 
particularly serious in the case of women of color whose unemployment rates 
skyrocketed in the first years of the transformation.   
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 Note that class divisions were to a great extent eliminated by the socialist regime, and Czechoslovakia 
began the transformation with what could be understood as a very strong middle class. 
45
 Note that in 1990, women represented 44 percent of the total Czechoslovak workforce (Havelkova 1997) 
46
 By 2007, the rate declined to 6,7% for women and 4,2% for men, but significant gender differences 
remained (Zeny a muzi v cislech 2008, 35).   
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As unemployment levels continued to rise, Central European countries initially 
chose to temporarily cushion the lay-offs of workers by implementing extensive 
unemployment insurance schemes (World Bank 2000).  But by 1993, all Central 
European states reduced the earlier generous unemployment benefits while the 
unemployment rate continued to rise.  As the gross domestic product in the individual 
states began decreasing, real wages also experienced decline, and wage inequality 
increased (World Bank 2000).   
While facing higher unemployment, women also continued to experience 
discrimination in the workplace.  In 2008, the gender pay gap was 19.8% as women were 
on average earning 80.2% of men‘s average wages (Zeny a muzi v cislech 2008, 46).  
Available statistics have led Marie Cermakova (1997), a renown expert in the area of 
labor market research, to note that the status of Czech professional women had not 
improved since the fall of communism. 
Surprisingly, there was little public discussion in regards to existing 
discriminatory practices on the Czechoslovak and later Czech labor market throughout 
much of the 1990‘s.  The topics of gender pay gap and discrimination in hiring practices 
appeared on the public agenda only slowly, and this happened primarily through media 
appearances of such experts as Marie Cermakova of the Sociological Institute of the 
Czech Academy of Sciences (Appeltova 2009).  Later, this topic was also taken on by the 
new Department for Equal Opportunities established at the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs.  But it was not until 2000 when the problem of gender discrimination became 
recognized by the Czech law through a new amendment to the Labor Code.    
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In response to the Czech accession to the European Union and a subsequent 
legislative coordination, the Czech Labor Code was amended once again in 2004 to 
reflect the strengthened commitment to integrate the principles of equal opportunities for 
women and men into the national legislation. For the first time, the amendment included 
a definition of and provisions against sexual harassment in the workplace.   Finally, a 
new anti-discrimination law was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament 
of the Czech Republic on 17 June 2009.
47
  One hundred and eighteen Members of the 
Parliament voted for this law, while 16 were against.  The President strongly opposed this 
piece of legislation, but his veto was overridden.  As a result, the Czech Republic became 
the last EU member state to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic 
background, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, age, handicap, religion, faith or world 
view – all of this in access to employment, education, health or other services or social 
benefits.  
Despite all of these formal modifications of the law, public perception of gender 
discrimination in the workplace continues to change very slowly.  The public discussion 
surrounding the ratification of the antidiscrimination law of 2009 provides an important 
insight into these developments.  In the summer 2009, as the law was being discussed in 
the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament, Czech media offered a series of articles 
devoted to the topic of gender discrimination.  While many in the national media used 
reliable statistics and data provided by experts, one could also find a number of articles 
with headlines such as ―We All Discriminate‖ and ―About The Right To Discriminate‖ 
                                                 
47
 This is referring to law N. 198/2009 Coll., on equal treatment and on legal remedies of protection from 
discrimination and on amendment of certain laws, and N. 349/1999 Coll., on the Public Defender of Rights. 
The law was published in the collection of laws under N. 198/2009 Coll. on 20 July 2009, and it came into 
effect as of 1 September 2009. 
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(Khorel 2009; Sima 2009).  On the whole, gender discrimination in the workplace 
continues to be widespread, but the Czech government has done little outside of formal 
steps required through international commitments to rectify the situation.  
 
Gender Differences in Political Representation 
In addition to facing higher unemployment rates and discrimination in the 
workplace, with the emergence of democracy, Czech and Slovak women also effectively 
disappeared from the political life of the country.  Under the communist regime, women 
and men played only a formal role in political decision-making as the actual decisions 
were made on the level of the Communist Party.  In the post-communist Czech Republic, 
the situation has not improved for women all that much. ―… while the Czech public was 
very well aware that the 30% share of parliamentary seats occupied by women under 
communism was a mere formality, it was nonetheless surprised at the fall in this share to 
10% after 1989 when the quotas were abolished.‖(Havelkova 1999, 145)  Until recently, 
women have been largely excluded from politics (see Table 4.1).  
When Civic Forum, the umbrella organization established to negotiate with the 
communist officials and to lead the country to its first free elections, was formed, 
seventeen of its eighteen leaders were men (Honajzer 1996, 52).  Additionally, 
approaching the first free elections in 1990, none of the forty newly formed political 
parties had a program specially targeting women.  A woman has never been seriously 
considered for President or Prime Minister.  For years, the Cabinet of Ministers of the 
Government of the Czech Republic consisted purely of men.  The cabinet had no female 
ministers between 1992 and 1996, and between 1998 and 2002.  The two governments 
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between 1996 and 1998 had only one woman minister. Today, the Czech Cabinet consists 
of a Prime Minister and fourteen Ministers with a portfolio – none of the fourteen cabinet 
members are women.
48
  
When the crude quotas in federal and state legislative bodies were abolished after 
the fall of communism in 1989, the share of the federal parliamentary seats occupied by 
women instantly fell to 10.7% as a result of the June 1990 elections, and further to 8.7% 
during the 1992 elections (Wolchik 1996)
49
.  Furthermore, as Vrabkova (1997) points 
out, these numbers are ―… hardly an advancement for women.  These legislators are 
recruited from church circles or represent their party‘s interests or both.  They intend to 
make a political career rather than promote women‘s rights. They therefore must adjust 
their behavior to a male way of doing things.‖ (Vrabkova 1997, 73)  
 
Table 4.1  Female parliamentary representation in the Czech Republic
50
 
Country First 
election 
Second 
election 
Third 
election 
Fourth 
election 
Fifth 
election 
Sixth 
election  
Seventh 
election 
Year 1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Czech 
Republic 
10% 10% 15% 15% 17% 16% 22% 
Source: Montgomery (2003) and Interparliamentary Union 
 
Czech women are best represented in local politics, where they currently hold 26% of 
seats (Zeny v politice 2011).  But this number is not impressive either as the bigger 
municipalities tend to have the smallest number of women representatives.   
Those studying women‘s political representation struggle to find a single cause to 
these trends.
51
   Many point to gender discrimination and to the fact that women‘s 
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 The current government was elected in the last legislative election in 2010. 
49
 The Czech electoral system is based on proportional representation, and it uses a closed list ballots. The 
multi-member districts are relatively large, ranging between 12 and 39 electoral seats. 
50
 Refers to the lower house of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. 
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continuous disproportionate responsibility for childcare and housework prevent them 
from running for public office.  For example, in 1996, 88 percent of Czech citizens 
agreed that ―family responsibilities make it harder for women to enter politics‖ (Focused 
on Women 2001, 96).   However, others propose that the low political representation of 
women is one of the many legacies of communism.  Referring to the latter, Jirina Siklova 
(1993) explains; 
 
In the West political experience is derived from a democratic parliamentary 
system, where political parties and participation in them have great significance. 
We, on the other hand, are the product of a system that reduced membership in a 
party to obedience and the loss of individuality. Through personal experience we 
know that the establishment of quotas for various social groups or other forms of 
so-called ―positive discrimination,‘ which have been so politically important in 
the West, often become a tool of oppression of the very groups they were 
designed to support. It is clear to us from our experience that the interests of 
women, workers, and farmers do not necessarily have to be defended by women, 
workers, and farmers. (79) 
 
In this view, a different historical experience accounts for gender differences in political 
representation.  But regardless of the reason, important gender inequalities prevail in 
Czech political decision-making bodies and provide women with important grievances to  
organize around. 
 
Women and Social Policy Reform 
The state emphasis on the ‗triple transition‘ (Offe 1991) of the political regime 
and state economy had major consequences for the post-communist welfare state.   This 
has, in turn, shaped the relationship between Czech women and the state because social 
policy is one of the key areas through which states define women‘s position in society.   
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 For a discussion of this in the Czech context, see for example,  Rakusanova 2003 
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Without doubt, the changing nature of social programs affected women and men 
differently. 
Under state socialism, the citizens of Czechoslovakia had access to an extensive 
network of social programs and services.  These were designed and controlled by the 
socialist state.   Vecernik (1993) described this phenomenon as the ‗over-institutionalized 
socialist paternalism‘.  These programs included free healthcare, extensive maternity leave 
and allowance, retirement benefits, generous sick pay, access to state run childcare 
facilities and even free vacation packages.  Prices of basic products were subsidized by 
the state, and so was much of the housing.  Since the fall of communism, this system of 
social protection and universal benefits has undergone significant changes.   
At first, Czech women were not concerned about losing the generous benefits 
introduced under state socialism.  Zdena Krejcova, a former member of parliament 
describes ―(In the early 1990‘s) nobody talked about state run daycare facilities or family 
policy, women were not afraid of losing it‖ (personal interview).  But soon it became 
apparent that the free market ideology would have an impact on these programs. Namely, 
there were visible trends toward tightening eligibility conditions for various social 
benefits, replacing some universal benefits with means-tested ones and reducing social 
expenditure in general (Potucek 2001, 6).   
Today, social benefits in the Czech Republic are derived from one‘s employment 
status and more specifically from the worker‘s actual income level.  Benefits have been 
transformed to match the collected contributions.  Therefore, social insurance no longer 
covers those with little or no contribution payment history.  Women have been 
disproportionately affected by these developments because they constitute the majority of 
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low-income earners in the Czech Republic and because they frequently (temporarily or 
not) opt out of the labor market to fulfill their parental roles. 
Between 1990 and 1992, the federal government developed and passed a proposal 
for a social reform.  This document became known as the "Scenario of Social Reform".  
It was clear that the government selected the ‗corporatist‘ or ‗conservative welfare state‘ 
path (Esping-Andersen 1990) existing, for example, in the neighboring countries of 
Austria and Germany.  The new Czech(oslovak) plan included the creation of a universal 
system of social welfare including universal compulsory health and social insurance and 
means-tested state social assistance serving as a last resort safety net when other forms of 
assistance have been exhausted.  Despite the decline in social programs, the neoliberal 
government of Vaclav Klaus relied on these social protections to guide the country 
through the economic transformation (see Orenstein 2001; Tucker et al. 1997).  
Aside from this transformation of the general social policy provisions, the social 
functions characteristic of public enterprises of the communist rule also underwent 
significant changes.  Prior to transition, social benefits were in Czechoslovakia as in other 
communist countries distributed almost exclusively through employment.  Citizen‘s 
employment status was critical to the allocation of various services and benefits ranging 
from healthcare and housing to childcare and vacation packages.  As the centrally 
planned economy was replaced by the capitalist economy of free market, new businesses 
began to emerge and previously state-owned enterprises were privatized, this system 
gradually disintegrated as individual businesses redefined their social policy functions.
52
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 In the case of post-communist countries, Rein and his colleagues (1997) discovered an important 
distinction between state-owned and privatized enterprises on one side and new private enterprises on the 
other. They argued that all three types of firms may provide social benefits for their workers, but the new 
enterprises differ profoundly in respect to the types of benefits offered. They documented on a study carried 
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While private enterprises in Central Europe have not completely dealt away with their 
social policy functions, the amount and importance of these benefits provided by state-
owned and recently privatized firms has decreased significantly.  
 These changes have had a significant impact on Czech women in particular.  Sasa 
Lineau, a women‘s activist, recalls: ―A lot of state run daycare facilities were closed … 
they were closing them quickly.  There was this discourse that women should stay at 
home around 1992 and 93.‖ (personal interview)   For example, the number of public 
nurseries declined from 1043 in 1991 to 54 in 2007 (Haskova, Marikova and Uhde 2009, 
105).   But other aspects of women‘s lives were affected as well.  For example, in 1995 
―the statutory retirement age for women, originally 53-57 was raised to 57-61 (the actual 
limit continues to depend on the number of children), while for men it increased from 60 
to 62.‖ (Potucek 2001, 17).    
At the same time as it was eliminating social provisions, the state used the 
introduction of other programs to reinforce the traditional gender division of labor 
prevalent in Czech homes.  As documented in Table 4.2 below, Czech women continue 
to be responsible for the vast majority of housework and childcare (Marikova 2000). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Poland, that benefits were indeed declining in state-owned and privatized firms, but only very slowly. An 
increase in social benefits was, on the contrary, found in the case of new business firms (Estrin et al. 1997). 
Similarly, the extent to which individual national governments provide new incentives for social services 
and benefits on the enterprise level also differs significantly. In both the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
studies have documented growing governmental incentives for the employment of social benefits by private 
firms (Rein & Friedman 1997; Filer, Schneider & Svejnar 1997). 
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Table 4.2  Survey Results Regarding the Division of Labor in Czech Families. Responses  
to the following question; ―According to you, who in the family should...― 
 Man Both  Woman Don‘t know 
take care of children? 0% 28% 50% 22% 
be the breadwinner? 51% 45% 4% 0% 
cook? 3% 10% 87% 0% 
shop for groceries? 5% 27% 68% 0% 
do the cleaning? 1% 25% 74% 0% 
have a career? 34% 25% 4% 37% 
Source: Public Opinion Research Centre of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of 
Sciences of the Czech Republic 07/2000 
 
 
In the 1990‘s, the state reinforced this gender division of labor through the newly 
reformed social policy in a number of ways.  For example, the state actively assisted in 
the introduction of a large number of private ‗family schools‘ that were assumed to 
prepare girls for their future responsibilities as housewives.  The state also prolonged the 
existing maternity policy allowing women to stay out of the labor force until their 
children were four years of age.  Haskova, Marikova and Uhde (2009) clearly link these 
policies to the ‗reaffirmation of family conservatism and the traditional definition of 
gender roles in the 1990‘s‖ (102).  Today, women stay at home with children longer than 
they did under the communist regime (Haskova, Marikova and Uhde 2009, 104).  While 
the legislation was later changed to refer to ‗parents‘ rather than just ‗mothers‘,
53
 it at 
least temporarily reinforced the women‘s traditional caregiving role. 
 
Women’s Activism Lacks Unity 
Despite the prevalent gender inequalities in the workplace, in politics and at 
home, Czech women have not mobilized to protest or resolve the prevalent gender 
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 On January 1, 2001, the Czech Labor Code was amended to enable all men to benefit from the parental 
leave policy. A variety of sources suggest that about 1% of men choose to take a parental leave (see, for 
example, Zeny a muzi v cislech 2008).  
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inequalities described above.  Twenty years after the fall of communism, it is not possible 
to talk about a unified Czech women‘s movement.  Hana Marikova, a Czech sociologist 
describes the situation in the 1990‘s ―It is not possible to talk about a movement. … A 
movement should have a vision but here it was just several women‘s organizations and 
each had a different goal.  There were no overarching topics‖ (personal interview). 
Similarly, Czech feminist Mirek Vodrazka  argues that a women‘s movement in the 
Czech Republic does not exist today.  He also suggests that the area of women‘s rights is 
overall weak and lacking participation (Ciprova and Sokacova 2009, 94).  Why do these 
efforts to improve women‘s position in society remain so fragmented? 
 After the fall of communism, almost all women‘s organizations had to be formed 
from ―scratch‖ because under the communist regime, the centrally organized 
Czechoslovak Women’s Union was the only functioning women‘s organization.  In the 
early 1990‘s, the Czechoslovak Women’s Union was transformed into Czech Women’s 
Union keeping its old leadership, resources and estate gained during the communist era.  
It remains the largest women‘s organization in the Czech Republic.  Only a small number 
of other women‘s organizations formed during this period.   In 1991, less than forty 
women‘s organizations were registered in Czechoslovakia (Wolchik 1998b). This number 
did not change significantly in the first few years after the fall of communism. For 
example, Altos and Sopranos – The Pocket Handbook of Women‘s Organizations in the 
Czech Republic (1994) lists the total of 27 women‘s groups during this time.
54
 
Jirina Siklova (1997) described these groups in the following way: 
The small, politically uninterested women‘s organizations, which are 
established and dissolved in the course of a few months, frequently make 
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 Note that these numbers are solely for the Czech Republic since the country of Czechoslovakia 
disintegrated by then. This explains the seeming drop in the number of women‘s groups compared to 1991. 
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Western European women politicians smile. They have no ideology, they 
lack political profiles, and they defy all examination and sociological 
analysis. Their protagonists are not interested in the philosophy of 
feminism and will not play any role in future political elections. (Siklova 
1997) 
 
Furthermore, the handful of new groups did not unite around any particular issue.  Eva 
Hauserova, one of the activists explains ―There wasn‘t one large problem we could unite 
around.  Instead, there were a lot of little problems‖ (personal interview).  Similarly, 
Eliska Jancova a female activist from this time points out, ―(women‘s activitists) couldn‘t 
agree on anything‖ (personal interview).   
  These individual issues taken on by these small groups (often consisting of only 
one to two members) included domestic violence, the environment, and family oriented 
topics such as childbirth and childcare.  Feminism was rarely discussed; ―In the 1990‘s, 
women were bringing up individual topics to be discussed.  They did not talk about 
feminism‖ (Sasa Lineau, personal interview).  Some of these small groups defined 
themselves in opposition to the (formerly state run) Czech Women’s Union which 
continued to be viewed in a negative light.  According to Zdena Krejcova, a former 
member of Parliament and an activist; ―(some) women‘s groups started because some of 
us were tired of the fact that there was only one organization – Czech Union of Women – 
that took the right to speak on behalf of all of us‖ (personal interview).  
It was not until the second half of the 1990‘s that a small number of more 
formalized women‘s groups began to appear.  Only slowly they began to make contact 
with each other ―Prior to 1990, the only connections that existed were with the Czech 
Union of Women.  … After 1989, individual women‘s organizations started making 
connections, there was an understanding that it was important to get connected‖ (Hubova, 
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personal interview).  These connections were further formalized through funding.  
Because a local culture of ‗giving‘ was destroyed during the communist regime, the few 
organizations that became more institutionalized depended on financial support provided 
by foreign donors, primarily those from Germany and the United States.  
 It is important to understand these trends within a broader context of the 
development of the civic sector in Central and Easter Europe.  Here, the work of Marc 
Howard (2003) is particularly relevant.   Howard argued that civil society was ‗weak‘ 
throughout post-communist Europe.  However, Howard‘s data do not always support his 
argument.  For example, Potucek (1997) documents that while there were approximately 
2,000 organizations in 1989 communist Czechoslovakia (including individual branches of 
the National Front), this number increased to 20,000 by 1992 and further to almost 
40,000 by 1996.  Therefore, the small number of women‘s groups in post-communist 
Czechoslovakia is in stark contrast to the developments in other areas of the country‘s 
social and civic life. 
 Even today, the sphere of women‘s organizing consists of a relatively small 
number of small organizations, and the women‘s movement remains weak and 
fragmented.  What has contributed to this situation is a legislation introduced in the mid-
1990‘s.   The goal of this piece of legislation was to provide a legal framework for the 
functioning of civic organizations, and it has  had a significant impact on the functioning 
of women‘s and other groups within civil society as it provided financial advantage to 
larger and more formal organizations (Marksova-Tominova 1999).
55
   But activists in 
other areas, such as the environmental movement, have been able to overcome this 
                                                 
55
 In 1997, after the introduction of this legislation, the number of civic organizations fell significantly – at 
this time, there were less than 1,500 registered groups in the Czech Republic (Potucek 1997).  
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institutional obstacle, so it is highly unlikely that this is the main reason for the lack of 
women‘s movement in the Czech Republic.  
By 2005, only about one third of the original women‘s groups established after 
the fall of communism were still in existence (Haskova & Krizkova 2006).   Furthermore, 
it is not clear what impact these fragmented groups have had on Czech society.  While 
some progress in remedying gender inequalities has been made, the activists themselves 
are sometimes skeptical when they are asked to evaluate their work.  One of them, 
Zdenka Holcmanova summarizes ―There was an effort to influence policy making as 
early as in the 1990‘s.  We were getting proposed bills but we were usually just given two 
or three days to do it.  It was quite demanding… I am not sure if we managed to influence 
anything‖ (personal interview).  These developments are especially surprising given the 
long tradition of a vibrant women‘s movement in pre-war Czechoslovakia I described in 
the previous chapter. 
  
Distaste for Feminism 
In the context of the post-communist Czech Republic, one cannot address 
women‘s mobilization and the articulation of women‘s issues without turning attention to 
the concept of feminism.  It is ironic that while the ideology of the communist state 
actually opposed feminism, the citizens came to associate feminism with communism.  
Because of this association, the terms feminism and women‘s emancipation maintain an 
extremely strong negative connotation among Czech women.  As Linda Sokacova (2009) 
points out, ―(In the Czech Republic), the 1990‘s were characterized by an intensive 
rejection of feminism‖(8).  Similarly, Zdenka Holcmanova, the director of the Czech 
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Association of Businesswomen and a former activist explains ―Feminism was an ugly 
word in the 1990‘s. Nobody knew what it meant‖ (personal interview).  
 Two issues stand out here.  One, women themselves knew very little about what 
feminism meant – both throughout communism and during the transition to democracy.  
Sociologist Hana Marikova explains ―We knew almost nothing about Western feminism. 
Also, women in Prague had a different point of view than those in small towns or even 
blue collar women‖ (personal interview).  Second, both Czech women and men 
associated feminism with the ‗forced emancipation‘ policies introduced under 
communism.  Given the lack of legitimacy of this regime it may not be surprising that 
Czechs rejected any concepts associated with the communist regime; ―(In the 1990‘s) 
feminism was a no, no.  Even when it came to such topics as violence, it had to be 
degendered.  People talked about ‗violence in the family‘ rather than ‗violence against 
women‘‖ (Sasa Lineau, personal interview).  A number of prominent Czech intellectuals, 
journalists and politicians, of which the most well known is writer Josef Skvorecky, have 
contributed to this public distaste for feminism when they used anecdotal evidence from 
abroad to highlight possible negative consequences of feminist movements.   
This situation has led to some misunderstandings and tensions between Eastern 
European and Western women‘s activists.  A number of Western feminists who arrived in 
Czechoslovakia during the democratic transition attempted to interpret Czech women‘s 
attitudes and current status in terms of the prevalent liberal-feminist arguments (Watson 
1993; Einhorn 2003; Wolchik 1996, 1998a, b).  In their view, Czech women were 
‗conservative‘ and they regarded them as ‗second class citizens‘.  But while the Western 
feminists seemed to be right about some aspects of the current Czech society such as 
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existing gender and racial discrimination and prejudice, the application of the liberal 
feminist framework failed to capture and adequately explain the situation in its full 
complexity.  
The work done by Western feminists soon aggravated a number of Czech 
feminists who suggested another explanation for the lack of tolerance for feminism 
among Czech people, and charged those from the West with ‗not paying enough attention 
to the unique post-communist social context‘, and thus, ‗misinterpreting‘ the situation 
(Havelkova 1997; Siklova 1993; 1997).  According to Czech feminists, women‘s 
identities, views and life strategies are products of the specific socialist ideology of the 
past.  ―The world view of Czech women is informed by the social legacy of communism‖ 
(Heitlinger 1996, 90).   As a result, these scholars concluded that women in Eastern 
Europe were neither conservative, nor second-class citizens. Eva Kanturkova (1981 cited 
in True 2003) explains;  
Feminism has been eradicated in our society by having been brutally transformed 
into a new form of woman‘s slavery: obligatory work. Thus, if in Czechoslovakia 
there is one thing that a woman wishes to obtain for herself, it is to recover her 
feminine essence rather than to promote herself. (51) 
 
This negative perception of feminism has not changed much since the 1990‘s (Ciprova 
and Sokacova 2009, 91). 
Czech women‘s groups and organizations have responded to this negative image 
of feminism by framing the issues concerning women in different terms.   Rather than 
‗feminism‘, the media frequently discuss ‗equal opportunities for women and men‘, 
‗discrimination‘ or ‗parenthood‘.  For example, Linda Sokacova, a director of the Prague 
Gender Studies Center describes the struggle for gender equality:  
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While about five years ago, the media and Czech public were primarily negative, 
given the reaction toward the work of a number of non-profit organizations, it is 
possible to say that the Czech public is beginning be open and even support the 
topics of discrimination and equal opportunities for women and men. Things have 
changed in regards to employers as well. Around the year 2000, companies 
explicitly rejected cooperation on programs addressing equal opportunities for 
women and men. Today, they seek it out or they remain neutral. (Sokacova 2009, 
9). 
  
Therefore, even today, feminism as a term continues to be associated with the 
communist past.  As Jacques Rupnik argued in 1989: ―For the people of Central Europe, 
the past, to use Faulkner‘s phrase, ‗is never dead.  It‘s not even past‘‖ (36).  Today, two 
decades after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, communist state 
policies continue to shape ongoing political processes by influencing the identities, goals 
and actions of both Eastern European political elites and of the mass public.
56
  This is 
happening even though many of these policies had been abandoned long before the 
Berlin Wall came down in 1989.   In the case of women‘s issues, for example, the state 
employment policies of the 1950‘s still serve as a dominant reference point against which 
many Central and Eastern European citizens form their attitudes and actions.
57
   
As a result, any public discussion of women‘s rights remains highly controversial 
in these nations where words such as ‗emancipation‘ and ‗feminism‘ still invoke 
memories of female workers on cranes and those of Soviet inspired slogans calling for 
women‘s involvement in heavy industry in order to ―build a more prosperous socialist 
society‖.  However, while these associations have undoubtedly contributed to the 
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 On the general importance of historical legacies for subsequent political developments in Eastern Europe, 
see Barany and Volgyez eds. (1995); Bunce (1999); Ekiert and Hanson eds. (2003); Grzymala-Busse 
(2002); Howard (2003); Lane eds. (2002).  In Latin America, the effects of liberal reform on later 
developments were addressed by Mahoney (2001).   The specific effects of communist legacies on 
women‘s movements in Central and Eastern Europe have been brought up in some edited volumes and 
exploratory articles and essay-type pieces. See for example Heitlinger (1996); Jacquette and Wolchik 
(1998); Kligman 1994; Siklova (1995, 1997). 
57
 see Heitlinger 1996 
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difficulties that women‘s activists have experienced in mobilizing the public and finding 
a common voice, it is not clear why they have not been able to frame their issues in a 
different way to ensure that their demands resonate with the public. 
 
Conclusion 
While Czech women played an important role in overthrowing the communist 
government and bringing down the totalitarian regime, neither the former female 
dissidents nor any other women organized into a mass women‘s movement during or 
after the democratic transition.  While Czech women never organized as women, other 
movements and groups have managed to overcome the communist past.  The Czech 
environmental movement, for example, was very vibrant throughout the 1990‘s proving 
that low civic participation is not a cultural phenomenon. 
However, women are by no means absent from the Czech public sphere.  Even 
though Czech women have not organized as women, they have become active players in 
the newly formed civil society.  In fact, existing research suggests that women represent 
between 50 and 70% of participants in the Czech non-profit sector (Fric 1998; Havelkova 
1997; neziskovky.cz).
58
  Therefore, women are using their skills to engage a variety of 
issues within the growing civic sector.  They do this through movements other than 
women‘s movements or through fragmented, individual groups and organizations. 
The regime and leadership change in the 1990‘s presented a textbook example of 
political opportunity for women.  However, women did not take advantage of it.  This 
was not because women were satisfied with their position in the society.  Existing 
research documents that women continued to face important inequalities at work, in the 
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home and also in the country‘s political life.  It was not because women did not have 
resources available to them either – they could rely on the existing women‘s, church and 
other groups and organizations to formulate their demands.  But they did not do so.  
 The change of political regime and introduction of free market economics after 
1989 situated Czech women in a new political, economic and social environment.  
Although the majority of Czech women still saw their full involvement in the family and 
in the labor market as a natural way of things, they also became aware of the increasing 
tension between the two roles.  Despite overall public support for women‘s participation 
in the labor market, nobody came to question the traditional gender roles that supported 
the notion of women‘s exclusive responsibility for childcare, elderly care and housework.  
The remaining social security provisions protecting women during the time of pregnancy, 
childbirth and child rearing clashed with the emphasis the Czech state was placing on 
individuals‘ role in the newly established capitalist economy and labor market.  
Today, the lasting traditional view of appropriate gender roles continues to affect 
family and social policies.  Until recently, the state used the parental and maternity leave 
and allowance scheme to de facto encourage women to temporarily leave the labor 
market and provide care for children.  Requalification programs making transition for 
parents back to the workforce easier are still rare.  Even when social policies seemed 
gender neutral on paper, in reality, they often disadvantage women.  At the same time, 
the rising disparities between women and men were overshadowed by the omnipresent 
emphasis on the economic and political transformation.   Milada Hrda, an expert in social 
and family policy who worked at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
prior to 1989 explains: ―After 1989, there was some continuity (in social policy), but 
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economic liberalism was too invasive‖ (personal interview).   Influenced by neo-liberal 
economics preached by Western experts who arrived to offer advice on how to handle 
key aspects of the economic transformation, the newly elected Czech politicians 
continued to emphasize citizens‘ position in the newly established free economy and 
labor market.   In this environment, the surviving social policies established under state 
socialism have often turned into an excuse for statistical discrimination of women 
(Cermakova 1997).  To date, employers continue to fear hiring young women in 
particular, worrying about the financial impact a possible employee pregnancy may have 
on their company.  
Despite these challenges, female labor force statistics demonstrate that Czech 
women continue to balance their maternal roles with full-time jobs.  Gender inequality is 
still prevalent, but women view these problems as ‗individual‘ problems rather than 
social ones and as a result, they seek ‗individual‘ solutions.  A divorce functions as an 
individual solution to the problem of domestic violence.  Finding a new job serves as a 
response to discrimination in the workplace.  As Hana Havelkova (1999) reminds us, 
while Czech women do not complain much, it does not mean that they are content with 
their situation.   
The state actions and rhetoric are surely not the only reason for the weakness of 
the women‘s movement in the Czech Republic and throughout post-communist Europe.  
Other factors, such as the legacies of communism in the form of anti-feminist ‗mood‘ 
make it difficult for women‘s groups to frame issues in ways that would resonate with the 
public as well.   
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Chapter 5 
CHILE 1973 - 1990 
Protecting the Nation: Pinochet’s Traditionalist Policy 
 
 
During the period of military rule, Chilean women organized around a variety of 
social and economic issues, and also to protect their rights.  While this may be surprising 
given the oppressive nature of Pinochet‘s government, it is less so in the light of previous 
historical developments.    
Chile has a rich tradition of female activism dating back to the 19
th
 Century.      
 For the first time, Chilean women gained greater visibility in the country‘s public life 
when, at the end of the 19
th
 century, a number of suffragists attempted to register as 
voters (Valenzuela 1998).  These were primarily women from middle and upper classes.   
As in Czechoslovakia, late 19
th
 century Chilean women first framed their efforts around 
their maternal identities (Franceschet 2005, 35).  They aimed to improve social 
conditions for themselves as well as their children, but they also wished to gain greater 
political rights.  These efforts took place in the context of legislation that was making 
Chilean women fully dependent on their husbands.   In fact, the civil code of 1855 gave 
married women no control over their bodies, children or assets (Lavrin 1995, 193).   
At the beginning of the 20
th
 Century middle class women began to fight for the 
right to vote.   As a result of these pressures, Chilean women first received the right to 
vote in municipal elections in 1934.  During the following decade, Chile experienced a 
rapid growth in the number of women‘s groups, networks and women‘s political parties 
of which the most notable was the national Movimiento Pro-Emancipacion de Mujeres de 
Chile.  As a result of these activities, in 1948, a bill was passed that granted Chilean 
women the right to vote in presidential elections as well.  
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These dramatic events were followed by what Julieta Kirkwood (1982) once 
referred to as ‗Period of Silence‘ for Chilean‘s feminist and women‘s movement. After 
they achieved suffrage, Chilean women became increasingly incorporated into the 
existing political system.  Party politics and internal disagreements replaced the 
previously cohesive nature of the women‘s movement.  The women‘s political party 
Partido Femenino Chileno fell apart as a result of a scandal surrounding its leader and a 
Senate member Maria de la Cruz.  As women became incorporated into party politics, 
Chilean women‘s movement disintegrated.  
This period of silence was interrupted with the presidency of Eduardo Frei in the 
mid 1960‘s.  According to Fiona Macaluay (2006), the Frei government was the first to 
consider women as a political constituency (115).  The government emphasized women‘s 
roles as those of mothers, defenders of the homeland, housewives and community 
managers.  The new president was looking to set up a wide network of local 
organizations to distribute a variety of social and other services and to seek support for 
the extensive social and economic reforms his government was about to undertake
59
.   As 
a result, a large number of community based organizations of which the most relevant to 
women‘s issues were the Mother‘s Centers (Centros de Madres also known as CEMA) 
began to appear throughout the country.  
Dependent on the state for funding and presided over by the First Lady, the 
Mother‘s Centers were established in the 1940‘s with the aim to involve women in 
political life but also to support the Christian Democratic Party that initially established 
them.  They were specifically created to organize and educate low-income women 
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 These included an agrarian reform, a state intervention into the copper industry, improving access to 
education and lowering income inequality. The government also enacted important electoral changes and 
strengthened the presidency through constitutional reforms. 
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(Frohmann and Valdes 1995).  The centers became further institutionalized in the 1960‘s. 
While they partially served the purpose of mobilizing women and increasing their 
political participation, the Centers also served the important function of teaching Chilean 
women practical domestic skills such as sewing and home economics (Valdes et al 1989).  
Furthermore, as Baldez (2002) describes: ―While women‘s participation in this program
60
 
tended to reinforce women‘s traditional gender roles, it also enabled women to develop 
leadership skills and to learn how to organize at the grassroots level‖ (40).  As such, 
CEMA became an institution that carried on from regime to regime, and it played an 
important role throughout the history of the Chilean women‘s movement. 
 
The Allende Government (1970 - 1973) 
Between 1970 and 1973, Chile experienced a crucial social and political crisis 
which had profound implications for Chilean women and their activism.  In September 
1970, Chile elected the Marxist government of Salvador Allende through democratic 
elections.  Allende‘s Popular Unity (Unidad Popular – UP) government was elected with 
only 36.9% of the popular vote, and his party controlled less than one quarter of the seats 
in Congress (Oxhorn 1995).   Allende‘s presidency was later confirmed in a runoff 
election in October 1970.   
In line with its socialist ideology, the government of President Allende did not 
consider women to be a social group in need of special consideration.  Instead, women 
were perceived as an integral part of the exploited working class (Cleary 1996).  
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 Baldez refers to the Popular Promotion program introduced by President Frei in order to mobilize 
previously disenfranchised groups such as women, peasants and youth. Mother‘s Center (CEMA) were 
formed as a part of this program. 
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Similarly as in communist Czechoslovakia, the state considered women to be workers, 
mothers and citizens also.   
 Salvador Allende‗s government turned the network of Mother‘s Centers 
established under the previous regime of President Frei into the National Confederation 
of Mother‘s Centers (COCEMA).  Between 1970 and 1973, the number of Mother‘s 
Centers and the number of women participating in them doubled (Franceschet 2005, 52) 
and by 1973, they had around one million members (Macaulay 2006, 116).  Under the 
new socialist regime, the centers were put in charge of implementing a variety of public 
and social policies: they worked to open new parks, assisted the government in building 
new houses, opening and maintaining daycare centers, as well as helping with health 
campaigns.  In addition to COCEMA, the government also proposed a new organization 
to address a variety of issues facing women in 1972: the National Secretariat for Women.  
This organization was supposed to tackle such issues as healthcare, childcare and 
education as it related to women, however, at the time of the coup, the bill was still being 
revised (Valdes and Weinstein 1993).   
President Allende‘s path to socialism was highly controversial.  Under Allende‘s 
rule, Chile nationalized large scale industries such as banking and copper mining, the 
government took over the healthcare and educational systems, and it also continued to 
collectivize land.  Primarily through employment in public work projects, the government 
also worked to improve living standards and eliminate poverty.  As a result of Allende‘s 
new redistributive policies, public expenditure rose dramatically.  While initially the 
Chilean economy grew and inflation declined, soon the country‘s fiscal deficit began to 
plummet.  In response, Allende‘s government decided to default on debts owed to foreign 
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creditors and governments.  In the end, the socialist government was opposed not just by 
Chilean landowners, businessmen and the Catholic Church, but also by foreign 
corporations and even governments.  
While Allende‘s government increased wages several times, the impact was 
negated by soaring inflation rates.  The prices of basic goods and groceries also continued 
to rise.  Furthermore, the price of copper, Chile‘s most important export material, fell 
dramatically on international markets.  Dependent on food imports, the declining export 
earnings combined with the outcomes of these other socialist policies resulted in 
economic and social crisis. At the same time, Allende‘s regime was also undermined by 
the U.S. government, which viewed the President‘s socialist policies and close 
relationship with Cuba as a political threat (Kornbluh 1999).
61
  
Women and existing women‘s organizations on the left were particularly 
concerned with the economic situation resulting in shortages of food and other basic 
products, and they organized to defend Allende‘s government.  Meanwhile, women on 
the right were concerned with  Allende‘s policies which they viewed as a threat to 
traditional family values (Dandavati 1996).
62
  As a result, women (and conservative 
middle and upper middle class women in particular) played an important role in the 1973 
military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet resulting in the overthrow of the 
Allende‘s government.  Within the first two years, Augusto Pinochet concentrated 
political power in his hands and became the President of the Chilean Republic. 
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 The Hinchey Report documenting CIA‘s activities in Chile documents, for example, that in September 
1970, President Nixon authorized 10 million U.S. dollars to stop President Allende from coming to power. 
http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp 
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 For a detailed account of the role women and women‘s groups played in the opposition movement 
against Allende‘s regime and policies, see Baldez (2002), pp. 49-97. 
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 Politics and Economics of the Military Regime (1973 – 1989) 
On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military led by General Augusto Pinochet 
staged a coup against Salvador Allende and his government.  After a farewell speech on 
the national radio, Allende committed suicide.  As a result of the coup, a right-wing 
military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet took power, leading the country with a 
bureaucratic, technocratic approach (Collier 1979).  In December 1974, the military 
appointed Pinochet as President of the Republic.  Pinochet‘s power was then further 
strengthened by the Constitution of 1980.  The subsequent political and economic 
changes had important implications for the lives of not just women, but all Chileans.  One 
would assume that given the repressive nature of the military regime, political 
opportunity for any form of independent activism closed.  But that was not the case.   
The direction in which the military government chose to move Chile was 
determined by ―the military government‘s national security doctrine and its concepts of 
maintaining order, reinforcing the patriarchal system and limiting the role of the state in 
dispensing social services‖ (Dandavati 1996, 6).  The government quickly privatized the 
economy, opened borders to enable free trade, centralized political power and limited the 
role of government in economic affairs.   
As soon as they took power, the military junta dissolved Congress and replaced 
government officials with military appointees.  Within days, General Pinochet and his 
supporters suspended the Constitution and severely limited civil and political rights.  
Elections were forbidden, and so were political parties that earlier supported Allende‘s 
regime.  The new military government eliminated any political opposition and 
autonomous forms or organization, and military officials took control of educational 
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institutions.  From the first days after the military coup in 1973, the state placed particular 
emphasis on repressing leftist supporters of the Allende regime and it also targeted such 
organizations as trade unions.  Former elites were often detained, interrogated, tortured 
and some even executed.  The 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 
Report (also known as the Rettig Report) determined that over 2,000 people were killed 
for political reasons during the military dictatorship.  
Radical economic transformation directed by the military leadership soon 
followed the political transformation.  Pinochet handed power over the economy to 
‗Chicago boys‘, a group of young libertarian economists influenced by the teachings of 
Milton Friedman while undergoing their studies in the United States.   Relying on the 
assistance of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, the military government followed what they referred to as a program of 
‗national reconstruction‘.  The primary features of this economic overturn included 
privatization, cuts in government spending and strong reliance on the theory of open and 
free markets and comparative advantage.   
In 1975, the government began what has become known as the ‗shock treatment‘ 
(Oppenheim 1999).  As a part of this treatment, the government set off deflation through 
dramatic cuts in public expenditures.  Government expenditure was cut by 27% in 1975.  
Meanwhile, unemployment rose, and wages were frozen while prices soared (O‘Brien 
and Roddick 1983).  Furthermore, in 1980 the government proposed what it referred to as 
‗seven modernizations‘.  These included a new labor code, privatization of health care 
and social security and the decentralization of education and local government (Winn 
2004, 31).  
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The situation of those already disadvantaged by the changes was made worse by 
the government‘s strong repression of labor unions.  Whereas unions were not made 
illegal, the 1979 Labor Plan effectively decentralized and weakened the existing ones.  
This is documented by available data; while approximately 40% of the total labor force 
was united in labor unions in 1972, the membership rate decreased to 10% in 1987 
(Chuchryk 1989, 152).  Peter Winn (2004) describes the situation as one where 
―Neoliberalism was imposed by the Pinochet dictatorship during the late 1970‘s in a 
highly ideological version that made it a vehicle for an aggressive attack on Chile‘s 
workers and the labor rights they had acquired during decades of struggle‖ (3).  In other 
words, the regime was supporting businesses, but not freedoms for workers (Winn 2004, 
22).     
Because Chile experienced economic growth, economists around the world 
viewed these policies as an ‗economic miracle‘ to be admired.  However, others 
emphasized the catastrophic social consequences of these reforms.  They saw the 
dramatic increase in poverty and income inequality rates.  In Chile, the GINI index, a 
standard indicator of income inequality, grew from 47.4 in 1971 to 58.5 in 1990.  
Similarly, the share of households living in poverty grew from 17 percent in 1970 to 39 
percent in 1987 (Huber et al. 2006).  Many Chileans began to experience a lack of public 
services such as electricity and drainage.  Increasing poverty rates and poor living 
conditions also increased the rates of illness (Collins and Lear 1995). 
During this time, it had also become increasingly clear that different social groups 
were affected by these reforms differently.   Most notably, those already disadvantaged 
(the poor, women, and the elderly) became disproportionately affected by the growing 
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levels of unemployment, decreasing real wages and rise in prices (see Chuchryk 1989; 
Winn 2004).  The new economic strategy also brought along with it a significant 
reduction of public spending and cuts in social programs.  Many areas of social policy 
previously handled by the state were privatized.  This, combined with growing 
unemployment and poverty, had a disproportionate impact on Chilean women.  
 
State Ideology toward Women: Emphasis on Tradition 
From early on, the military headed by Augusto Pinochet placed great emphasis on 
the importance of family and traditional gender values (see, for example, Valenzuela 
1991).  Trying to depoliticize women, the state founded its gender ideology on the values 
of ―Catholic traditionalism‖, emphasizing the role of religion, family and the nation.  In 
Pinochet‘s words, ―Women and the Armed Forces are inextricably united through a 
spiritual bond that allows them to generate, maintain and promote the Great Chilean 
Family‖ (Giselle Munizaga cited in Macaluay 2006, 117).   Pinochet‘s regime used its 
rhetoric, organizations and policies to encourage women to stay home, take care of their 
families and raise their children for the fatherland.  Chilean sociologist Alexandra Bach 
explains, ―The official discourse toward women was conservative, women were 
portrayed as saints, as good housekeepers‖ (personal interview).  
The government drew a strong link between the need to protect the nation and the 
need to protect the Chilean family.  This was done through the constitutional acts passed 
in 1975 and 76 and through other documents (Thomas forthcoming).  Pinochet then 
presented himself as the protector of the nation and the family.  Gwynn Thomas describes 
how the government worked to construct a positive image of itself through the 
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introduction of a variety of policies and propaganda campaigns surrounding these 
policies.  Fully controlled by the government, Chilean television stations in particular 
used peak viewing times to run advertisements by government agencies.  These were 
repeated over and over again (Hojman 1992).  For example, television spots prepared for 
a propaganda campaign entitled Somos Milliones were used by the government to 
highlight its social and economic accomplishments.  They were also designed to send the 
public the message that Chilean families were living a better life under the new political 
regime. 
Notably, as Gwyn Thomas (forthcoming) documents, this life was presented 
along the ‗ideal‘ of the traditional family.  As Thomas explains; 
 
The spots were replete with images of happy and successful traditional families. 
Thus, on a visual level, the ultimate message presented was that Pinochet and his 
government had strengthened traditional families. His policies were framed as 
having provided good jobs for Chilean men, thus enabling them to fulfill their 
role as heads of households and provide for their wives and children. 
Furthermore, the increased prosperity meant that Chilean women were content to 
stay at home and manage the house as a refuge for their husbands and nurture 
their children…  (Thomas forthcoming, 179) 
 
Indeed, the model of family and gender roles as portrayed by the government was very 
patriarchal, resting on a rigid sexual division of labor.  The military regime looked to 
‗homogenize‘ the role of women in society (Munizaga and Letelier 1988). ―… The 
official discourses of the military regime regarded women as a homogenous group on the 
basis of their role as mothers, which transcended all other characteristics of women such 
as class, status and education‖ (Dandavati 1996, 28)  These gender differences were seen 
as basic and constituted an integral part of the military government‘s national security 
doctrine.   
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This cultural model was further reinforced through the influence of the Catholic Church.   
The narrow traditional view of women‘s role in society was clearly reflected in 
Chilean law.  The Civil Code declared that wives must live with their husbands, be 
faithful to them and be obedient (Dandavati 1996, 46).  The husband owned all property; 
women were only in possession of the salary they earned.  The control exercised by the 
husband was strong. Women were not allowed to travel abroad with their children 
without the permission of the husband or without the authorization of the court.  The 
husband was also in charge of the children and could determine their future.  The Penal 
Code sanctioned adultery committed by married women.  Divorce was not legal.  The 
military government opposed abortion, sterilization and contraception, and any access to 
contraceptives was limited (1979 document by the Office of National Planning).   
In line with these policies, soon after the coup in October 1973, the military 
government set up the National Secretariat of Women.  It also reorganized the already 
existing Mothers Centers (CEMA).  The National Women‘s Secretariat was formally 
established to oversee programs and policies for women, but both the Secretariat and the 
CEMA ―became political tools to disseminate images of the traditional woman‖ (Kohl 
2008).  The Secretariat‘s activities included ―talks and seminars to possible volunteers on 
being a good mother, wife, and housewife‖ (Canadell 1993, 49).  Directed by Pinochet‘s 
wife Lucia Hiriart, the National Women‘s Secretariat targeted primarily upper-middle 
class and upper class women.   
  In contrast, the Mother‘s Centers (CEMA) were targeting lower class women, 
and the government maintained control over the centers by appointing the wives of 
military officials and other supporters of the regime to higher ranking positions.  Some of 
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the primary activities of these organizations included courses for women and the 
production and sale of artisan goods; the Centers also provided some health, educational 
and housing services.  Poor women frequently depended on the Centros for economic 
support (Dandavati 1996).  By 1983, the Mothers Centers (CEMAs) had over 10,000 
centers around the country (Valenzuela 1991) with a membership of about 200,000 
(Valdes et al. 1989, 41).  While these organizations resulted in some tangible benefits for 
Chilean women, it is important to keep in mind that their goal was to promote women‘s 
role as mothers who bring up patriotic citizens supporting the Chilean fatherland – with 
the long-term aim to keep women away from politics (Chuchryk 1989). Together, the 
existing gendered laws and government expectations created ground for women to pursue 
their grievances.   
 
Family Life and Social Policy 
Under Pinochet‘s government, social policy became subordinated to economic 
policy.   The cuts in social spending were particularly reflected in such areas as housing, 
healthcare and education (Richards 2004).  ―By 1978… Public spending was slashed to 
one-half its 1973 levels as a percentage of GNP, amid a new round of privatizations.  
Prices were freed and the banking system and financial markets deregulated.  A new pro-
business labor code was decreed and social security was privatized‖ (Winn 2004, 52). 
The provision of some services was delegated to the private sector.  This 
happened through the privatization of some social policy schemes and services, as well as 
through subcontracting specific services to private companies.  The social costs of the 
economic and social system reform were high. ―Increasingly, workers were left to 
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confront their social problems – illness, retirement, education – as individual consumer 
choices within the marketplace, not as objects of social solidarity or collective action‖ 
(Winn 2004, 52).  The decentralization and privatization of health services was reflected 
in higher cost for these services for Chilean citizens.  The military government almost 
eliminated government provided social services as well as the safety net for the poor 
(Dandavati 1996). 
These social and economic changes introduced by the military regime affected 
women and men differently.  ―Although Gen. Augusto Pinochet's liberalizing project was 
not explicitly gendered, the reforms had gendered consequences‖ (Pribble 2006, 99).  
When combined with the market-oriented reforms, the regime‘s gender ideology was 
soon reflected in the erosion of protective labor legislation for women.  A new law 
introduced soon after the military takeover enabled employers to discriminate against 
women in the hiring process, and to fire pregnant women; it also took childcare subsidies 
provided by employers away from working women.  Changes in the educational system 
led to a significant increase in the cost of childcare and lowered its availability (see 
Chuchryk 1989).  Gender stereotypes were prevalent in all levels of the educational 
system, and despite having a formally equal access to education, women were educated 
only in traditional areas.   
Pinochet‘s government used social policy strategically as a propaganda tool.  To 
do this, the formerly universalistic social programs were replaced with ones targeting 
specific social groups, primarily mothers and children.  For example, soon after he took 
power, Pinochet vowed to support Chilean families by improving their security of 
housing.  He developed his housing policy with the aim to show his dedication for 
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Chilean families. Rather than a social right, housing was presented as a gift from 
Pinochet to Chilean families (Thomas forthcoming, 174).  The ongoing lack of housing 
available to families did not make it an easy task (Que Pasa, 25 January, 1974, no. 144, p. 
18 cited in Thomas), and the government struggled to follow through with its promises.  
Despite the widespread social cuts, ―traditionalist benefits were never touched by 
the dictatorship‖ (Rios Tobar, personal interview).  As a result, women were both victims 
and beneficiaries of the social and economic changes introduced under Pinochet‘s rule 
(Tinsman 2004).  From the beginning, social legislation in Chile included provisions for 
protecting women in their role as mothers.  Minister Jorge Mardones explained in 1954: 
"When women work at home, they exercise a social function that deserves to be 
recognized" (cited in Arellano 1985, 83).  In accordance with its traditionalist rhetoric, 
the state increased such contributions as a family welfare allowance covering pregnant 
women and children that had been excluded from the previous program (Montecinos 
1994).   
Similarly, the military government also sought to maintain its emphasis on health 
care for mothers and children (Montecinos 1994).  As did previous Chilean governments 
and in accordance with the regime‘s pro-family propaganda, Pinochet chose to place 
particular emphasis on the importance of declining infant mortality and improving 
maternal care.  At the same time as the government was cutting healthcare and other 
social expenditures, Pinochet expanded public policies for infants and mothers living 
under poverty.  Specifically, the Corporation for Infant Nutrition provided care and 
nutrition for needy infants and education for their mothers (Collins and Lear 1995).  All 
of these policies painted a clear picture of the position that the state desired women to 
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have in the society – a very traditional one where women were excluded from the public 
sphere.  
 
Employment 
Soon, unemployment in Chile soared as a result of the economic stabilization 
steps made by the military government.  In the Santiago metropolitan area alone, 
economic unemployment increased from 3% at the time of the coup to over 10%  in June 
1974 (O‘Brien and Roddick 1983, 45).  By 1975, overall unemployment soared to 17%  
Winn 2004, 28) and further to 19.8% in 1976 (O‘Brien and Roddick 1983, 63).  
Furthermore, if one adds the number of people working through the government 
emergency working programs, the 1976 figure stood at 28%.  Estimates suggest that the 
unemployment rates reached 80% in some of the country shantytowns (Chuchryk 1994). 
At the same time, the rising unemployment and declining wages led the 
government to introduce several new programs targeting ‗heads of households‘.  These 
included the Programa de Empleo Minimo (PEM) and the Programa de Ocupacion para 
Jefes de Hogar (Dandavati 1996).  The goal of the Program de Ocupacion para Jefes de 
Hogar (POJH) program was to provide employment opportunities for the heads of 
households. ―The terms ‗heads of households‘ meant men, since women could not be 
legally regarded as heads of households, despite the fact that many women with children 
did not have husbands, or were the primary income providers in the family‖ (Dandavati 
1996, 42).  As a result, women often relied on the PEM program which provided half the 
salary offered by the POJH program.  In fact, women represented about 80% of the PEM 
beneficiaries.  
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Ironically, while the state encouraged women to stay at home, the poor economic 
situation meant that more and more women were entering the labor market.  While 25% 
of women aged 15 and over worked outside of home in 1976, the number increased to 
32% by 1990 (Valdes and Gomariz 1995, 38).  While unemployment rates for women 
became only slightly higher than those of men, in 1985 women were on average making 
just little over half of the average male wage (Leiva 1987; Valenzuela 1991).  
Furthermore, some of the decrees in the new Labor Code (Plan Laboral) eliminated most 
of the rights enjoyed by sick and pregnant workers. 
 
Women Organize 
Under Pinochet‘s regime, the Chilean state allowed little space for citizens‘ 
political activism.  In the language of social movement theory, political opportunity for 
social mobilization was closed, or so it seemed.   But perhaps surprisingly, Chilean 
women were able to frame their issues in ways that created political opportunity for 
women‘s mobilization despite the repressive nature of the Chilean military regime. How 
did they accomplish that? 
Especially in the early years of the dictatorship, the government targeted (through 
arrests and harassment) men much more than women.  This was in part due to the fact 
that men represented a disproportionate number of political party members of existing 
political parties, labor unions and other primarily leftist organizations viewed 
unfavorably by the regime.  In contrast, women were often ignored and seen as 
unimportant and harmless.  This presented an important opportunity for Chilean women 
to organize around their issues.  
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After the coup in 1973, the Chilean military government channeled women‘s civic 
participation into government controlled organizations such as the Mother‘s Centers 
(CEMA) and the National Women‘s Secretariat (Secretaria Nacional de la Mujer) in 
order to depoliticize women.  These organizations were not autonomous and they only 
further perpetuated the patriarchal cultural model (Lechner and Levy 1984).  The state 
strategy was not to empower Chilean women.  In fact, just like Sonia Alvarez describes 
in the case of Brazil ―In the context of military rule, the authoritarian State was, of 
course, viewed as the chief enemy of feminism and of all other progressive social 
movements that emerged during the 1960‘s and 1970‘s‖ (Alvarez 1994, 14).  Instead, the 
state de facto depoliticized women by defining them as those with greater morality and 
asked them to serve and protect the fatherland.   
Ironically, this combination of state traditionalist ideology and policies toward 
women combined with state repression of traditional forms of resistance provided women 
with political space for action.   A strong Chilean women‘s movement re-emerged 
primarily in response to these changing conditions and shifting powers within the newly 
dictatorial regime.  As the power of political parties was getting weaker, alternative forms 
of civic participation were being developed (Rios Tobar et al. 2003).  The regime‘s 
numerous and often brutal violations of human rights together with the growing 
economic crisis provided women with grievances against the state.  In fact, women led 
the first organized resistance to the repressive regime. They had a strong sense of who 
and what they were opposing.  ―Early 1980‘s, that‘s when you begin to see a lot of 
women‘s groups‖ (Carmen Torres, personal interview).    
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In response to these pressures, Chilean women organized both around feminist 
and non-feminist issues.  Writing about women‘s movements in Latin America, scholars 
came to recognize three dominant strands of the movements: (1) human rights groups, (2) 
community-based groups responding to the worsening economic situation and (3) 
feminist groups (Waylen 1994). By the early 1980‘s, three women‘s federations emerged: 
the committee for the Defense of Women‘s Rights (CODEM), Women of Chile 
(MUDECHI) and the Movement of Shantytown Women (MOMUPO) (Chuchryk 1994, 
76).  These groups soon formed a cohesive social movement (Kirkwood 1986).   
First, a number of groups emerged in response to the serious human rights abuses 
under the authoritarian regime.  As in the case of the Argentinean ‗Madres de Plaza de 
Mayo‘, Chilean women – mothers, wives and sisters – used their traditional roles to 
organize and demand the return of their ―disappeared‖ children, brothers and husbands.  
To do this, women initially sought the protection of churches (Frohman and Valdes 
1995).  Despite the repressive nature of the regime, the state found it difficult to suppress 
these efforts because women strategically used their maternal roles assigned to them by 
the state and its policies to protest.   Steve J. Stern (2004) explains 
 
In a Catholic society whose military rulers proclaimed fidelity to Christianity as a 
basic principle and where political polarization and bitterness had run deep, a 
social referent that questioned official truth on the basis of religious conscience 
was culturally and practically feasible. Religious conscience framed the question 
of violence and human rights as transcendent. There were themes beyond 
mundane political calculations, rules, and fault lines. Those who insisted on 
defending fundamental human rights had a right to do so because they were acting 
not as a political opposition, but as Chileans of conscience. Theirs was a moral 
insistence legitimized, organized, and partially protected by the Santiago Catholic 
Church.  (Stern 2004, 119) 
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This ‗unintended politicization of the private sphere‘ (Valenzuela 1991, 166) became 
clear as early as 1975 when women went into the streets to demand the return of the 
disappeared and to protest the authoritarian state.  
Second, women represented a disproportionate number of those organized in a 
variety of urban community groups that appeared in response to the economic crises that 
were particularly harshly affecting the urban poor (pobladoras).  According to the 
organization Centro de Estudios de la Mujer (1988), by 1986 there were 1,383 popular 
organizations in the Santiago metropolitan area, with a total of close to 50,000 active 
members.  Three groups stood out in their dedication to these issues: Committee for the 
Defense of Women‘s Rights (CODEM), Women of Chile (MUDECHI), and the 
Movement of Shantytown Women (MOMUPO).  While CODEM and MUDECHI were 
nationwide federations of women‘s groups association with political parties, MOMUPO 
was a Santiago-based group independent of political parties (Baldez 2002, 138).  
These groups were set up to pursue new survival strategies (see, for example, 
Chuchryk 1989), and they often sprung up from church related base communities (see 
Stewart-Gambino 2005).  Waylen (1994) describes these in terms of women‘s 
involvement in ―the politics of daily life‖ (336).   Here, women organized grocery co-ops 
and communal soup pots, set up and tended community gardens, collected and sold 
clothing and organized workshops to generate incomes or community-based provision of 
various social services and organized child care cooperatives.  The Chilean Catholic 
Church often supported these initiatives and helped to coordinate and expand them 
(Stewart-Gambino 2005, 51).  
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While these groups were established with the aim to ensure family survival on a 
daily basis, they also provided environments where women could discuss political issues, 
educate themselves and express doubts about the social and gendered division of labor.  
Here, as Chuchryk (1989) notes, women also discovered that they were capable of 
political action: ―By creating the need for alternative economic survival strategies, the 
regime‘s economic policies have impelled women to organize‖ (155).  Because women‘s 
activities were not seen as dangerous or political, women were able to use their 
traditional roles to utilize this space outside of the realm of conventional politics.  
Excluded from formal politics because of societal patriarchal norms, women moved 
political activity from the mainstream institutions to community-based action (Waylen 
1994).  
The third general type of women‘s organizations – feminist ones - grew out of 
these two movements, as women realized that gender constrained their lives in ways not 
shared by the men of their class (Alvarez 1994).  As Chuchryk (1989) notes, ―… the 
process of engaging in political activity often encourages women to begin to question 
those very same roles which provided the initial impetus for political organizing‖ (159).  
Women active in the trade unions began to demand equal pay and organizing on the basis 
of their gender identity, Chilean women began to press for furthering of women‘s rights 
and gender equality.  ―Democracy in the country and in the home‖ became the slogan of 
the Chilean feminist movement of this time. Some of the key groups included the Centro 
de Estudios de la Mujer – CEM) and LaMorada.  In 1983, MEMCH83 an umbrella group 
for a wide range of both feminist and non-feminist groups began to play a prominent role 
as well.   
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International influences came into play as the International Women‘s Day of 1978 
provided basis for an emerging women‘s political platform.   Western feminism was, as 
in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, rejected as irrelevant and as hurtful to the 
relationship between women and men.  Chilean, as well as other Latin American 
feminists, largely accepted (but not without discussion) Marxist feminism to frame their 
grievances and demands.  Chilean women eventually drew a link between their 
subordination and capitalism (Kirkwood 1986; Rios Tobar 2003b).  
In short, Chilean women‘s groups organized into what many perceived as a 
relatively cohesive women‘s movement, and as such played an important role in the 
breakdown of the authoritarian regime and in the revitalization of the civil society.  Using 
the authoritarian state‘s rhetoric and policies, Chilean women were among the first to 
publicly challenge the military states in these countries, and women‘s movements joined 
broader opposition coalitions to end military rule (Jaquette 2001).  To do so, women 
strategically used the political space available to them in the context of the authoritarian 
regime.  As a result of these developments, feminist issues came to be positively 
associated with democratization and human rights (Jaquette 2001).   
 
Conclusion 
During Augusto Pinochet‘s rule, thousands of people were tortured, murdered and 
made disappear simply because of their political affiliation or beliefs.  Therefore, it is 
remarkable that Chilean women were able to organize around a variety of social issues, 
human rights and gender injustices.  To do so, women used the Catholic Church as an 
important resource and a mobilizing structure.  Furthermore, they framed their grievances 
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in ways that created a political opportunity within the existing societal structures.  
Finally, they were able to form a unified movement in response to the gendered ideology 
of Pinochet‘s government.  
The Chilean military dictatorship was very clear on what the role of women was.  
The combination of the traditionalist gender ideology and of the regime‘s social policies 
toward women led to a situation where Chilean women were sent a clear message that 
they were not welcome in the public sphere.  In a very paradoxical way, these were the 
very same measures that also created political space for women to return to the public 
arena.  Framing their issues in terms of their roles of good mothers and wives, women 
responded to the economic and human rights crises by engaging the state through its own 
rhetoric and policies.  Similar frames remained unavailable to Chilean men.   
 Avoiding ‗Western feminism‘, Chilean women subsequently framed their issues 
in Marxist terms.  Through its repressive measures against labor unions and other 
traditionally leftists groups, the Chilean military dictatorship left this particular frame 
available for women to utilize.  Furthermore, as a result of these processes and women‘s 
demands, the commitment to equality helped differentiate the new democracy from the 
old authoritarian political model.  In Latin America, women‘s issues then became 
―congruent with and symbolic of a larger political transformation‖ (Jaquette and Wolchik 
1998, 8).  
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Chapter 6 
CHILE 1990 - present 
Toward Equality, But Without Women 
 
While in Czechoslovakia democracy arrived almost overnight, the Chilean 
transition to democracy was a product of long, careful negotiations.  These took place 
between (1) the outgoing government of General Augusto Pinochet, and (2) the new 
democratic forces, namely the anti-Pinochet Coalition for Democracy (that subsequently 
emerged as a winner in the 1989 elections).  The compromises that emerged out of these 
talks had important implications for the development of gender policy in post-dictatorial 
Chile.  Surprisingly, despite ongoing gender discrimination and inequalities, Chilean 
women did not take advantage of this political opening to organize around their 
grievances.  
In Chile the first wave of pro-democratic protests began in 1983.  A 14% decline 
in GDP led copper miners‘ unions to declare a National Day of Protest, to express 
Chilean workers‘ dissatisfaction with the current situation.  During the same year, the 
Catholic Church in Chile also declared its opposition to the military regime.  As 
opposition parties began reviving, Christian Democrats joined forces with the Socialists, 
forming a National Accord for Transition to Full Democracy.  The Accord demanded free 
and fair elections and rejected the 1980 Constitution.63 
By 1985, the Chilean market was recovering from an earlier crisis.  In this 
context, Augusto Pinochet regained confidence and also some popular support.  Public 
demonstrations organized by the opposition were having little impact on Pinochet‘s 
                                                 
63
 The Constitution of 1980 replaced the Constitution of 1925.   Approved by Chilean voters during a 
heavily controlled plebiscite under the military rule of General Augusto Pinochet, the new Constitution was 
very controversial because it significantly increased the power of the Chilean President. 
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government and the Chilean political regime.  A subsequent 1986 attempt to assassinate 
Pinochet gave the dictator a much sought after justification for the new imposition of a State 
of Siege.  Throughout the year, the opposition forces continued to lack a clear strategy for 
ending Pinochet‘s rule and returning Chile to democracy.  Meanwhile, the Chilean society 
remained divided between those opposing Pinochet‘s rule, and those who supported the 
military government in order to achieve greater political stability. 
Things began to change in 1987.  First, with the exception of the Communist 
Party, political parties were once again made legal in Chile.  During the same year, the 
new U.S. Ambassador Harry Barnes also began to work with Chile‘s political opposition 
to advance democratization.  Barnes added his influential voice to those who reasoned 
that the opposition ought to accept a referendum on Pinochet‘s rule as set in the 1980 
Constitution.  Pinochet considered declaring the Ambassador persona non grata, but the 
General remained optimistic about his chances of winning given his continued control of 
the mass media, of much of the government and because he felt he had the support of a 
significant part of the population.  Augusto Pinochet also expected the economic and 
social context would play in his favor as the economy was growing and the Chilean 
standard of living was improving.   
The opposition discussions resulted in Concertacion por el No, a center-left 
alliance of sixteen political parties led by Christian Democrats and Socialists.  Supported 
by a broad based grassroots movement, the coalition made every effort to register as 
many citizens as they could to vote.   And they were successful.  In the October 5, 1988 
referendum, the Concertaction por el No won a decisive 55%-43% victory, with a voter 
turnout at a record 90%.  Pinochet had to accept his defeat which by the 1980 Constitution 
required free elections for President the following year.  The Concertacion coalition then 
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subsequently won presidential elections in 1989, 1993, 1999 and 2005/06.
64
  The 
Christian Democratic government of Patricio Alywin took power peacefully on March 
11, 1990.  The outcome of the earlier negotiations between Pinochet‘s government and 
the opposition parties was, among other things, a political compromise on sensitive issues 
which inhibited future investigation and made it possible for the proponents of the 
military regime to avoid future personal and institutional responsibility for crimes 
committed prior to 1989.  Overall, as a result of these political negotiations, the military 
regime has been able to shape the future transformation in unprecedented ways.  For 
years, Chile was left with what has become known as ‗protected democracy under 
military guidance‘ (Winn 2004, 30). 
For two decades after 1990, the governing center-left Coalition for Democracy 
(later renamed Concertacion de Partidos Por la Democracia)  ―pursued an agenda of 
intensified global economic integration at the same time as a political programme focused 
on greater equity, claiming to be making a concerted effort to reduce poverty‖ (Schild 
2002, 170).  Surprising to many was the fact that the newly elected governments 
continued to reinforce the neoliberal economic reforms initiated under Pinochet‘s regime, 
which they formerly criticized.  For the next decade or so, Chile experienced high growth 
rates and increased productivity.  The eleven year long growth has become known as the 
Chilean miracle.   
However, at the same time that Chile was showing signs of good economic 
progress in the early 1990‘s, it was also faced with high levels of inequality and poverty.  
In other words, not all Chileans have benefited from the ‗Chilean miracle‘ equally.  In 
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 While the presidential elections took place in 2005, run off elections had to be called and those were held 
in 2006. 
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1987, 45% of Chilean population lived below poverty level (Schild 2002, 177), and the 
figures did not improve much despite the economic boom.  In 1990, some 39% of 
Chileans were still living in poverty (Schild 2002).
65
  Aware of the situation, the first two 
Concertacion governments implemented what they referred to as ‗Growth with Equity‘ 
strategy to balance the negative effects of neoliberal economy with social life.   
Formally, the new democratic government in Chile expressed support for women 
and their demands.  It soon established the National Service for Women (SERNAM), and 
it committed itself to adhere to a number of national and international treaties and 
documents relevant to women‘s rights.  This included its continuous support for the 
United Nation‘s Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW).   
At the same time, however, SERNAM‘s relationship to women‘s groups remained 
problematic and Chilean women continued to face important gender inequalities in the 
workplace, at home and in regards to their reproductive and other rights.  In 1999, the 
Women‘s Anti-Discrimination Committee of the United Nations concluded that; ―Chile's 
women had played a leading role in the battle against the dictatorship and for human 
rights, yet they had no divorce law, were under- represented in decision-making positions 
and faced severe constraints in reproductive health, expert members of the Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women said this afternoon‖
66
.  To this date, all 
forms of abortion in Chile continue to be penalized, making Chile one of the most 
restrictive regimes in the world in this regard. 
  Surprisingly, despite these inequalities, the Chilean women‘s movement broke up 
                                                 
65
 But note that poverty rates have further decreased  to 22% by 1998 (Schild 2002, 177). 
66
 Women's Anti-Discrimination Committee - 1a - Press Release WOM/1145 443rd Meeting (PM) 22 June 
1999 
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and went largely silent once the new political regime was in place.  On March 8, 1989, 
about 20,000 women came to the Santa Laura Stadium to celebrate the return to 
democracy (Rios Tobar 2003a).  But even though Chilean women and women‘s 
movements played an important role in ―ending fear‖ and bringing the Chilean 
authoritarian regime down, it is paradoxical that they began to disappear from the public 
realm soon after the country shifted towards democracy. 
 
State Ideology toward Women 
In democratic Chile after 1990, the government‘s position on women‘s desirable 
role in society has been inconsistent.  On the one hand, the democratic government 
declared support for women‘s issues when it created The National Service for Women 
(SERNAM) in 1991.  During the presidency of Michele Bachelet (2006 – 2010), the 
executive branch also fought for greater inclusion of women into formal politics and for 
women‘s advancement in other areas of social life.  At the same time, however, the 
state‘s strategy of economic neoliberalism combined with the enduring adherence to 
restrictive reproductive rights left women‘s activists cynical about Chilean state‘s 
commitment to furthering women‘s rights and issues.   
The National Service for Women (SERNAM) was formally put in place with the 
passage of Law No. 19.023 in January 1991.
67
  This only took place after a political 
struggle since the Chilean Right (UDI and PRN political parties) opposed its 
establishment, fearing that he agency would be a feminist establishment.   Once in place, 
the mission of SERNAM was to ―promote the participation of women in national life and 
equality of opportunities between the sexes‖ (SERNAM 1994, 1).  In other words, 
                                                 
67
 For more information on the establishment of SERNAM, see Matear 1997; Waylen 1994. 
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SERNAM‘s task was to oversee and improve the status of Chilean women.  Its focus was 
shaped by the demands the Concertacion Nacional de Mujeres por la Democracia and 
also by the objectives of the United Nations‘ Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
68
  
In practice, SERNAM has been overseeing legal reforms and their 
implementation and it has also organized a number of educational campaigns pertaining 
to women‘s issues.  Veronica Schild (2002) explains that ―In addition to proposing legal 
reforms, advising other relevant ministries on gender-sensitive policies, and initiating 
educational campaigns, SERNAM channels government funds and foreign aid to 
gendered social programmes intended to integrate women fully into the development 
process‖ (173).   The agency formally belongs under the Ministry of Planning and 
Cooperation (a ministry responsible for social issues), and it works through thirteen 
regional offices responsible for executing its agenda on local level (Dandavati 2004).  
Therefore, while SERNAM has the ability to propose and influence gender related 
legislation and offer educational programs in the area of gender issues and rights, it does 
not have the power to fund or implement its own programs.  To carry out its programs, 
SERNAM has to turn to other ministries for financial backing (Richards 2004, 185).   
The agency has been critical for the advancement of Chilean women‘s rights in a 
number of ways.  For example, SERNAM has established Centers for Information 
regarding women‘s rights and the agency also played a critical role in passing a law 
making domestic violence illegal in Chile.  In 2000, SERNAM introduced what has 
become known as the Equal Opportunity Plan for Women and Men (plan de iqualidad 
entre mujeres y hombres) to be reached by 2010.  The plan has become a key tool in 
                                                 
68
 The CEDAW Convention was ratified by the government of Augusto Pinochet in early December 1989. 
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implementing gender equity policies in Chile.  According to the response of the Chilean 
delegation to the CEDAW Committee, the Plan focuses on six main priority areas: 1) 
promoting a culture of equality; 2) promoting women‘s rights and their full enjoyment; 3) 
promoting women‘s participation in power structures and in the decision-making process; 
4) guaranteeing economic independence for women and reducing poverty; 5) improving 
women‘s day-to-day well-being and quality of life; and 6) integrating gender perspective 
into public policies (CEDAW responses 2006).   
Furthermore, SERNAM proposed important amendments to the Civil Code that 
would improve the legal rights of married women in regards to their estate.  The agency 
also worked with the Ministry of Labor to update the Labor Code by providing rights for 
domestic workers and by eliminating articles that excluded women from certain 
professions (Dandavati 2004).  Finally, by updating the Labor Code, SERNAM also 
contributed to the provision of increased rights for working parents. 
Therefore, it is without doubt that using SERNAM to institute these legal and 
institutional reforms, the Chilean government has expressed some level of commitment to 
gender equality.  At the same time, however, the state has been communicating other 
messages in regards to women‘s position in the Chilean society.  This has been taking 
place both through SERNAM and by using other channels as well.                
First, while the National Service for Women (SERNAM) has always looked like a 
progressive institution on paper, it has not always been so in reality.  It is true that 
Chilean women have succeeded in institutionalizing some of their demands through the 
agency.  At the same time, however, Marcela Rios Tobar (2003) and others have noted 
that SERNAM‘s relation with women‘s groups and other civil society actors has from its 
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inception been rather problematic (see also Richards 2004).  A common criticism of the 
agency includes charges that it is too conservative and that it has been co-opted by the 
state.  Some suggest that concerned about the strength of the women‘s movement, the 
democratic government used SERNAM to exert control (Baldez 2001).  Others go as far 
as to argue that especially in the early years of the political transition, SERNAM only 
protected and advanced women‘s rights as they related to the traditional family.  For 
example, Chuchryk (1994) writes  
Unfortunately, SERNAM has replaced the women‘s movement as the key 
interlocutor in the public discourse on women‘s issues. It is a government 
agency that consistently frames women‘s issues in the context of the need 
to preserve and harmonize family life. (88) 
 
Similarly, Franceschet (2005) suggests that SERNAM developed ―a potentially 
irresolvable tension at its core: to pursue women‘s equality while strengthening the 
traditional family‖ (119).  
This charge that SERNAM focuses primarily on women‘s familial roles as 
opposed to women‘s rights more generally seems to be supported by governmental 
actions and reports.  For example, in its 4
th
 periodic report to the United Nations‘ 
CEDAW Commission, when referring to the Convention‘s articles on equality before the 
law and elimination of discrimination in legislation, the Chilean government places the 
following pieces of legislation at the top of the list of laws recently put in place to 
advance women‘s status in Chile (in order listed):  amendment to the law concerning 
family abandonment and payment of alimony and support to ensure timely and equitable 
alimony provisions, and their effective enforcement; the introduction of amendments to 
regulations regarding domestic violence;  the creation of the Family Courts and the 
establishment of the Mediation System providing people with appropriate opportunities 
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to reach cooperative solutions through mediation; amendment to the Constitutional 
Organic Law of Teaching embodying the right of access to educational establishments for 
female students who are pregnant or are nursing mothers (CEDAW 2006).  In 2000, 
newly elected President Ricardo Lagos named Adriana Del Piano SERNAM‘s minister. 
―Six months after assuming her post, Del Piano participated in the UN Beijing Plus Five 
conference, where she not only stayed clear of any commitments towards improving the 
country‘s track record on reproductive rights but explicitly state that her government 
would pursue a ‗pro-life policy‘‖ (Rios-Tobar 2003a, 262).  
Indeed, throughout much of its existence, SERNAM remained neutral in its 
position toward a number of controversial issues pertaining to women.
69
  Among these 
were access to abortion, divorce, and birth control.  According to Annie Dandavati (2004) 
SERNAM was defending its neutral position on these issues, ―claiming that it is a 
technical office which is not permitted to intervene in the moral issues of society and, 
therefore cannot initiate legislation on either divorce or abortion‖ (102).  Dandavati 
suggests that ―SERNAM‘s emphasis on moderation and avoiding conflict, together with 
the overwhelming influence of the Catholic Church, which does not support any of these 
issues, has resulted in the maintenance of the status quo for several women‘s issues‖ 
(102).  It may not be surprising then that some continue to view the agency as one that 
―plays a confusing, symbolic role in the government‖ (Obach interview).   
The second way in which Chilean women sense and experience an anti-women 
mood from the state is through some of the important legacies left behind by the military 
regime.  According to Molina (1998), ―… lingering authoritarian legacies manifested, for 
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 Veronica Schild (2002) also notes that ―SERNAM‘s programmes have left the specific situation of 
women in formal sector employment virtually untouched.‖ (186). 
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example, in the organization of the structures of the state bureaucracy‖ (132-3).  Namely, 
the Catholic Church and the Constitution of 1980 have played key roles in the Chilean 
transition to democracy and beyond.  The situation is somewhat ironic.  While Chilean 
women found an ally in the Catholic Church during the time of the transition, these ties 
between pro-democracy forces and the Church also ensured an important political role for 
the traditional Catholic Church in post-transition politics.  This has, in turn, weakened the 
impact of the Chilean feminist movement (see, for example, Htun 2003).  Ironically then, 
the same organization that helped to bring democracy and increased rights for millions of 
Chileans later joined forces with the Chilean state in curtailing the extension of rights for 
women. 
The effects of the traditionalist ideology associated with the Catholic Church 
continued to be reinforced through the Constitution of 1980 drafted by Pinochet‘s 
government.  As Leiva (2005a) notes ―To ensure the success of the negotiated transition, 
the Concertacion had to provide ample evidence of its commitment to both the neoliberal 
economic model as well as Pinochet‘s 1980 Constitution‖ (75).  This Constitution has 
become known primarily as the one which ordered a gradual transition from the military 
dictatorship to a civilian government.  It introduced significant changes into Chilean 
political and legal system.  In this way it has had a profound influence on Chilean politics 
throughout and after the 1990‘s.    
For example, the Constitution of 1980 provided incentives that resulted in the 
transformation of the traditional Chilean multiparty system into a two-party system.  It 
did this by introducing new organization of electoral districts and rules.  As a result, the 
members of the new political coalitions have been reluctant to address even remotely 
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divisive social issues fearing that voters will turn to opposition.  These changes in the 
electoral system then led to overrepresentation of conservative forces in Congress 
(Galleguillos 1998 cited in Schild 2002).  In this way, Chilean coalition politics has 
impeded policy changes favoring women‘s rights (Baldez 2001).   
Furthermore, the Constitution strengthened the institution of the President and it 
ensured that a significant number of seats in the Chilean Senate were set to be appointed, 
not elected.
70
  Appointed for life, the Senators chosen during the Pinochet regime have 
continued to shift Chilean politics in a conservative direction.  The Constitution also 
introduced a lasting legacy of the military regime when it made future governments 
accountable to the National Security Council.
71
  The Constitution was written in a way 
that made it difficult for any future government to incorporate changes, and its future 
legitimacy was ensured when it was ratified in a country-wide referendum.  
In these ways, the Constitution represented the primary force through which the 
military regime continued to reinforce traditional social forces.  It did this by including 
institutional protections which safeguarded the representation of conservative interests 
through the creation of the binomial electoral system and the appointment of "senators for 
life." (Pribble 2006, 19).   It was not until 2005 that some of these rules were removed 
from the document.  Given that progressive and leftist forces, and women in particular, 
had very little access to political posts prior to 1989, this has clearly had important 
consequences for women‘s rights in post-dictatorial Chile.  In other words, through the 
electoral, legislative and party politics system, the former authoritarian regime continued 
for years to affect gender policy in newly democratic Chile.  
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 The provision was finally abolished by constitutional reforms in 2005. 
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 The National Security Council is a quasi-governmental institution which convenes  to discuss threats to 
national security. As such it has not only factual powers, but perhaps more importantly, symbolic ones.  
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The third and final way in which the state influenced the lives of Chilean women 
was through its economic policy.   Carmen Espinosa Miranda, a director of the Chilean 
Programa de Economia del Trabajo summarizes, ―During the last decade, the government 
has been supporting policies that strengthen the market. The opening started under the 
military government, but it‘s under the democratic government that most free trade 
agreements have been signed‖ (personal interview).   Over time, it has become quite clear 
that Chilean neo-liberalism has affected women and men differently.  Studying seasonal 
fruit workers in the Aconcagua valley, Heidi Tinsman (2004) has argued, for example, 
that women have been both victims and beneficiaries of these reforms.  According to her, 
some women have become empowered through paid work while others have been 
exploited in the workplace.   
 
Women’s Rights: Enduring Inequalities  
The democratic transition and governmental commitment to human rights did not 
automatically translate into equal rights for Chilean women.  It is true that during and 
after the democratic transition, women in Chile did witness some advances in their rights.  
As I describe above, they have benefited from a variety of family oriented policies 
supported by SERNAM.  At the same time, however, throughout the 1990‘s, Chilean 
women continued to struggle with gender discrimination in employment, politics and 
they were also uniquely affected by the legal restrictions in regard to divorce and 
reproductive rights.  Finally, the United Nations‘ Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) concluded in 2006 that Chile was 
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still facing serious problems in regard to family law, health and reproductive rights, 
political participation, and work and social security (CEDAW 2006).   
 
Women and the Labor Market 
In Chile, women's participation in the labor force has risen significantly over the 
last few decades, from 22% in 1970, to 28.06% in 1992, to 31.5% in 1995 all the way to 
35.57% in 2002 (CEDAW 2006; SERNAM 2000).   In 2008, 41.6 percent of Chilean 
women of working age were economically active (Estrada 2009).  By contrast, the labor 
force participation rate for men declined by 1.49 percentage points over the same period.  
Despite this significant increase in the numbers of women working outside of the home, 
the Chilean rate of female labor  participation still lags behind that for Latin America as a 
whole, which stood at 45.2% in 2004 (CEDAW 2006).  
Furthermore, Chilean women continue to face serious inequalities in the labor 
market.  Namely, they encounter discrimination when they work on temporary contracts 
with little access to social and health benefits; they are faced with sexual harassment in 
the workplace; they experience lower wages for work comparable to that of men; and 
they also have limited access to childcare.  This situation seems to reflect cultural and 
social attitudes in Chile.  According to the World Values Survey, in 2006, 30% of 
Chileans agreed that if jobs are scarce, man should have more right to a job than a woman 
(World Values Survey).
72
 
One of the areas where women are negatively affected more than men is that of 
informal employment.  According to Carmen Espinosa Miranda, ―It is estimated that 
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 In the same survey, 46% or respondents disagreed with the statement and 23% neither agreed or 
disagreed. 
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about 40% of workers in Chile are employed informally. This is in opposition to 
government statistics that say it is about 30-35%‖ (personal interview)   Women 
constitute the vast majority of these informal workers.  The largest number of women 
works in agriculture, typically in temporary work.  There are still very few possibilities in 
stable employment in Chile.  ―Women often enter workforce informally and are reported 
to work in unsafe, terrible conditions where the wages are decreasing‖ (Espinosa, 
personal interview).  Furthermore, as Espinosa notes, those employed informally are 
rarely protected by the existing social policy and labor legislation.  For example, the only 
maternity policy instituted in Chile is for workers with indefinite contract – this is the 
case for very, very few Chilean women (Espinosa, personal interview). 
Another area where Chilean women encounter gender inequalities is the 
segregated job market.  According to the 4
th
 period report to the United Nation‘s 
CEDAW Committee (2006), employment in Chile is still segmented by sex and most 
women continue to hold jobs that society considers as ―women‘s work‖ (para. 40).  This 
feminization of the labor force is particularly prominent in the seafood, fruit and textile 
industries.  The report also indicates that that the female labor force is better educated 
than the male labor force; yet women have higher unemployment rates than men, and 
their jobs are more vulnerable in times of economic difficulty (paras. 206 and 207, 
CEDAW 2006).    
Finally, Chilean women are more likely to be unemployed than Chilean men
73
, 
and women also continue to be paid less for equal work in comparison to men.  In 2003, 
the unemployment rate for Chilean women was 9.9% compared to 8.7% for men (Selame 
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According to the organization Programa de Economia del Trabajo in Santiago, Chile, the lowest 
unemployment Chile has experienced after the political transition was 5% in 2005. It was 15% in 1995.  
(Espinosa interview) 
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2004).  In terms of pay, according to the National Institute of Statistics, women workers 
in Chile earn on average 31.1 percent less than men.  The wage gap is even higher among 
professionals – in fact as high as 49.8 percent (Estrada 2009).   
It took 20 years from the time of the democratic transition for the Chilean 
government to take action to eliminate the existing pay gap.  Finally, in May 2009, the 
Parliament approved and President Bachelet signed a law attempting to close the wage 
gap, introducing the principle of equal remuneration for men and women into the Labor 
Code.  And while the law contains specific provisions for businesses with more than 200 
workers, requiring them to specify positions, functions and qualifications, smaller 
businesses are exempt.  Therefore, it is not clear to what extent the legislation may be 
effective in fighting the wage gap since small and medium size business represent about 
80% of all Chilean companies (Estrada 2009).
74
  Journalist Daniela Estrada (2009) 
explains that behind the wage gap are cultural beliefs that assume that women are less 
productive, and go out to work so that their family can have a "second income."  But in 
Chile, she notes, working women are the chief breadwinners in 31.5 percent of 
households.   
 
Women in Chilean Politics 
Even with the reemergence of democracy, Chilean women have also continued to 
be marginalized in formal politics (Franceschet 2005).  This pattern was particularly 
prominent during the first fifteen years after the political overturn.  Despite the election 
of the first female President in 2006, it is still rare for women in Chile to hold elected 
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 In response, SERNAM launched a program to support the creation of organizational charts and job 
descriptions in these smaller businesses. 
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posts.  Only nine women were elected in the 1989 legislative elections.   Furthermore, 
President Aylwin angered women‘s groups when he appointed an all male cabinet.   The 
situation did not change significantly during the following years (see Table 6.1).   
 
Table 6.1  Percentage of female representatives in Chilean Parliament 1993 - 2010 
Election year Lower House (% women) Senate (% women) 
1993 7.5% 6.5% 
1997 10.8% 4.2% 
2001 12.5% 4.2% 
2005 15% 5.3% 
2009 14.2% 13.2% 
Source: Inter-parliamentary Union 
 
 
According to the Inter-parliamentary Union, Chile takes 80
th
 place in the world in 
regards to the percentage of elected female parliament members (2010 data).  It also 
ranks among the Latin American countries with the lowest political participation of 
women.  While the combined rate for female legislators in both houses is currently at 
about 12%, the average for the Americas (excluding Canada and the United States) is 
20%.  After the December 2009 congressional election, women hold 17 out of the 120 
seats in the lower house of the Chilean Parliament (14.2%) and 5 out of the 38 seats in 
the Senate (13.2%).   
 That Chilean women‘s access to formal politics is restricted as a result of 
prejudice and discrimination is supported by survey data.  For example, the World Values 
Survey found in 2006 that almost one half (46%) of Chileans believed that men made 
better political leaders than women did.  This compared to 24.2% of respondents in the 
United States who agreed with the statement.  In addition, this number was significantly 
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higher for male respondents in Chile than it was for Chilean women.  In fact, almost two-
thirds of men agreed with the statement that men made better political leaders.
75
   
Even as women now enter electoral and bureaucratic politics in greater numbers, 
they continue to be divided by ideology, specific interests, and unequal access to power 
(Fransceschet 2005).  Soon after 1990, Chilean women were faced with what Maria 
Elena Valenzuela refers to as the ‗dilemma between autonomy and subordination‘ 
(Valenzuela 1998, 48).  In other words, as the political context changed with the arrival 
of democratic regime, women‘s groups and individual women had to decide whether to 
continue to press for their rights from within or outside of the formal political process.  
The general trend was to favor greater integration of women into mainstream politics.   
 
Reproductive Rights 
In Chile, women continue to be uniquely affected by the legal restrictions on 
reproductive rights and until very recently also on divorce.   Until 2004, Chile was one of 
only two countries in the world where divorce was illegal, and even today, it is still one 
of very few countries where abortion is banned even to save the mother‘s life (Htun 2003, 
3).
76
   This situation is a result of the cooperation between the Catholic Church and the 
Chilean state.  This alliance has grown out of the special role that the Catholic Church 
played in the transition to democracy.  During the political transformation, the opponents 
of the military dictatorship considered the Church a legitimate social actor as it built 
important relationships with the democratic forces.  Therefore, it has remained powerful 
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 For comparison, the World Value Survey data show that in the United States, 27% of men agreed with 
the statement that men make better political leaders.  
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 In Chile, the permission for therapeutic abortion was withdrawn by a 1989 law (Htun 2003). 
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throughout the period of democratic consolidation, and it continues to affect, directly or 
indirectly, the lives of Chilean women.  
After the emergence of the Coalition for Democracy (the anti-Pinochet coalition 
that won the 1989 elections), abortion and divorce became topics of public and later also 
parliamentary discussion.  In the fall of 1995, a proposal to reform rules concerning civil 
marriages was placed on the legislative agenda and presented to the Congress.  However, 
the first two attempts to legalize divorce after 1990 failed.  It was not until May 2004, 
some fifteen years since the reemergence of democracy in Chile, that President Richardo 
Lagos signed a bill legalizing divorce in Chile.  
In Chile, women also continue to struggle with access to abortion.  In fact, to this 
date, all forms of abortion remain penalized in Chile.  This is despite the estimated 
170,000 back-street abortions carried out every year throughout the country (Acuna 
Moenne 2005, 159).  Some argue that this socially conservative stance is a result of a 
situation where active feminists have been co-opted by the new governments, and have 
lost their distinctive voice (Alvarez 1998; Olea 2000; Rios-Tobar et al. 2004).   It is 
evident that despite the Chilean economic miracle and the political environment of 
consolidated democracy, women in Chile continue to face important gender inequalities.  
It would be difficult to argue, then, that the lack of women‘s activism reflects women‘s 
satisfaction with the status quo.  
 
Social Policy and Family Life 
The story of Chilean family and social policy development after 1989 is a 
complicated one.  On the one hand, the Concertacion governments expressed 
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commitment to reducing widespread poverty and inequality.  On the other hand, the state 
also made it clear that social policy was not to be made at the expense of economic 
growth and development.  This new social policy as developed and implemented by 
Chilean state agencies also paid little attention to applying a gender-sensitive approach to 
policy development.  As a result, Chilean women, and especially poor Chilean women, 
have had to pick up where the state left off.  As Veronica Schild (2002) notes, ―The 
state‘s redefinition of responsibilities of social spending, in the name of a redefined active 
citizenship, continues to be accomplished on the backs of women.‖ (183) 
Under the military regime, social expenditures were significantly reduced in size 
in the name of economic neo-liberalism.  The ideology of neo-liberalism also continues 
to play an important role in policy formation in Chile today (Beneria 1996).  After 1990, 
the Concertacion government focused on targeted policies and employment policy.  
Namely, the state has been supporting individual participation in the labor market by 
assisting with job training programs, community development and social services 
delivered by businesses and other organizations.  
The government responded to the social cost of the economic transformation by 
focusing on poverty and inequality.  In 1990, a governmental agency The Fund for 
Solidarity and Social Investment (Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversion Social - FOSIS) was 
established to provide support for the social policy pushed forward by the new 
democratic government.  Its mission was to "participate in the country's effort to 
overcome poverty, contributing original proposals that complement those offered by 
other governmental services." (FOSIS website)  Furthermore, all ministries dealing with 
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social issues assigned a portion of their spending to ‗fondos concursables‘ accessible to 
non-governmental organizations.   
Surely, women did benefit from some of the developments and reforms in the 
family and social policy area.  Namely, SERNAM headed a number of efforts to improve 
the status of women in the labor force. For example, it supported a law passed in 1998 
which made it illegal for employers to request pregnancy tests for female job candidates.  
Several modifications were also made to the Labor Code to prevent gender discrimination 
in the workplace.  In 1994, family violence legislation was passed in the Chilean 
Congress, and in August 2005, Chile adopted the Domestic Violence Act, which 
recognized habitual abuse.  In addition, a new law introduced in 1998 granted mothers 
equal parental rights (Htun 2003). 
However, men and women have been affected by these developments differently.  
In its response to poverty and inequality, rather than returning to the post-Second World 
War era and its emphasis on the role of the state, Chilean governments have instead 
emphasized the role of non-governmental organizations in the delivery of social services.  
In this ‗new social policy‘ paradigm (Bienefeld 1997), women have been both the 
dominant providers/workers and clients in these efforts.  Veronica Schild (2002) explains 
how these reforms affected Chilean women: 
 
There is a (…) problem with this trend in social provisioning. Implicit in 
the innovative framework, for policy-making as a modernizing force in the 
social policy field, both in Chile and beyond, and endorsed today by 
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank, are some very 
old, gender-biased notions about the private-public divide that 
discriminate against poor women.  For claims for more effective and 
efficient social spending, through a partnership of state and civil society 
organizations, take for granted that communities and households can take 
up the slack for what the state no longer invests in. Ultimately, this means 
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that women, who have traditionally been responsible not only for the well-
being of family members but also of their communities, pick up where the 
state leaves off. .. (Schild 2002, 184) 
 
More specifically, the Chilean state continues to rely on women‘s volunteer work 
in its efforts to reduce poverty rates.  For example, Schild (2002) documents a case where 
even the National Service for Women (SERNAM) – a supposedly progressive state 
agency set up by the state to protect and advance women‘s rights – relied on the services 
of a group of primarily female experts who were not salaried.  This trend of the ‗new 
social policy‘ reliance on women‘s unpaid or underpaid labor is prominent throughout 
much of the Chilean non-profit sector.  
What further exacerbates this situation is the traditional division of labor within 
Chilean homes.  Despite their growing levels of economic activity outside of home, 
Chilean women are to date the ones primarily responsible for the vast majority of 
housework and childcare.  Survey data provide ample evidence of this situation.  In 2007, 
Knud Knudsen and Kari Wærness (2008) tallied hours of housework performed by 
women and men in 34 countries. The survey was done under the auspices of The 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP), and around 18 000 couples from the age of 
25 to 65 answered questions on how much time they spent weekly on cooking, washing, 
tidying up, shopping and care.  The researchers have found that out of the 34 countries 
studied, the women who perform most housework of all are the ones in Chile.  Chilean 
women reported spending 38 hours each week on housework.  Furthermore, the research 
reveals that the greatest difference between men and women is also found in Chile where 
women spend about 28 more hours on housework than men do. 
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Chilean women not only disproportionately compensate for the limitations of the 
social welfare system, but in some instances, they are also negatively affected by the 
policies themselves.  For example, Chile has a private pension system often used as a 
showcase of good practice by international organizations.  What is less known, however, 
is the fact that throughout the 1990‘s, close to one half of the Chilean population did not 
pay contributions to the system.  Women represent the majority of these who cannot 
contribute.  Feminist critics argue that the system discriminates against women (Arenas 
de Mesa and Montecinos 1999).   For example, Leiva (2005b) claims that gender 
discrimination on the labor market is transferred to the pension system.  In comparison to 
their male counterparts, Chilean women receive lower wages, work in more insecure jobs 
and have lower density of contributions.  As a result of these factors and because their 
life expectancy is about six years higher than that of men, women‘s pensions end up 
being significantly lower.  
Overall, the social policy strategy employed by the Chilean government has had 
important consequences for Chilean women.  While women do disproportionately benefit 
from some of the social programs implemented by the state agencies, they are also the 
ones who bear some of the negative effects of the ‗new social policy paradigm‘ when 
they pick up where the state left off --  both in the home and through their volunteer work 
outside of the private sphere.   As Arenas de Mesa and Montecinos (1999) note, ―… 
perhaps unintentionally, the Chilean reform has hurt women‘s interests by ignoring the 
fact that men‘s and women‘s lives follow different cultural and institutional patterns‖ (1).   
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Fragmentation of the Women’s Movement 
On March 8, 1989, some 20,000 women came to the Santa Laura Stadium to 
celebrate the return to democracy (Rios Tobar 2003a).  But while Chilean women and the 
women‘s movement played an important role in ―ending fear‖ and bringing the Chilean 
authoritarian regime down, it is ironic that they did not take advantage of the political 
opening after 1989.  In fact, women began to disappear from the public realm soon after 
the country shifted towards democracy.  Still in 1998,  some 5,000 women gathered 
under the slogan ―Democracy is in debt to women‖ but after that, the Chilean women‘s 
movement entered into another phase of what some call ‗feminist silence‘ (see Rios 
Tobar 2003a; Rios Tobar, Godoy Catalan, Guerrero Caviedes 2003; Blofield 2006).   
This situation is even more puzzling given the new government‘s emphasis on the 
importance of civil society, social capital and civic participation (Leiva 2005a).  
The decline in women‘s activism was less a sign of women‘s satisfaction than of the 
movement fragmentation.  Some have argued that the new democratic regimes in Chile 
and Latin America in general are not conducive to the emergence of social movements 
and women‘s movements in particular (see, for example, Rios-Tobar 2003a).  However, 
others have documented that the environment did not prevent other types of movements 
from emerging.  For example, Deborah Yashar (2005) has found ―a burst of widespread 
protest among indigenous peoples in the region‖ (5).  Therefore, the lack of women‘s 
activism in post-dictatorial Chile remains a puzzle. 
The formerly unified women‘s movement in Chile has lost its cohesion.  In a 
personal interview, referring to a book she co-edited (2003b), Marcela Rios Tobar 
documents this when she says, ―The question in our book was, ‗why the movement 
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disappeared but the number of women‘s organizations went up‘‖.  According to Elena 
Valenzuela (1998), ―The women‘s movement, which had developed outside the party 
system, lacked sufficient internal cohesion to confront the system, to bring a substantial 
number of women into leadership positions, or to press its demands on government 
agencies, including the newly established women‘s ministry, Servicio National de la 
Mujer (SERNAM)‖ (48) 
 This fragmentation took place over a number of topics.  In their comparison of 
grassroots women in Brazil and Chile, Carol Ann Drogus and Hannah Stewart-Gambino 
(2005) describe the importance of the class divide for post-dictatorial Chilean women‘s 
movement.  They argue that while popular and middle-class women recognized the 
benefits of working together while resisting the military regime, by mid-1980‘s ―middle-
class and professional women‘s organizations split into several tendencies that distanced 
them from popular women‘s groups.‖ (Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005, 174).  
Similarly, Blofield (2006) and Pribble (2006) document how the country‘s continuing 
high level of income inequality has become an important source of division and dissent 
within the women's movement. 
Organizations such as Casa de la Mujer La Morada that was formerly associated 
with political parties gained a strong radical, feminist identity.  By late 1980‘s, academic 
and professional women associated with the political center organized in the 
Concertacion de Mujeres por la Democracia that eventually led to the creation of 
SERNAM.  In contrast, popular women (pobladoras) felt their interests were betrayed by 
these middle-class groups, and they have continued to work toward community and 
individual survival on their own (Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005, 174).  Furthermore, 
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strong rifts have grown between groups of poor women as well.  While some began to 
organize around a feminist agenda through the Movimiento de Mujeres Pobladoras, 
others have continued to address class and human rights issues. The return of exiled 
women and former activists has served another divisive force.  In a personal interview, 
Carmen Torres of Fundación Instituto de la Mujer de Chile explains, ―Feminism was first 
seen as something foreign.  Everyone was critical of women who brought feminism into 
the country. Women who were in exile were told they had no right to preach.‖   
Another discussion, already mentioned here, focused on the question of whether 
women should be working within or outside of the formal political system to achieve 
their goals.  Some of the women‘s activists got co-opted by the state and moved into 
SERNAM or other agencies to continue their work from within.  A number of women‘s 
groups remain active around a variety of issues, but they rarely come together to press the 
state to respond to their demands.   
 
Conclusion 
To this date, Chilean women continue to face important gender inequalities and 
discrimination at home, in the workplace and also in the public life of the country.  One 
would expect that women would utilize the large number of women‘s groups and 
organizations as well as the political opening associated with elite realignment and the 
new democratic regime to mobilize around their grievances.  Surprisingly, that has not 
been the case.  
Upon return to democracy, the first newly democratically elected Chilean 
government continued to (at least formally) support women and their demands.  It 
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established the National Service for Women (SERNAM) and ratified a number of 
national and international treaties and documents relevant to women‘s rights. It also 
furthered its commitment to the United Nation‘s Convention on Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  At the same time, however, SERNAM 
relationship to women‘s groups has remained problematic, and the traditionalist ideology 
of Pinochet‘s regime continued to creep into democratic politics through the Constitution 
of the 1980 and through other policies and bureaucratic rules.  The democratic forces 
agreed to respect the Constitution introduced by the government of Augusto Pinochet.  
This established, for example, the existence of eight institutional senators appointed for 
life by Augusto Pinochet (called designados).  Their presence then increased the power of 
socially conservative forces in the Chilean Senate, making gender reforms very difficult 
(Londregan 2000).  In other words, the Chilean democratization process has been 
constrained by ―the constitutional, legal, and institutional framework left in place by the 
outgoing regime‖ (Schild 2002, 174).  The Catholic Church also continues to have a 
disproportionate effect on policy-making in the country.  As a result, Maria Elena 
Valenzuela (1998) argues, ―The political dynamics of the democratic transition in Chile 
encouraged the resurgence of an elitist, male-oriented establishment.‖ (47-48)    
Therefore, although Chilean women continue to be affected by what Mala Htun 
once referred to as a ―puzzling combination of economic modernization and social 
conservatism‖ (Htun 2003, 3), the Chilean democratic governments have continued to 
show significant levels of commitment to the advancement of women‘s rights.  Even 
though SERNAM‘s relationship to women‘s groups has remained problematic and the 
traditionalist ideology of Pinochet‘s regime continued to creep into democratic politics 
 
163 
 
through the Constitution of the 1980 and through other policies and bureaucratic rules, 
the state‘s position toward women‘s issues has gradually loosened up.  Over time, as 
female labor force participation of Chilean women increased and women faced less state-
created obstacles in reconciling their traditional and public roles, the Chilean women‘s 
movement slowly disintegrated. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
Both in Chile and in the Czech Republic, women‘s movements have been 
intimately linked with the changing nature of the two states and their policies.  However, 
the effects of the past regimes and policies have not been straightforward.  The Chilean 
traditionalist gender policies aimed to exclude women from political life, and they often 
eliminated the prior accomplishments of the Chilean women‘s movement.  In contrast, 
the Czechoslovak communist state used its policies to include women in the job market, 
raise female educational levels, include women into formal politics and enable them to be 
both mothers and workers.  While women continued to experience a number of growing 
gender inequalities in both countries during and after the fall of the authoritarian regimes, 
Chilean women mobilized on the basis of their gender identity to demand a variety of 
rights and protest the regime while Czech women never mobilized into a mass women‘s 
social movement.  At the same, the Chilean women‘s movement died out soon after the 
political transformation.  
What my research seems to suggest is that in the context of authoritarianism and 
post-authoritarianism, the policy context within which social movements operate is an 
important factor in shaping what social movements can do.  Namely, when grievances are 
present, such as accusations of gender inequality, women are more likely to mobilize in 
protest in situations when the state uses public policy to define women‘s role narrowly in 
terms of traditional division of labor. In contrast, if public policies are enabling women to 
reconcile their maternal and public roles, women are less like to organize on the basis of 
their gender identity to protest the state.  
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As this dissertation documents, the Czechoslovak totalitarian state introduced a 
number of policies that Western women continue to unsuccessfully demand from their 
own governments.  These included generous maternity benefits, access to affordable 
childcare and safe working conditions for female workers.  These changes in their 
educational and employment status represented important gains for Czech women.  
Despite the ongoing gender segregation of the labor market, gender pay gap and varying 
access to and quality of the new social benefits, Czech women felt empowered to 
reconcile their work and family lives.   
This notion was further reinforced by the growing importance that family life 
played in the lives of Czechoslovak citizens.  While the country experienced a general 
liberalization in the 1960‘s, the state continued to restrict many aspects of public life: the 
borders were still closed to travel, media and literature were censored, independent civic 
participation was outlawed and all aspects of the political and cultural life of the country 
were under strong state supervision.  Elections and political posts existed only formally 
and offered little self-actualization as the country continued to be run solely by the 
communist apparatus.
77
  By introducing an official scale according to which workers 
were rewarded, the state also took away motivation and incentives for self-realization at 
work. In this context, and without the possibility to travel abroad, the private sphere of 
the family was becoming increasingly important as it began to represent the only ―safe‖ 
environment where opinions could be freely expressed and individuals could find self-
fulfillment.   
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 In a public opinion poll conducted at the end of the communist regime, 74% of respondents agreed with a 
statement that civic organizations have no power, and that the communist party decides everything 
anyways‖ (Forst et al. 1989). 
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Through the introduction of a variety of ‗emancipatory policies‘ and implicit 
emphasis on women‘s traditional role within the private sphere, the state was sending 
conflicting messages to women in regards to their role in the society.  This situation was 
further exacerbated by the introduction of the pro-natalist policies that reinforced 
women‘s roles as those of mothers and housekeepers.  Because of these mixed messages 
regarding women‘s position within the public and private spheres, women could not 
identify a clear ideological stance they could use to enter the public sphere.   
Finally, two generations of Czech women grew up in a context where any 
mention of women‘s equality and emancipation was associated with the policies and 
rhetoric of the communist state. More specifically, using a twisted Marxist-Leninist 
argument, the communist state propaganda had been brainwashing women for decades 
making them believe that they have been made equal to men simply by adding eight-hour 
shifts to what were seen as their duties within the family life. The women‘s movement 
has also been discredited when the state appropriated all independent organizing under 
the umbrella of the state-controlled Czechoslovak Union of Women (CUW), and the 
organization further damaged its reputation when it sided with the totalitarian 
government upon its brutal repression of the student demonstration in November 1989. 
As a result, Czech women have over time come to associate emancipation and women‘s 
rights with the totalitarian political regime (Heitlinger 1996; Wolchik & Jaquette 1998). 
When by the 1980‘s the communist regime was fully discredited and ridiculed by 
Czechoslovak citizens, there was little public enthusiasm among women to organize 
around an ideology associated with the totalitarian government and its policies.
78
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 By the 1980‘s, public opinion polls documented that citizens blamed the regime for worsening living 
standards, worsening environmental pollution, problems in healthcare, long-term existence of failing 
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Upon the fall of communism in 1989, there was an overwhelming enthusiasm for 
a capitalist economy and right-wing parties in the Czech lands – the traditional targets of 
criticism from women‘s movements in countries that did not undergo a long period of 
state socialism.  Women also began to experience open gender discrimination on the 
labor market (partially resulting from the remaining protectionist policies of the 
communist state).  While the state emphasis on individualism and free market 
participation has been in direct contrast to some of the traditionalist assumptions 
presented in much of the social legislation, Czech women continue to balance their 
maternal and public roles.  
Furthermore, despite the new programs and policies emphasizing gender equality 
that have been ratified as a consequence of the Czech Republic‘s accession to the 
European Union, Czech women still find it difficult to find a common language that 
would allow them to organize on the basis of their gender identity.  By using the rhetoric 
of Marxism and equality, the communist state ―stole‖ the most likely frame for the 
articulation of gender inequalities. The concepts of equality and women‘s rights could not 
resonate with women or the mass public in these countries because these were terms and 
notions earlier used (and abused) by the communist states.   This situation continues to be 
further exacerbated by the public lack of information about the feminist developments 
other countries and by the intense misinterpretation of women‘s movements and demands 
by public media.  
 Unlike the Czech totalitarian regime, the Chilean military dictatorship used public 
policy to define women‘s role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
economy and other (Forst et al. 1989).  In a 1988 opinion poll conducted by UVVM, over 90% of 
Czechoslovak citizens suggested a need for further democratization of the Czechoslovak society (Misovic a 
kol 1988).   
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combination of the traditionalist gender ideology and of the neoliberal economic reforms 
led to a situation where women were sent a clear message that they were not welcome in 
the public sphere.  In a very paradoxical way, these were the very same measures that 
also created political space for women to return to the public arena.  Framing their issues 
in terms of their roles of good mothers and wives, women responded to the economic and 
human rights crises by engaging the state through its own rhetoric and policies.  Similar 
frames remained unavailable to Chilean men.   
 Avoiding ‗Western feminism‘, Chilean women subsequently framed their issues 
in Marxist terms.  Again, through its repressive measures against the labor unions and 
other traditionally leftists groups, the Chilean military dictatorship left this particular 
frame available for women to utilize.  Furthermore, as a result of these processes and 
women‘s demands, the commitment to equality helped differentiate the new democracy 
from the old authoritarian political model.  In Latin America, women‘s issues then 
became ―congruent with and symbolic of a larger political transformation‖ (Jaquette and 
Wolchik 1998, 8).  
 Upon return to democracy, the first democratically elected government continued 
to (at least formally) support women and their demands.  It established the National 
Service for Women (SERNAM) and ratified a number of national and international 
treaties and documents including the United Nation‘s Convention on Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.  While SERNAM‘s relationship to women‘s 
groups has remained problematic and the traditionalist ideology of Pinochet‘s regime 
continued to creep into democratic politics through the Constitution of the 1980 and 
through other policies and bureaucratic rules, the state‘s position toward women‘s issues 
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gradually loosened up.  Over time, as female labor force participation of Chilean women 
increased and women faced less state-created obstacles in reconciling their traditional and 
public roles, the Chilean women‘s movement slowly disintegrated. 
 In sum, women in both Chile and the Czech Republic experienced and continue to 
experience important gender inequalities in the private as well as in the public sphere.  
Despite the state repression of civil society under the authoritarian regimes, women in 
both countries had the opportunity to draw on an extensive set of family, friendship and 
organizational networks.  Chilean women mobilized on the basis of their gender identity, 
but Czech women did not.  In the late 1980‘s, a political opportunity to organize 
presented itself as a result of the political transformations in both nations.  And yet, 
Czech women did not use this opportunity at all while the Chilean movement 
disintegrated soon after the transformation took place.  Why? 
What the developments in these two countries (and regions more generally) seem 
to suggest is that the political context within which social movements form and operate is 
key for understanding these mobilization processes.  Rather than focusing solely on the 
presence or absence of political opportunities, as much of the existing research devoted to 
social movement emergence has done, I have found that focusing on specific policies is 
more useful for explaining women‘s mobilization patterns.  This is congruent with the 
findings of the policy feedback strand of research in American Politics.  Namely, it 
confirms Pierson‘s (1993) findings that policies affect citizens by providing individuals 
with specific resources and incentives (such as education) and by conveying certain 
meanings about citizens‘ status within the system.
79
 In the case of women‘s movements 
in Chile and the Czech Republic, state policies provided with women with varying 
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resources and meanings.  Women received resources in the form of maternity leaves, 
allowances, birth grants, subsidized childcare and employment protection policies. The 
states also conveyed a variety of meanings ranging from assigning women strictly 
traditional roles to enabling them to combine their maternal and public roles. 
Overall, this dissertation suggests that in the case of authoritarian and post-authoritarian 
regimes, women are more likely to mobilize in protest in situations when the state uses 
public policy to define women‘s role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor. In 
contrast, if public policies are enabling women to reconcile their maternal and public 
roles, women are less like to organize on the basis of their gender identity to protest the 
state.  
This occurs on both the individual and group level.  In-depth interviews with 
Czech women reveal that if the state provides policy support to women to reconcile their 
traditional and public roles, women become less conscious of the state‘s role in their 
lives.  They tend to view the state as a diffuse set of actors and ideas that do not create a 
coherent whole.  In contrast, if state policies provide little support for women‘s 
participation in the public sphere, individuals find it much easier to articulate who the 
state is and how it affects their lives.  Furthermore, public policy also affect movements 
on the group level – complex policies supporting both women‘s traditional and public 
roles are likely to create multiple camps within a formerly unified movement and lead to 
movement fragmentation and demise.  In contrast, policies emphasizing women‘s 
traditional roles only make it easy for movement leaders and actors to identify key issues 
and subsequently organize for collective action.   However, given the role that good 
leadership, available resources and even historical context play in the formation of social 
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movements, it is clear that traditionalist state policy is a necessary, not a sufficient, 
condition for the development of a cohesive women‘s movement.  
The theoretical framework presented in this dissertation deserves comparison 
across other cases.  Given the findings of this study, one would expect to find women‘s 
movements only in environments where the state uses public policy to define women‘s 
role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor.  To confirm the credibility of the 
findings presented in this dissertation would require a detailed knowledge of not only 
women‘s activism in particular countries, but also of a wide range of state policies and 
policy implementation.   In the vast majority of Latin American and Eastern European 
cases, these complete data are not readily available.  To test the findings of my study, I 
relied on the few existing empirically rich examples of secondary literature.   
Specifically, Russia presents an interesting case because during the democratic transition, 
women came the closest of all women in the Eastern European region to forming a 
women‘s movement.  Therefore, in comparison to the Czech case, one would expect to 
find some differences in state policy resulting in an increased activism of women.    
 While Russian women have never formed a broad based mass social movement, 
they have established several hundred women‘s groups and organized these into multiple 
large networks.  They have also engaged the state on a variety of topics with sometimes 
successful results.  In Russia, women‘s groups began forming in the 1980‘s as a result of 
Gorbachev‘s policies of glasnost and perestroika.  The move away from state repression 
presented a political opportunity for women to organize.   The first feminist groups and 
organizations were concentrated in the cities of Moscow and St. Petersbourg.  
Subsequently, more self-help type organizations were formed in response to economic 
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crisis and reductions in social programs in the mid-1990‘s.  By 1994, there were some 
300 women‘s organizations formally registered with the Russian Ministry of Justice and 
the number rose to 600 by the year 2000 (Women 2000; Sperling 1999, 18).  By 1995, 
these groups formed four distinct networks: the Independent Women‘s Forum, Women‘s 
League, Union of Russia‘s Women and the US-NIS Consortium.   
 Russian women‘s groups were addressing a wide range of existing grievances 
including domestic violence, discrimination of women in the labor market, and the lack 
of women in formal politics among others.  This rise in women‘s activism was taking 
place in a context of democratic transition and economic transformation.  Most notably, 
as a result of these changes, Russian women (in comparison to Russian men) were being 
disproportionately affected by rising unemployment.  According to the Russian State 
Statistics Committee, by 1994 women represented approximately two-thirds of the 
registered unemployed (Sperling 1999, 43).  Aside from widespread discrimination in 
politics and at work, women were finding it also more and more difficult to combine 
professional and family roles (Women 2000 2000, 374), partially as a result of the newly 
democratic state dismantling a system of state subsidized childcare facilities provided 
under communism.     
 The rise in women‘s activism was taking place in a policy context dominated by 
traditionalist rhetoric of the state.  While sexism has always been prevalent in the Russian 
society, the transition to democracy and the introduction of the market economy made it 
more visible. The Russian state rhetoric and policy was communicating to women that 
their place was primarily in the private sphere.  Valerie Sperling (1999) cites the chair of 
the Union of Russia‘s Women as she described the effects of newly introduced market 
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economy on women: ―They are crowding us into the house, into the kitchen, to our 
‗natural‘ destiny‖ (56).  A quote by the 1993 Labor Minister Gennadii Melikian proves 
this point when he states, ―There is no point in creating jobs for women, when there 
aren‘t enough jobs for men‖ (Sperling 1999, 57).   The implied assumption was that 
Russian women‘s place was in the home. Raising children and taking care of the family 
were also clearly represented in the rhetoric of new institutional mechanisms targeting 
women and families.  In 1990, a Committee on the Affairs of Women and the Protection 
of the Family, Motherhood, and Childhood was created within the Russian Supreme 
Soviet.  This was followed by the establishment of The Committee on Family and 
Demographic Policy (Women 2000 2000).  These institutional mechanisms remained in 
place upon the dissolution of USSR.  From the beginning, the work of these committees 
was accompanied by controversy and clashes with the forming Russian women‘s 
movement.  Most notably, in 1992, a Supreme Soviet committee was asked to draft a 
family law code.  The bill entitled ―Protection of the Family, Motherhood, Fatherhood, 
and Childhood‖ united Russian women‘s groups and networks when it proposed to make 
the family (and not the individual) the sole subject of rights (Sperling 1999, 114).  The 
bill drew vast criticism from the women‘s movement because it was seen as infringing on 
woman‘s reproductive rights.  According to Sperling, the law also made it mandatory for 
women with children under the age of 14 to work a shortened 35-hour workweek, de 
facto reducing women‘s income.  The women‘s movement‘s powerful response led to the 
failure of the second reading of the proposed bill.  The women‘s groups also rallied 
around the new labor code proposal in 1994.  Russian women‘s groups were particularly 
critical of a number of openly discriminatory articles that they viewed as reinforcing 
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existing gender stereotypes and traditional family roles.  For example, one of the articles 
listed occupations that women were by law forbidden from obtaining.  
While the state rhetoric surrounding women‘s issues was to a great extent unified 
in supporting women‘s traditional roles, women‘s groups in Russia did find allies in some 
state institutions.  Most notably, the Minister of Social Protection Liudmila Beslepkina 
was publicly pointing out the worsening position of women in the labor market, and she 
and her staff cooperated with women‘s groups to improve the status of women.  Russian 
women also found an ally in Ekaterina Lakhova, the head of the Presidential Commission 
on Issues of Women, the Family, and Demography, as well as in President Yeltsin 
himself (Sperling 1999).  But even these alliances and relationships proved to be 
problematic as the allies and institutional mechanisms were constantly changing.  In this 
environment, women‘s groups found themselves excluded from some of the discussions 
accompanying the preparation for the Beijing Conference and they lost their ally in 
Beslepkina when she was removed from office in 1996.  Furthermore, the President‘s 
message regarding women‘s rights was questioned on a number of occasions when the 
actual implementation of the pro-women‘s decrees he introduced was lacking.   
The Russian case then presents a story of a fragmented women‘s movement that 
came together on several short lived occasions to protest a set of openly traditionalist and 
discriminatory policies.  During much of the 1990‘s, however, Russian women‘s groups 
were receiving contradictory messages from different state institutions.  In fact, Valerie 
Sperling (1999) describes instances where, for example, the representatives of the 
Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Social Protection presented a dramatically different 
vision for women‘s position in the society as they took turns on the podium during the 
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same event.   In light of the findings presented in this dissertation, it may not be 
surprising that Russian women found it difficult to identify a common frame that would 
resonate with the mass public and consequently assist them in forming a more unified, 
mass movement.  
The four cases presented in this dissertation – Chile under military regime, Chile 
under democracy, Czechoslovakia under totalitarianism and Czech Republic under 
democracy – point to the importance of state policy in the formation of women‘s 
movements.  It is without a doubt that such a small number of cases cannot confirm the 
plausibility of the framework outlined here.  Hopefully, future empirical studies covering 
a greater variety of cases will provide further information in regards to the possible 
generalization of these findings and suggestions. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A 
Interview questions: policy makers, activists, experts 
 
1. Policy-makers 
 
1.1. Experience  
 
How long and in what position have you worked at the Ministry (of Labor and Social 
Affairs)?  
 
Are you still active in the policy-making process? In what way? 
 
1.2.  Women‘s Policies and policies disproportionately affecting women 
 
Did the communist state introduce any policies that only targeted women? 
- What were they?  
- What was the goal of these policies (officially and unofficially)? 
 
In your view, did the communist state introduce policies that were not targeting women 
specifically, but which over time affected women more then men?  
- What were they? 
- What were their goals? 
- In what way did they affect women more than men?  
 
How have these various policies changed over time? 
 
1.3. Policy-making process in authoritarian setting 
 
How were policies made during communism?  
- Where did the ideas for the new policies come from? 
- How were they selected? 
- Who had the main decision making power (formally)? What about informally?  
- Who were the different public actors who had some input into this process? 
 
I understand that research and public opinion polls were conducted at that time.  
-  Do you remember who conducted polls/research regarding the policies you 
mentioned earlier? 
- In the case of policies targeting specific social groups (e.g. women, Roma etc.), 
did the group‘s opinions or the public‘s as a whole was taken into account? 
- Were the outputs of these polls/research taken into consideration when policies 
were made? If yes, in what way? 
- Can the research outputs still be found somewhere? Do you know where? 
 
Who was in charge of implementing these various policies?  
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- How much power did local communist parties/national unions/social workers 
have in delivering these policies? 
- Were there typically any subsequent studies conducted that looked at citizens‘ 
satisfaction with these policies once they were implemented? 
 
 
1.4. Post-1989 
 
Questions in this section will relate back to the particular policies the respondents 
mentioned in the first part of the interview, and the questions will differ depending on 
whether the respondent is still active in the policy making process or not… But here are 
some preliminary topics… 
 
How have the policies we have just talked about changed after 1989? In your opinion, 
how have the changes affected the public? How have they affected specific social groups, 
in your opinion? How has the government been responding to the new grievances of 
different social groups? 
 
The policy-making process has formally changed in a number of ways since the political 
overturn. What changes have you experienced in the everyday work of the Ministry? 
How have they affected how policies are selected, made and implemented ? 
 
1.5.  Other 
 
Can you recommend other administrators, researchers or experts I should contact about 
this topic? 
 
Is there anything you would like to add? 
 
 
2. Academics/Researchers 
 
2.1.  Experience  
 
How long and in what position have you worked at (research institution)?  
 
To what extent has you work concerned women‘s activism and/or social and employment 
policies before and after 1989? 
 
2.2. Women‘s policies and policies disproportionately affecting women 
 
As a researcher, do you find that the communist state introduced policies that only 
targeted women?  Which ones?  
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In your view, did the communist state introduce policies that were not targeting women 
specifically, but which over time affected women more/differently than men? Which 
ones? In what way did they affect women more/differently than men?  
 
How have these various policies changed over time? 
 
What impact have these policies had on:  
- the lives of individual women 
- women‘s status generally 
- family life in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic 
- society as a whole? 
 
Are you aware of important research and/or public opinion polls regarding these policies 
conducted during communism? Do you know where they can be found now? 
 
2.3.  Women‘s Activism 
 
Who, in your opinion, were the main actors in the development of women‘s activism 
after 1989 in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic? 
 
In your view, was the general (legal, cultural, political, economic) environment 
conducive to (1) activism as a whole and (2) women‘s activism in particular? What where 
the main obstacles these activists have faced in their work?  
 
What changes has women‘s activism in the CR undergone over time? How has the 
environment in which activists operate changed? 
 
2.4.  Other 
 
Can you recommend other administrators, researchers or activists I should contact about 
this topic? 
 
Is there anything you would like to add? 
 
3. Activists (women’s groups) 
 
3.1.  Experience  
 
How long and in what position have you taken part in the Czechoslovak/Czech women‘s 
movement?  
 
Are you still active in the movement? In what ways? 
 
3.2.  Actors and topics in Czech(oslovak) women‘s activism 
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Who, in your opinion, were the main actors in the development of the Czech(oslovak) 
women‘s movement after 1989? How many of these are still active? 
 
What topics were emphasized by women‘s activists after 1989? 
 
3.3.  Environment 
 
After 1989, how was the general (legal, cultural, political, economic) environment 
conducive to  
- activism as a whole 
- women‘s activism in particular?  
 
Some say that Czech and Eastern European feminism in general have been very weak. 
Do you agree with this statement? If yes, why? What do you think is the source of this 
weakness? If no, why not? 
 
What where the main obstacles you/activists have faced in their/your work?  
 
How has women‘s activism been accepted by Czech(oslovak) public? Were any topics 
more acceptable to the public than others? Which ones were they? 
 
Has any of this ever affected the topics you pursued in your work? 
 
Has any of this ever affected the ways in which you presented the problems/themes to the 
media, government officials or the public? 
 
3.4.  International Feminism 
 
What role, if any, did international feminism play in the work of your organization(s)?  
 
If you wished to, would you have had access to sources and outputs of international 
feminism? 
 
3.5.  Development over time 
 
What changes has women‘s activism in the CR undergone over time?  
 
How has the environment in which activists operate changed? In what ways? 
 
Have the public perceptions toward women‘s activism changed over time? 
 
3.6.  Other 
 
Can you recommend other researchers or activists I should contact about this topic? 
 
Is there anything you would like to add? 
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